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 This dissertation traces a politically contentious practice from its emergence in southern 
China in 2010, through its repression and appropriation by the state in 2015. In asking why social 
movements occur and why they do or don’t succeed, social-movement literature must contend 
with movement failure and how entrenched political structures can thwart efforts for reform. By 
studying the rise and fall of collective bargaining, which was introduced to workers by labor 
NGOs as a contentious political practice, and situating findings within a social-movement 
framework, this study bridges studies on regime resilience and social movements.  
 Contentious collective bargaining found acceptance among workers due to ambiguous 
political opportunities that dovetailed with labor NGOs efforts to promote the practice. Similarly, 
collective bargaining’s demise was brought on through contradictions in the state-built 
organizational structures, rather than repressive forces alone. Indeed, local state actors did not 
immediately move to stamp out workers’ attempts to use collective bargaining. At one point, 
they even actively encouraged workers to use it to resolve their disputes. Eventually, they would 
appropriate the practice for themselves while quashing the activists and NGOs who had 
originally promoted it. But the state’s support of collective bargaining depended on the extent to 
which it could be used to minimize workers’ disruptive activity and maintain legal boundaries. 
While labor NGOs had hoped collective bargaining could be used to expand workers’ rights, 
contradictions within the state-built organizational infrastructure were able to neuter the practice 
and maintain structures of power.   
 The data for this study is primarily built from the analysis of six different labor disputes 
that unfolded from 2011 to 2014. The overarching analytic approach of this study follows 
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McMichael’s (1990) incorporated comparison strategy, which emphasizes the relational aspect 
of different cases and allows a systemic whole to be constructed through comparison of related 
cases. The chapters here focus on presenting a narrative of these labor disputes in order to 
provide  multiple snapshots of a different moments in collective bargaining’s life course, and 
construct a more holistic picture of its trajectory in China. While each chapter engages a distinct 
line of inquiry, the cases throughout these chapters are connected to each other across time and 
space. 
  This dissertation contributes to social-movement theories by detailing the institutional 
mechanisms that fortify regime resilience, allowing this literature to better understand movement 
failure. The rise and fall of collective bargaining shows how authoritarian political structures are 
complex, capable of learning, adapting, and retooling the threats that come their way; and how 
groups and organizations successfully—and unsuccessfully— navigate these fragile spaces to 



















 Starting in 2010, Chinese labor activists, most of whom were in Guangdong Province, 
began promoting collective bargaining among workers. From 2011 to 2013, collective 
bargaining appeared to be on the rise in Guangdong, with grassroots promotion from labor 
NGOs and occasional support from local authorities in facilitating the process. In at least one 
case, workers were able to garner state support to use collective bargaining to claim interests that 
actually exceeded their legal rights. However, collective bargaining’s success as a potent 
repertoire for contention would not last long. In 2014, the state was already maneuvering to 
restrict the use of collective bargaining among workers, and by 2015, as state authorities moved 
to cripple the network of labor NGOs that advocated the practice, the grassroots proponents of 
collective bargaining were in retreat.  
 Although the implementation of collective bargaining for the first set of workers was 
riddled with difficulties, these workers ultimately did find recourse for their grievance. Bolstered 
by this success, labor NGOs continued to promote collective bargaining among workers, who 
then used it successfully in other cases. The activists and workers who were involved in these 
successful cases claimed that it was workers’ solidarity, along with the assistance of labor NGOs, 
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that enabled their wins. However, a closer analysis of these cases reveals that the implementation 
of collective bargaining depended on the intervention and support of local authorities. While 
worker agitation played its part, the essential element was the support of local authorities; 
without it, management would never have agreed to meet workers at the bargaining table.  
 The three chapters of this dissertation focus on the origins, implementation, and decline 
of collective bargaining as a repertoire of contention for low-wage manufacturing workers in 
China. Chapter 1 asks how labor activists were able to promote collective bargaining, given that 
workers were unfamiliar with the concept, had little institutional support for its pursuit, and 
lacked any real evidence of collective bargaining’s efficacy.  Chapter 2 asks why local 
authorities occasionally supported workers and compelled companies to engage in collective 
bargaining and what conditions prompted them to do so. Chapter 3 asks why collective 
bargaining failed to become an effective, labor-driven repertoire of contention among workers. 
Each of these chapters tackles a fairly distinct line of inquiry outlined here. Thus, in order 
provide greater organizational clarity, this dissertation follows a similar presentation to a three 
paper model. Altogether, these three chapters trace the rise and fall of collective bargaining as a 
means to expand labor rights in contemporary China.  
 The case of worker-led collective bargaining provides a lens through which to study the 
fractures of political opportunity in authoritarian regimes in order to understand the conditions 
under which contentious collective action is possible. My dissertation shows how groups and 
organizations navigate these fragile spaces—whether successfully or unsuccessfully—through 




The Setting: A Brief on China’s Political Economy, Migrant Workers, and the Law 
 China’s political, economic, and legal contexts form the backdrop for the story of 
collective bargaining’s rise and fall. The cases detailed in the following chapters took shape 
within a multi-tiered government structure marked by competing interests at different levels. 
Also, the economic environment, specifically slowing production and declining demand, affected 
all the companies discussed in this study. Because many workers at these companies were 
migrant laborers, they are in a structurally disadvantaged position compared to local residents, 
and have been hit particularly hard by the economic downturn. Contentious action bringing the 
assistance of the state was one of the few effective means for migrant workers to ameliorate the 
economic insecurity they faced. But, because a high prevalence of strike incidents reflects poorly 
on the political performance of local officials tasked with maintaining social stability, local 
officials seek to limit workers’ insurgencies. While China’s legal system exists and was meant to 
give workers an institutionalized channel to resolve their disputes, the courts and labor laws have 
fallen short in providing broad-based, substantive recourse to workers. Collective bargaining 
came to the fore in this particular moment in China’s contemporary history, when local officials 
and labor NGOs alike were in search of a solution for the quandary of workers’ discontent and 
rising insurgency created by China’s political economy and social structures. This section 
provides a brief overview of this political, economic, and social setting.    
 The multi-tiered state apparatus governing China is arranged in a regional hierarchy, with 
the Central government, located in Beijing, occupying the highest seat of authority, and 
subsequent levels of government pegged at the provincial, municipal, city, county, and township 
levels. While the central government constructs broad frameworks and national laws for 
governance, it is local authorities and local governments — which refer to provincial down to 
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township level officials— that are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of 
regulations (van Rooij, 2012). But local authorities have their own economic and political 
agendas, which sometimes do not align well with the central government’s policy dictates 
(Whiting, 2000). Local authorities’ pursuit of their own interests and goals can sometimes result 
in a de-coupling of the central policies and local action (Lawrence & Martin, 2013). Workers’ 
social security is a germane example. The central government has positioned itself as pro-labor 
and requires companies and local governments to pay into social security funds for workers. 
However, rather than manage these accounts for future repayment to workers, local authorities 
have found it lucrative to siphon these funds into development projects in their own localities in 
order to bring additional revenue to the region and grow their own personal finances (Frazier, 
2010).  
 On the one hand, the gap between central and local authorities in terms of policy 
implementation and enforcement creates an opportunity for challengers to mobilize and use the 
central government’s rhetoric to articulate their own grievances. On the other hand, the central-
local gap bolsters regime resilience as it allows the central government to shift responsibility on 
to local governments.  Aggrieved constituents blame their local government—rather than central 
powers— for their problems while also seeking out local authorities to resolve their grievances 
(O’Brien & Li, 2006; Cai, 2008; Perry, 2008).  
 While the structure of the state forms the political backdrop for this study, China’s 
contemporary economic history is also an important contextual factor for understanding the labor 
disputes discussed throughout this study. Starting in the late eighties, China entered its economic 
reform period, where it moved away from its socialist economic system and toward a freer 
market economy (Naughton, 2007). China’s economic growth from the late eighties up to 2008 
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was regarded as triumphant proof that the Chinese communist party could successfully steer the 
country into a new era of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” (Huang, 2008). The state 
relinquished much of its control over many industries, allowing private and foreign companies to 
participate as independent agents in the market. In Guangdong, three (out of four) special 
economic zones were established, giving tax incentives and special treatments to businesses in 
order to draw capital to the region. Foreign investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the west 
flocked to the province to plant their production and manufacturing facilities there (Ge, 1999; 
Zhang 2013). The plethora production and manufacturing firms in Guangdong has earned the 
province its reputation as the “World’s Factory.” But rather than an absence of the state in the 
market or an invisible hand steering economic development in this province, a more accurate 
description of state and market relations would be a visible and friendly hand of the state 
engineering the economic conditions for the rise of manufacturing and textile industries 
(Gallagher, 2004; Shirk, 1993). And despite the move to privatize industry and commerce across 
the country, state and business spheres in Guangdong—and across China— are still deeply 
enmeshed. Cultivating good relationships with the state remains an important practice for 
companies that would do business in China (Wank, 2002).  
 If political policies created the conditions for China’s economic development, migrant 
workers’ labor constitutes the fuel enabling production on the ground. Indeed, much of 
Guangdong’s (and by extension, China’s) success story rests on the backs of the migrant laborers 
that came to urban centers and special economic zones for work (Chan KW, 2010). Migrant 
workers in search of gainful employment have flooded cities and manufacturing hubs across 
Guangdong province. Under China’s residency, or hukou, system, migrant workers enjoy very 
little in the way of state support for social benefits in the cities where they live and work (Cheng 
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& Selden, 1994; Chan A, 2003) Their access to some of the most important social institutions 
needed for security and social mobility, such as housing and education, is limited or effectively 
barred through prohibitive fees. And because they are often in more economically and socially 
disadvantaged positions, they are more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by the companies 
they work for. Thus, migrant workers in Guangdong— who make up the majority of workers in 
manufacturing hubs like Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Dongguan— are essentially made into 
second-class citizens through an apartheid system that determines access and inclusion on the 
basis of residency (Chan KW, 1996; Lee, 2007b; Liu, 2005).   
 China’s slowing production constitutes the economic backdrop for the workers’ 
grievances and the labor disputes discussed throughout this study. Though migrant workers were 
subject to precarious livelihoods even at the height of China’s economic success, they now face 
even more tenuous working conditions as production has slowed. The global financial crisis of 
2008, as well as the shifting fortunes of industries whose technologies have become obsolete, left 
many companies with reduced production orders, slimmer profit margins, and the need to cut 
costs (Chan KW, 2010; Pomfret, 2008). Workers’ wages and benefits were some of the first on 
the proverbial chopping block. In all the cases discussed throughout this study, declining 
company sales, slowing production, and shrinking profit margins predicated company’s 
decisions to lay-off workers, adjust wage structures, or merge with other companies. This then 
disturbed workers’ (already fragile) sense of security, and gave way to labor disputes wherein 
workers sought to reclaim some economic security, be it through social security, compensation, 
or payouts. But the best method for actually making good on their claims was not a particularly 
straightforward one. Taking legal action, for example, was not always effective or feasible. And 
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strike action carried real economic risk for workers due to lack of legal protections for such 
activities. 
 The legal-political structure as it is relevant to labor and labor relations in China, 
contextualizes much of collective bargaining’s story. The 2008 National Labor Contract Laws 
provided a set of state-sanctioned labor laws requiring companies to sign labor contracts with 
their (primarily migrant) workers, and, in doing so, ensure that companies adhere to minimum 
standards around hours, wages, housing benefits, and social insurance. While some hail these 
national labor laws as an important step forward for workers’ legal rights, others regard these 
laws as a means for the state to shift the responsibility and costs of supporting workers over to 
capital (Gallagher, 2006). Either way, many companies have either neglected to sign contracts 
with workers or do not provide workers with documentation of the work relationship that is 
needed for workers to successfully file suite in courts. More recently, workers are further 
dissatisfied with current legal provisions, contending that the law is not enough— that 
protections and standards for compensation do not provide adequate recourse in cases when 
workers lose their incomes.  
 In sum, then, the state has constructed a residency system that situates migrant workers in 
considerable economic insecurity. Although economic reforms brought an influx of private and 
foreign investments —and thus job opportunities—and raised the standard of living for many in 
China, there are few protections in place to inoculate migrant workers against economic 
downturns or industrial shifts that may negatively impact the companies they work for. In the 
face of slowing production, downsizing and cuts to workers’ salaries in order to keep operations 
afloat are all too common. While this constitutes rational, economistic decision making on the 
part of the companies, it is an affront to workers’ sense of justice and their desire to maintain a 
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secure livelihood for themselves. The 2008 National Labor Contract Laws are meant to give 
some assurances to workers by requiring companies to maintain minimum standards for working 
conditions and arrangements. But its efficacy in doing so has been limited. In conjunction with 
the issues discussed above, enforcement of laws and reforms is left to local authorities, who may 
not consider it in their best interest to hold companies to these laws as this might endanger 
capital’s willingness to continue investments in the localities that authorities oversee (Zheng 
2009).  
 But even if the promulgation of national labor laws has not been a panacea to China’s 
complex of labor ills, at the very least these labor laws lend support to aggrieved workers by 
providing a framework for workers to legitimize their claims against companies during strikes 
(Silver & Zhang, 2009). Strike action can be particularly effective for workers, not because 
workers are able to leverage their power the point of production, but because they are able to 
threaten the central government’s mandate to maintain social stability. Social stability 
maintenance requires that local governments minimize unrest and insurgency, or any such 
precursors to movement activity where challengers might seek to upend the current power 
structure. The central government’s imperative for social stability makes workers’ strikes 
because they affect local authorities’ political scorecards. Just as it is in their interests to attract 
business investments, it is also in local authorities’ interests to minimize “mass incidents” and 
uphold the central government’s command for social stability. Sometimes, the local government 
will step in during a strike and give payouts to workers in order to put such insurgencies to rest. 
Other times, workers find themselves terminated, without recourse, and in an even worse 
position than before. For all parties concerned, strike action is not a particularly desirable method 
for dispute resolution. All together, this has resulted in something of a perfect storm for the rise 
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of collective bargaining as a potential resolution to increased labor insurgency and discontent in 
China. 
 
Collective Bargaining in China 
 The term collective bargaining is a direct translation of Chinese activists’ own 
terminology (jí tǐ tán pàn集体谈判). However, the actual implementation of the practice by 
these activists in Guangdong Province (where it is most strongly advocated) differs from 
collective bargaining as it is seen in Western industrial contexts. Chinese activists’ version of 
collective bargaining also differs from the Chinese state collective negotiations (jí tǐ xié shāng 集
体协商). To provide clearer definitional distinction among Western-industrial collective 
bargaining, Chinese state collective negotiations, and Chinese activists’ collective bargaining, 
the table below compares and contrasts these three different forms in terms of their purpose, the 
actors involved, and the guiding principles. 
 
Table 1: Three Forms of Collective Bargaining and Negotiation 






















Organized workers vs. 
management Labor rights  
 
 In Western industrial settings, collective bargaining is conceptualized as a means for 
unionized workers and employers to set the terms of a collective labor contract. Ideally, 
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collective bargaining can prevent labor disputes by allowing labor and capital to arrive at a 
shared consensus about the conditions of employment. Collective bargaining is also typically 
conducted under the auspices of a labor union that represents worker interests at the bargaining 
table. As I discuss in the first chapter, the Chinese state began promoting collective negotiations 
starting in 2010, and their guides and conceptualization were rough approximations of Western 
versions of collective bargaining. Like the collective bargaining seen in the United States or in 
other late-industrial settings, the Chinese central government’s guide envisioned collective 
negotiations as a means to set a collective contract through discussions between the union and 
business associations.  
 However, there are some important differences. For one, official state guidelines for 
collective negotiations explicitly denounce the use of violent and radical actions. Also, since 
China’s central labor organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), is 
ultimately an agent of the state, it prioritizes the interests of the state over interests of workers, 
even though it may also occasionally lend its support to labor. Thus, discussions between the 
Chinese union and businesses are really conversations between the state and business. Other 
scholars have labeled the state’s vision for collective negotiations more accurately as party-state-
led collective negotiations. These localized forms of bargaining and negotiation have been 
implemented intermittently in recent years in China under the full control of the state-led official 
union—importantly, with little to no input or participation from workers themselves (Chan & 
Hui, 2014; Friedman, 2014).  
 Guangdong activists promote a form of collective bargaining that differs in two respects 
from both Western-industrial bargaining and Chinese party-state-led negotiations. In the activist 
version, collective bargaining is a post hoc solution for dispute resolution and is led not by union 
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representatives but by the workers themselves. Hence, scholars who have studied these labor 
NGOs and their advocacy for collective bargaining have termed the NGO-promoted version 
“worker-led collective bargaining” (Li, 2016). When Chinese activists promote collective 
bargaining to workers, they intend that workers bargain independently of the union on the 
assumption that the union has no real interest in representing workers’ demands or in advocating 
for workers’ needs.  
 When promoting collective bargaining, activists encourage workers to organize 
themselves, to elect their own representatives, to consolidate demands, and to pool financial 
resources. Workers then hold meetings and send written requests to management that outline 
demands, propose meetings, and request a response within a set time. These activities draw 
directly from the procedures of collective bargaining in Western industries. For this reason, 
Chinese activists have designated their own version of the process with the same name. Unlike 
state actors, labor activists neither encourage nor discourage disruptive action. The activists I 
spoke to were careful to tell me that they recommended that workers avoid disruptive activities, 
although this was done primarily out of concern that workers risked detainment when taking to 
the streets and that labor NGOs risked repression if they were known to encourage such 
activities. As we shall see, the extent to which worker-led collective bargaining is truly led by 
workers or is entirely independent of union officials is questionable. A more accurate 
nomenclature for the process as it is implemented on the ground by workers who have partnered 
with labor NGOs might be NGO-promoted, worker-demanded, and state-facilitated collective 
bargaining. 
 Ultimately, it is the ideological underpinnings of Chinese activists’ version of collective 
bargaining that distinguishes it most from the state’s version of collective negotiations. For one, 
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the Chinese term for collective bargaining (jí tǐ tán pàn集体谈判) recognizes a conflictual 
relationship between labor and capital and describes a process in which these two parties are 
fundamentally in a battle over competing interests. In contrast, the Chinese term for collective 
negotiations (jí tǐ xié shāng 集体协商) connotes a less contentious process, one in which the 
underlying relationship between workers and management is harmonious and negotiations are 
discussions aimed at consensus building and mutual benefit. Where the state considers collective 
negotiations as a means to avoid workers’ use of disruptive action, Chinese activists regard 
collective bargaining as a means to empower workers against the company. Labor NGOs that 
promote collective bargaining hope that by engaging in the process of organizing and bargaining, 
workers will develop a greater sense of solidarity and collective power and that the process itself 
will serve as a kind of antidote to the continued pervasiveness of fragmented interests and 
cellular activism (Lee, 2007). Most importantly, activists view collective bargaining as a way to 
expand labor interests by offering a venue for workers to make collective claims beyond the legal 
minimum. The state, however, is very clear that collective negotiations should abide by legal 
standards. 
 The ability of workers to use collective bargaining to find recourse for their grievances 
and to successfully claim interests beyond the legal minimum (as occurred in one case) indicates 
that the practice had the potential to bring substantive reforms to industrial relations in 
contemporary China. Even more, the state’s move to shutter some of the more prominent labor 
NGOs that were involved in promoting and advising workers in collective bargaining underlines 
the effectiveness of these organizations in planting the seeds for social change, seeds that 
represented a direct threat to the current power structure, which ultimately privileges the interests 
of capital and state actors over labor. 
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 Collective bargaining is unique among other practices and procedures for grievance and 
dispute resolution. Unlike legal action or petitioning, collective bargaining has no institutional 
infrastructure support, and unlike strikes and marches, it is neither disruptive nor even 
particularly public. Furthermore, collective bargaining requires more coordination and unified 
persistence than do these more common forms of collective action in China. Finally, the 
ideological component that labor NGOs infused into collective bargaining—their rendering of it 
as a means to privilege the interests of workers, to expand workers’ rights, and to empower 
workers through the strength of their solidarity—makes it qualitatively different from the 
collective negotiation promoted by the state. The labor NGOs that promoted collective 
bargaining were tantamount to movement organization. For them, collective bargaining was a 
repertoire of contention. To the extent that they follow any models in their promotion of 
collective bargaining to workers, these labor NGOs draw more from international and Western 
conceptualizations of labor relations than from Chinese state precedents or doctrines. Workers 
with whom I spoke throughout my fieldwork said that they had not heard of collective 
bargaining prior to connecting with labor NGOs and that most workers were unfamiliar with it.  
 
Authoritarian-Regime Resilience and Social Movement Theories  
 For all the reasons discussed above, collective bargaining represented a novel means of 
resistance for workers. These three chapters discuss collective bargaining’s entry into the 
landscape of contentious labor politics, its rise, and its eventual decline and appropriation by the 
state. More than a story of a practice or contentious repertoire, however, these chapters tell a 
story of how spaces for resistance in an authoritarian regime are opened and resealed. They 
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document the ongoing jostling for interests and power between the Chinese state and its citizens, 
in which the state continues to have the upper hand. 
 To understand collective bargaining’s emergence, implementation, and retreat as a 
contentious practice, the following chapters draw primarily from social-movement theories. 
However, the rise and fall of collective bargaining underscores the resilience of China’s 
authoritarian regime and also speaks to the rich body of literature that addresses regime 
resiliency. In general, because single-party governments maintain authority without democratic 
electoral processes (or through corrupted electoral systems), the legitimacy of authoritarian 
regimes is constantly subject to contestation and occasional crisis. Durability in the face of these 
challenges speaks to the adaptability and complexity of authoritarian institutions (Nathan, 2003). 
While repression often draws the most attention as a salient characteristic of authoritarian states, 
it is, in fact, only one instrument at the disposal of these governments and is not even the most 
powerful factor explaining authoritarian endurance (Magaloni, 2006). Instead, it is institutional 
and economic factors that keep competition at bay and autocrats in power (Magaloni, 2006; 
Wright, 2007).  
 Most of the literature on the resilience of the Chinese authoritarian regime focuses on 
various institutional aspects to explain how the state has maintained its power and its legitimacy 
(Lee & Zhang, 2013; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Cai, 2008; Nathan, 2003). Nathan (2003) 
detailed how norm-bound succession and meritocratic promotion processes, as well as increased 
institutional specialization and bureaucratization and more inclusionary processes for the public 
to participate in politics, has steadied the regime through several administrations. Cai (2008) 
pointed to political arrangements, namely the multiple levels of authority in China and multiple 
state agencies within each tier of government. While the central government occupies the highest 
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seat of power, it has assigned stability maintenance—the responsibility of handling unrest, 
protest, and any kind of disruption of social stability—to lower authorities. On the one hand, the 
gap between the central government’s promulgations of law and policy and local authorities’ 
shortcomings in adequately implementing and enforcing these policies creates the opportunities 
for challengers to take action. On the other hand, ascribing responsibility to local authorities for 
stability maintenance allows the central government to avoid blame and to reduce its direct 
intervention in disputes (Cai, 2008).  
 Lee and Zhang (2013) provided a detailed account of how these local authorities 
effectively bolster regime resilience through non-zero-sum bargaining, patron-clientalism, and 
bureaucratic absorption. Most concretely, non-zero-sum bargaining involves the use of monetary 
incentives and payouts to satisfy challengers. Officials also work to calm challengers through 
emotional control, dispel collective action through fragmentation and co-optation, and negotiate 
with workers in adjusting their demands. Patron-clientalism is the dependent relationship 
between the state and citizenry that is built on the state’s provision of material, political, and 
social benefits in exchange for party loyalty. Patron-clientalism has taken on new forms since the 
inception of a market-based economy in China, but its fundamental attributes remain (Lee & 
Zhang, 2013; Wright, 2007) and further reify the current power structure. Finally, in bureaucratic 
absorption, the state is able to buy time to find solutions to problems and to present at least a 
façade of stability when conflicts enter into institutionalized processes for resolution. 
 While this literature on authoritarian-regime resilience provides rich discussions on how 
power structures ensure their own perpetuation, most of these studies primarily detail specific 
mechanisms or processes that have allowed for a given regime’s durability; they tend not to 
situate themselves within a broader framework that might link different phenomena or enable 
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theorization across different contexts. At most, the guiding principle appears to be that 
institutions matter. From there, scholars discuss which ones and how.  
 Furthermore, the concepts and insights from social-movement theories are curiously 
absent from works on regime resilience. Indeed, the two bodies of literature seem to talk past 
each other. But studies of regime resilience and social movements are both concerned with the 
intertwining issues of societal change and stasis. In asking how state politics and power are 
maintained in the face of continued insurgency and challenge, the efficacy (or inefficacy) of 
those insurgencies is brought to bear in studies on regime resilience. And in asking why social 
movements occur and why they do or don’t succeed, social-movement literature contends with 
movement failure and how entrenched political structures can thwart efforts for reform. By 
studying the rise and fall of collective bargaining and situating findings within a social-
movement framework, the three chapters here bridge studies of regime resiliency and social 
movements. Harnessing social-movement theories to understand collective bargaining in China 
brings insights from authoritarian-regime resiliency into the broader conversation of social 
movements to connect it with contentious action that occurs in vastly different contexts.  
 If durable institutions form the bedrock of regime resilience, political opportunities are 
fundamental to social movements’ rise and success (Almeida & Stearns, 1998; McAdam, 1983; 
Meyer, 2004; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Tarrow, 1994). Political opportunities such as supportive 
legislation (McAdam, 1982), elite alliances (Almeida & Stearns, 1998), and changes in 
administration create spaces for resistance that encourage and enable challengers to take action. 
In authoritarian regimes, however, the political-opportunity structure is regarded as more closed, 
since these regimes do away with electoral processes that could allow change, limit institutional 
access to non-governmental entities (Almeida, 2003), or use legal systems to embellish the 
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power of ruling authorities and elites (Ginburg & Moustafa, 2008). When spaces do open, they 
are quite narrow. Though political resistance can and does occur in authoritarian regimes, most 
studies focus on typical forms of contention, such as protest and uprising (Almeida, 2003; 
Einwohner 2003; Kurzman, 1996; Lee, 2007; Taylor & Van Dyke, 2003) or micro acts of 
resistance (Johnston, 2006). Overall, this picture of collective contention in authoritarian regimes 
does not account for the emergence and implementation of new and unfamiliar practices. How 
did a practice like collective bargaining, which was unfamiliar to the majority of Chinese 
workers, gain acceptance among them?  
 I show that it was “ambiguous political opportunities”—in which both opportunities and 
constraints exist—that provided the conditions in which collective bargaining was able to gain 
acceptance by workers. These ambiguous political opportunities are themselves a product of 
China’s multi-level system of authority (Cai, 2008). The central government’s promulgation of 
pro-labor-law reforms created opportunities for workers, giving them a legal basis on which to 
stake their claims. But by leaving implementation to lower-level authorities, whose own interests 
in maintaining pro-business environments conflicted with the implementation and enforcement 
of these regulations, the political structure created a space for workers to challenge the 
contradictions between their legal rights and their lived realities. When confronting local state 
agencies, workers faced bureaucratic blockading and other constraints that made institutional 
channels for dispute resolution unviable. The combination of opportunities and constraints 
created conditions of uncertainty; under these conditions of ambiguous political opportunities, 
workers were willing to try a tactic that was untested and unfamiliar to them. However, as we 
shall see, state-driven ambiguity and contradiction pervade much of the political structure. 
Where ambiguous political opportunities allowed labor NGOs to usher in contentious collective 
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bargaining to workers’ tactical repertoire, a contradictory and ambiguous organizational 
infrastructure pushed out those very same labor NGOs—and contentious collective bargaining 
along with.   
 In recognizing how China’s ambiguous political opportunities can give way to the use of 
new forms of resistance, this chapter is able to connect such tactical testing in authoritarian 
regimes to tactical innovation as it unfolds in other settings. As a case in point, Walmart workers 
in the United States have faced considerable ambiguity; although they have the legal right to 
unionize, the company expends considerable effort to prevent them from actually doing so. 
Despite the vast differences in political structure, labor history, and contemporary industrial 
landscapes between China and the United States, a media report in 2013 on Walmart workers’ 
organizing activities showed that union activists for Walmart workers echoed Chinese workers’ 
sentiment that they had no choice but to start new organizations and deploy new tactics, such as 
the use of online and social-media tools, to engage more workers. Thus, the concept of 
ambiguous political opportunities may have broad application to a wide range of political 
circumstances and can provide us with explanatory purchase for understanding the use of new 
tactics in a diverse range of contexts.  
 While the labor NGOs promoting collective bargaining championed it as a means for 
workers to claim their rights independent of local authorities who were complicit in labor 
exploitation, workers’ capacity to actually engage in collective bargaining depended on the 
intervention and support of these local authorities. The second chapter considers the conditions 
under which local authorities offered their support in the facilitation of collective bargaining and 
acted as temporary allies. Studies of the Chinese authoritarian regime have shown that local 
authorities will provide assistance to workers when it is in their interests to do so (Cai, 2008) and 
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on terms that suit the mission and goals of a particular agency (Fu, 2016). Furthermore, because 
the maintenance of social stability is deeply tied to government actors’ interests in terms of 
maintaining good political standing and moving up the hierarchies of government (Chan and 
Selden, 2014; Chen 2014), the ability for workers to ramp up their disruptive activities can 
immediately lead to intervention by local authorities and to local authority support in the form of 
cash payouts that are used to quell worker insurgencies (Lee & Zhang, 2013; Su & He, 2010). 
Thus, support through local-authority intervention is typically understood as hinging on workers’ 
capacity to effectively threaten social stability through disruptive action.  
 But support of collective bargaining reveals that local government officials also consider 
the legality of workers’ claims. Local authorities would support workers’ use of collective 
bargaining only insofar as it could be used to maintain legal boundaries. Their facilitation of 
collective bargaining depended on the extent to which it could be used as a tool to maintain the 
status quo and prevailing labor relations. When workers sought to use collective bargaining to 
expand their rights beyond current legal boundaries, they met with much more resistance from 
local officials. When collective bargaining threatened the cozy relationship between state and 
capital, state agents refused to involve themselves in workers’ disputes. 
 Thus, the decisions of local officials are structured just as much by legality as by 
antipathy to disruptive action. The conditionality of local officials’ support for collective 
bargaining—and by extension, workers’ demands to expand their rights—shows that maintaining 
the status quo undergirds their decisions around whether to support workers during labor 
disputes. For local officials, social stability is a composite outcome that involves both the ability 
to subdue or prevent disruptive action and the ability to avoid the undermining of a regulatory 
environment that is ultimately tied to maintaining current power relations. Earlier studies on elite 
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support in a vastly different context—the US civil rights movement in the 1960s—show a similar 
pattern: foundations and state agencies were more likely to support more professional, less 
radical organizations whose activities did not threaten to overturn political and economic systems 
ordering social relationships and structures of power (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986).  
 Finally, the third chapter asks why collective bargaining failed to last as a potent 
repertoire of contention for workers. I argue that it was contradictions within the organizational 
infrastructure, even more than lack of support from elite allies, that allowed the state to 
effectively prevent the use of collective bargaining as a tool for the expansion of labor rights. 
Resource mobilization theory recognizes the importance of organizations in capacity building, 
networking, and strategically planning and coordinating action. These organizations are what 
make insurgencies and protests purposive action geared toward substantive change for a broader 
constituency rather than ad hoc agitations that stall in defeat or resolve with benefits for a limited 
few.  
 However, regulatory constraints on NGOs and the ACFTU’s state-facing representation 
of labor constituted a “representational fix” that prevented the use of collective bargaining as a 
means to expand workers’ rights. In the parlance of social-movement frameworks, the 
representational fix incapacitated the necessary organizational resources that would otherwise 
have worked to support workers and neutered collective bargaining’s potential as a repertoire of 
contention. Thus, the fall of collective bargaining as a repertoire of contention did not stem from 
the repression of its proponents alone. Although repression certainly played its part, 
contradictions in the organizational structure that led workers themselves to participate in both 
the marginalization of labor NGOs and partnership with the ACFTU also contributed to 
collective bargaining’s fall. When workers were able to secure the ACFTU’s assistance, they 
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were steered away from labor NGOs and the use of collective bargaining and toward state-
controlled legal channels that atomized workers claims and reified the limitations of Chinese 
workers’ legal rights.  
 
Contribution  
 Collective bargaining in China began as a challenge from labor activists. It ended in 
appropriation by the state. The following chapters detail how, tracing the life course of resistance 
within an authoritarian regime. This dissertation adds to studies on authoritarian resilience by 
following a repertoire of contention as it moved across several interconnected cases, which few 
studies have done before. Furthermore, by harnessing social-movement frameworks, it brings 
studies of regime resilience into a broader conversation of social change and reproduction and 
reveal connections among phenomena across widely different contexts.  
 This dissertation also contributes to social-movement theories by detailing the 
institutional mechanisms that fortify regime resilience, allowing this literature to better 
understand movement failure. While social-movement literature has, understandably, dedicated 
much time to detailing opportunity and change, as well as movement in the midst of constraint, 
movement as a mere interlude to reproduction—as collective bargaining was in China—is 
attributed to repressive forces that are part and parcel of a closed-opportunity structure. 
However, as is shown by the rise and fall of collective bargaining, authoritarian political 
structures are complex, capable of learning, adapting, and retooling the threats that come their 
way; even repressive action is shown to follow a nuanced set of rules and regulations and is not 
simply doled out at the first sign of challenge. 
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Methods and Data  
 The data for these chapters is primarily built from the analysis of six different labor 
disputes that unfolded from 2011 to 2014. For eight months, from late 2013 through mid-2014, I 
worked as an intern at a labor-advocacy law firm in Shenzhen. The firm was an ideal site in 
which to gain access to workers and activists involved in labor disputes, and I spent over 900 
hours engaged in participant observation there. I was able to sit in on meetings between activists 
and workers and to participate in events ranging from conferences to celebratory dinners. These 
observations inform my analysis of the labor disputes discussed in this chapter. Interning at the 
law firm led to introductions to other labor NGOs and activists in Guangdong Province, which 
led to interviews with workers involved in past labor disputes.  
 I sought to establish a culturally typical relationship with respondents and met with them 
on terms with which they were most comfortable (Harper, 1992). While activists were 
comfortable meeting with me independently in their offices or in coffee shops, I was often 
introduced to workers in groups through meetings arranged by activists. Interviews took place in 
parks, restaurants, in the homes of the workers, or in the NGO offices. Sometimes, I would be 
speaking with three to five workers all at once, asking about their experiences in the labor 
dispute while we shared a meal. Occasionally, after a group interview, I would ask a worker or 
two for their contact information and, if they were willing, would meet and speak with them one 
on one. All interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese. They were recorded and transcribed 
in Chinese by native Chinese speakers. 
 I myself am Chinese American and began learning Mandarin during high school, with 
intermediate to high-intermediate speaking skills at present. Any native Chinese will 
immediately recognize me as a foreigner, especially when engaged in substantive conversations 
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over, say, labor relations in China. When asked where I was from, I would say that I was Chinese 
American; if probed further, I would divulge having family roots in Guangdong Province. As a 
female ethnic-Chinese researcher, it was much easier to sit inconspicuously through meetings 
and events and to establish rapport with respondents, especially women workers. 
 In addition to conducting interviews, I also collected media reports and attended 
conferences organized by the law firm and other labor scholars and activists, further deepening 
my understanding of local-expert perspectives on the political context. To understand the state’s 
role and perspective on issues relevant to the labor disputes, I used publicly available documents 
promulgated by the central and Guangdong provincial governments on laws and standards for 
social insurance and collective negotiations. I also conducted a two-hour interview with a retired 
union official in the summer of 2016.  
 I was able to gather information for thirteen different cases, albeit at varying levels of 
depth and breadth in terms of data across the cases. The cases presented in these three chapters 
were selected for the analytical purchase they brought to the inquiry at hand. In order to 
understand the emergence of collective bargaining, I studied the first known case in which 
workers attempted to use collective bargaining. In my second chapter on the state’s role in the 
implementation of collective bargaining, I study three different labor disputes in which the 
state’s intervention and support of workers ranged from responsive support, active 
encouragement, reluctant support, and complete absence. Finally, to understand how collective 
bargaining failed to become a tool to expand labor rights, I consider two cases of failed attempts 
to implement collective bargaining during a labor dispute. I use pseudonyms for the names of 
companies, civil society organizations, activists, and workers in order to protect respondents and 
organizations involved in these cases. 
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 The six labor disputes all unfolded in manufacturing companies located in Guangdong 
Province. Furthermore, in all cases, labor NGOs promoting collective bargaining were involved, 
and workers had expressed interest in collective bargaining. All companies were privately 
owned, with four out of the six owned by Hong Kong and Taiwanese corporations and two 
owned by companies headquartered in Europe. Although there are variations across the different 
labor disputes in manufacturing sector, city location, and type of worker grievances and 
demands, these cases nevertheless typify labor disputes in China. Workers sought recourse for 
common grievances such as unpaid social-insurance funds, wage restructuring, and company 
restructuring. Furthermore, these cases illustrate workers’ continued proclivity toward legal 
action, their contingent use of disruptive action, and their wariness toward labor NGOs and 
activists. A summary table of all six cases is below.  
Table 2: The Rise and Fall of Collective Bargaining: Six Illustrative Labor Disputes  




Grievance Collective Bargaining 
Diamond Corp 2010-2011 Jewelry Hong-Kong Guangzhou Social Insurance Yes 
Elegance 
Company 2012 Jewelry Hong-Kong Guangzhou Social Insurance Yes 
Golden Company 2013 Molding Hong-Kong Guangzhou Overtime Yes 
MobileTech 2013-2014 Electronics Finland Dongguan 
Merger & 
Acquisition No 
CompuTech 2014 Electronics US  Shenzhen Merger & Acquisition No 
ShoePro 2014 Shoes Taiwan Dongguan Social Insurance No 
 
 My overarching analytic approach follows McMichael’s (1990) incorporated comparison 
strategy, which emphasizes the relational aspect of different cases and allows a systemic whole 
to be constructed through comparison of related cases. This strategy provides a descriptively 
accurate narrative that depicts a sequence of events in chronological order and, in doing so, is 
able to reveal the causal mechanisms undergirding case outcomes (Silver, 2003, p. 30). While 
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incorporated comparison has been deployed most famously to connect national revolts across 
different countries (McMichael, 1990; Walton, 1984) or the development of global economic 
transformations (McMichael, 1990; Polanyi, 1975), its attention to connections among different 
cases across time and space and the use of comparative analysis to construct a mutually 
constitutive relationship among specific cases and a larger systemic process can be applied to a 
single-nation setting as well.  
 The chapters here focus on presenting a narrative of the labor disputes in order to make 
their respective analyses. While each chapter engages a distinct line of inquiry, the cases 
throughout these chapters are connected to each other across time and space. This connection is 
captured most visibly in the movement-like labor NGOs that were involved in all these cases. 
These labor NGOs were part of a direct relational process that diffused ideologies of solidarity 
and the practice of collective bargaining itself (Silver, 2003) and brought otherwise fragmented 
workers together in meetings, conferences, and dinners. At the same time, as each labor dispute 
unfolded, it became a lesson in strategy and tactical deployment for all actors involved. Case 
outcomes certainly influenced how state actors regarded collective bargaining and altered their 
strategies of engagement with workers and labor activists. This, in turn, was particularly 
consequential to the life course of collective bargaining and its eventual appropriation by the 























Ambiguous Political Opportunities  
and the Beginnings of Contentious Collective Bargaining  





 This chapter discusses the origins of collective bargaining as a repertoire of contention in 
southern China, and considers the first set of pioneering workers who attempted to engage in 
bargaining. A confluence of interests among state actors, labor NGOs, and workers enabled the 
practice of collective bargaining to emerge. Starting in 2009, labor officials at the central and 
provincial levels signaled a willingness to use collective negotiations to set collective wage 
contracts. Around this time, labor NGOs in Guangdong also began to fervently advocate worker-
led collective bargaining. Labor activists presented worker-led bargaining to workers as a means 
for dispute resolution, their main impetus in promoting the practice being to guide workers 
through the tactical and logistical mechanics of collective organizing for the expansion of labor 
rights. For themselves, workers’ had little prior familiarity with or even knowledge of collective 
bargaining and were much more inclined to take legal action; their willingness to use collective 
bargaining was itself a product of the ambiguous political opportunities they faced and the 
subsequent intervention of labor NGOs that introduced them to the practice. 
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 Thus, the origins of worker-led collective bargaining can be located with labor NGOs, 
which were the primary drivers and promoters of it among workers, and with the state’s 
concurrent push for alternatives to legal action in general and collective negotiations in 
particular. While the labor NGOs promoting collective bargaining were contentiously positioned 
against the state and regarded collective bargaining as a form of resistance and training for 
workers who could potentially start a labor movement, their efforts around collective bargaining 
dovetailed with the state’s experiments to bring in “negotiations” and offered workers an 
additional tactic in their struggle to find recourse for their grievances.  
 This chapter presents the emergence of contentious collective bargaining in two parts. 
First, it describes the state’s signals for collective negotiations and the labor NGOs that began 
promoting collective bargaining. Second, it explains why workers themselves agreed to attempt 
collective bargaining. 
  As mentioned above, workers were not particularly familiar with collective bargaining. 
For the first set of workers, there were no local examples to follow or evidence that it would be 
effective. The tactic was not meant to draw the conciliatory attention of government officials as 
seen in disruptive street protest (Su & He, 2010), nor did it have a strong basis in China’s labor 
history as wildcat strikes do (Selden, 1995). Neither did it enjoy the same institutional legitimacy 
that legal action does. Furthermore, there would seem to be little that could compel management 
to even meet with workers. Herein, then, is our empirical puzzle: Given these circumstances, 
why did workers ever attempt to engage in the unfamiliar and unproven tactic of collective 
bargaining? I consider the case of Diamond Corp, the first known case in which workers 
attempted to use collective bargaining. In this case, workers had no evidence that such a tactic 
would work to their advantage. Why then did these workers agree to attempt such a thing?  
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 To explain why Diamond Corp workers were willing to engage in collective bargaining, I 
theorize a two-step process. First, workers in China find themselves in a space of “ambiguous 
political opportunity.” This space is produced by a political structure that provides opportunities 
even as it constrains collective mobilization. The convergence of political opportunities and 
political constraints creates this space of ambiguity, wherein labor confronts deep uncertainty as 
to what the best course of action might be, if indeed one exists at all. Second, NGOs are able to 
intervene in this space to promote collective bargaining among workers. 
 
Political Opportunity and Tactical Decisions: A Review 
 Earlier literatures have spoken to the benefits of introducing new tactics into a 
movement’s repertoire of contention. When rehashed tactical “performances” (Tilly, 2006) lose 
their effectiveness, new tactics may be ushered in (Jansen, 2016; McCammon, 2003; McAdam, 
1983). The use of a new tactic may bring renewed attention to movement actors and occasionally 
achieve insurgents’ immediate goals. However, most of these studies focus on new tactics 
introduced by movement leaders (Jansen, 2016) or carried out by movement organizations 
(McAdams, 1983). Furthermore, it is through a retrospective analysis that these studies are able 
to assert that new tactics led to movement success.  Such post hoc explanations cannot explain 
why the aggrieved should, in the moment of decision making and before any outcomes can 
possibly be known, attempt new (at least to them) and unproven tactics. How the rank and file 
perceive the choices before them and why they agree to attempt an unfamiliar practice is less 
understood. This gap in the literature is addressed by explaining why early users of an unfamiliar 
tactic agreed to try a new practice.  
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 Much of the literature explaining tactical innovation has considered a variety of 
explanations for the emergence of new tactics, ranging from a focus on organizational factors 
(McCammon, 2003; Dalton et al., 2003; Meyer, 2004), field theory (Ennis, 1987), culture 
(Jasper, 1997; Larson, 2013), and political opportunity structure (McAdam, 1983; Tilly, 2006; 
Jansen, forthcoming). Most of these studies offer more complementary analyses to the pervasive 
importance of the political structure rather than providing compelling alternative explanations to 
replace this reigning framework (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). The 
importance of the political context continues to provide a powerful framework for the analysis of 
mobilization, and it is the point of departure for this chapter’s argument as well.  
 A state’s political opportunity structure can be defined by four dimensions: 1) the 
openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; 2) the stability or instability of the 
broad set of elite alignments undergirding a polity; 3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and 
4) the state capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam, 1996). McAdam’s (1983) study on 
the civil rights movement underlines how the political opportunity structure influences 
movement actors’ tactical decisions. While McAdam’s argument highlighted the “chess-like” 
interaction between insurgents and opponents that brings forward and neutralizes tactics, his 
narrative also showed how political structure forms a critical backdrop for the use of new tactics. 
Importantly, favorable conditions and a conducive political environment were precursors to the 
use of a new tactic. New—or newly reintroduced—tactics came on the heels of supportive 
legislation or the incumbency of allied political leaders. From there, movement organizations 
worked to diffuse a given tactic (McAdam, 1983). 
 Tilly’s work on the relationship between regimes and repertoires of contention similarly 
paid close attention to the political structure to explain the shape of movements, claims, and 
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tactics or, in Goffmanian parlance, “performances”(1979, 2006). Insofar as broaching why we 
might see actors take on new tactics, Tilly pointed to regime change and the expansion of 
political opportunities via this change (Tilly, 2006). 
 Drawing from Tilly, Jansen’s (2016) more recent study on tactical innovation provided 
even more focused detail on the emergence of a new practice. His account pointed to actors 
innovating within a “situated political” context and responding to “new social and political 
conditions…where old repertoires were repeatedly coming up short” (Jansen, 2016, pp. 5). In a 
similar vein to previous studies, openings in the political opportunity structure, in the form of 
crumbling elite party politics and electoral reforms allowing for increased political access, 
provided the necessary mechanism for the emergence and use of the new practice.  
 Whether it is reforms within a stable government system, regimes undergoing complete 
overhaul, or political actors responding to a wide breadth of change, the thrust of these studies 
established and reiterated the pervasive importance of positive changes in the opportunity 
structure: supportive laws and administrations (McAdam), more expansive electoral politics 
(Jansen), and change toward democratic governance (Tilly). But they do not speak to non-
democratic, authoritarian regimes that are relatively stable and enduring. Any such theory of 
tactical innovation must be able to account for such contexts.   
 Putting aside the issue of new tactics for a moment, studies on social movements in 
authoritarian regimes have found much evidence that repressive environments have their own 
share of contention. For example, Almeida’s study of protest cycles showed that both periods of 
openness and periods of restriction in El Salvador’s military regimes brought forward a surge of 
movement activity (2003). Inclán similarly revealed that “protest activity increased in those 
localities that remained closed and repressive and decreased in the more democratic ones” 
	 31 
(Inclán, 2008) in Mexico. Einhower (2003) and Maher (2010) both discussed movement activity 
in one of history’s more famously closed environments, the Warsaw Jewish ghetto and Nazi 
concentration camps. In these cases, where no opportunities for resistance seemed remotely 
possible, Jewish communities still revolted. The key takeaway from these studies on movements 
in authoritarian regimes is that closed, repressive environments—not simply open and supportive 
political opportunities—can give way to movement activity, too (Earl, 2011).  
 Thus, studies on social movements in authoritarian states further complicate the 
relationship between political opportunity and movement action. But almost all are concerned 
with the actions of strike, protest, and revolt. When and why do movement actors in authoritarian 
regimes engage in bottom-up practices requiring sustained coordination and organization that is 
heavily discouraged, if not outright repressed? More globally oriented social movement 
scholarship may provide some answers. Under this framework, the advent of global institutions 
and world society constitutes a new political opportunity structure in and of itself (Stamatov, 
2010; Meyer et al., 2007), where local movement actors now find new leverage in the 
international legitimacy of their cause and new sources of support through international civil 
society (Schofer & Longhofer, 2011; Hafner, Burton, & Tsutsui, 2005). While these studies have 
adequately established that global norms and foreign practices have spread and that practices 
often evolve to become something new at the local level (Tsutsui & Shin, 2008: Larson & 
Aminzad, 2007; Merry, 2006; Liu, 2006), they have not given as much attention to why local, 
aggrieved individuals might engage with a new tactical practice.  
 In the case of China and the emergence of grassroots collective bargaining as an 
alternative to dispute resolution, we find a similar story of a practice (collective bargaining) 
crossing national boundaries and being modified by local activists to fit local conditions. In this 
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case, the Chinese cause lawyer who is credited with bringing worker-led collective bargaining to 
China has described how his interaction with foreign labor scholars during a trip abroad inspired 
his own turn toward collective bargaining as an alternative to legal action. Starting in 2010, he 
began to promote worker-led, grassroots collective bargaining, advocating it to other activists in 
China and to the workers who approached him for legal aid. The emergence of collective 
bargaining in China, then, seems a relatively straightforward case of a well-documented 
empirical phenomena of international norms received, modified, and occasionally implemented 
at the local level. But though the cause lawyer and other activists promoting worker-led 
bargaining believe fervently in collective power and rights captured in collective bargaining, it is 
not necessarily the case that the workers they assist do—certainly not at first. In fact, most of the 
workers in China are totally unfamiliar with the collective bargaining he promotes. Why did 
some workers agree to attempt collective bargaining in the first place?  
 
Ambiguous Political Opportunities and Intervening Organizations 
 This chapter theorizes that the use of new and unfamiliar tactics can be explained as a 
result of ambiguous political opportunities. The presence of both supportive and repressive 
political conditions during relatively stable periods leads to uncertainty as to the best course of 
action—indeed, all available options for action may be unappealing. Heeding the call for more 
“careful and more explicit conceptualization and specification of political opportunity variables” 
(Meyer & Minkoff, 2004), this study focuses on law and the legal system as capturing the most 
salient aspects of the political opportunity structure. Because the law is “inherently 
multidimensional in its practical manifestations and hence meaningful in varying forms and 
ways” (McCann, 1998, p. 88), it is able to capture the wide breadth of the political structure 
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while at the same time providing a narrower lens for more precise analysis. The law can provide 
regulatory protections for vulnerable groups and restrain elite power (Peerenboom, 2002), or it 
can serve as another tool of repression and control over those who would challenge current 
power relations (Gramsci, 1975). Encompassing codified legal texts, courtrooms and legal 
institutions, personnel, often-contested ideology, and scripts both hidden and publicly performed 
in and outside of the courts (Ewick & Silbey, 1991-2), the law should be recognized as 
“indeterminate, mutable, and pluralistic” (McCann, 1998, p. 88)—fertile ground for ambiguity. It 
is thus the legal political structure (a slight variation on Andersen’s [2009] “legal opportunity 
structure”) that provides the most salient venue to study political opportunity and constraint. 
 Within authoritarian states, the contradictions and ambiguities of the law are quite potent. 
Perhaps one of the most trenchant ways in which the law permeates authoritarian society is by 
providing discursive legitimacy for movement actors. Indeed, the law is often a symbolic 
resource for activists and social-movement actors (O’Brien & Li, 2006; Lee, 2007). At the same 
time, legal systems in authoritarian states are widely recognized as doing more to strengthen the 
interests of the ruling party (Huang, 2015; Ginsburg & Moustafa, 2008; Peerenboom, 2002) than 
provide a well-functioning channel for recourse for all. Scholarly analysis recognizes legal 
apparatuses within authoritarian states as maintaining social control and legitimacy for the power 
elite—to the disadvantage of the broader population.  
 In such circumstances, the political opportunity structure cannot be characterized as 
wholly supportive merely by dint of extant supportive legislation. But neither can it be 
characterized as closed and totalizing in its repression. Instead, the complexity of the political 
structure is best understood as providing both opportunities and constraints. This chapter 
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identifies ambiguous political opportunities as a salient factor for understanding when actors 
become more open to unfamiliar tactics.  
 Of course, all social movements actors face ambiguity and uncertainty. When deciding on 
a given tactic or strategy, movement actors—like any other— make decisions with incomplete 
information and little ability to know the consequences of their actions (Deng, 1997). After the 
deployment of some tactic, movement actors are not able to gauge the impact of their actions  
until long after the dust has settled. Even then, pinpointing outcomes and determining success or 
failure can be an elusive task for those who may seek definitive answers on such matters 
(Giugni, 1998). All this to say: ambiguous circumstances are not very new.  
 Perhaps because ambiguity is, by definition, conceptually vague, social movements 
literature has given little more than a passing nod to it. However, the conditions creating 
ambiguity are worth specifying as a means to better understand a given social context. By 
specifying ambiguous political opportunities, we are able to delineate the competing 
opportunities and constraints of the political environment, the connections between these 
competing factors, and how movement actors navigate the uncertain spaces created by them. 
Even more, we can link ambiguity to movement processes. In this chapter, I connect ambiguous 
political opportunities to the deployment of unfamiliar tactics.   
 It is under conditions of ambiguity that movement organizations are most able to 
intervene, introducing and persuading potential beneficiaries on the effectiveness of a new and 
untried tactic. In sum, I theorize that workers’ use of collective bargaining, despite their 
unfamiliarity with the practice, is a product of ambiguous political opportunity and the 
subsequent intervention of movement organizations.  
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Data and Methods  
The case presented in this chapter was selected for its analytical purchase as the first known case 
in which workers attempted to use collective bargaining. I refer to the company involved in the 
dispute as Diamond Corp, and the labor NGO as South City Labor Organization (South City).  
The data for this analysis comes from interviews with three workers who were involved in the 
dispute, including one of the leaders of the labor dispute. All three were men in their mid to late 
thirties. I met the workers at a public park, and, after introductions from the South City activist 
who coordinated the meeting, spoke with them about their experiences. I conducted a follow-up 
interview with one of the workers a couple months later. While I would prepare interview 
questions to ensure I gathered the necessary information, interviews were open-ended. 
Interviews lasted from one to two hours. I typically invited workers to simply tell their stories as 
they saw fit and used prepared questions to fill in gaps (Weiss, 1994). With the permission of the 
respondents, these interviews were recorded and transcribed by a research assistant. 
 In order to obtain data on as many observable implications as possible (King et al., 1994), 
I also collected media reports in order to fill in any gaps in my recounting of the labor dispute. I 
conduct interpretative textual analysis of publicly available, state-issued documents and include 
information on legislative reforms and limitations. The case analysis is used to show how 
workers on the ground navigated the legal, economic, and bureaucratic realities that stemmed 
from broader political openings and constraints, and how this led to their decision to use 
collective bargaining. All the data is used to construct a narrative of collective bargaining’s 
origins and emergence in a labor dispute that unfolded in 2010.  
 One important limitation of my data is the missing information and perspectives of 
workers who followed, rather than led, as well as information from workers who decided not to 
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participate at all. Because of this, my analysis is circumscribed to explaining the broader 
conditions that affected all workers and the subjectivities of those who ultimately agreed to 
participate. My argument—that Diamond workers confronted ambiguous political 
opportunities— is drawn from an inductive analysis that, while unable to test existing theory, 
seeks to extends current theory through the specification of ambiguous political opportunities as 
causally related to their decision.  
 
Origins of Contentious Collective Bargaining in China 
 State Signaling: Central and Provincial Guides to Collective Negotiations:  The origin 
story of contentious collective bargaining in China does not begin with labor NGOs promoting it 
or workers using it. It begins with the state. Indeed, the intervention of labor NGOs in labor 
disputes and their advocacy of collective bargaining, while an important piece of collective 
bargaining’s origin story, was in itself enabled by ongoing state promotion of “collective 
negotiations,” which allowed officials and labor bureaucrats to give labor activists additional 
space in which to promote collective bargaining.  
 First, it is worth clarifying the state’s position on collective activity writ large. 
Mainstream and expert consensus agree that the state’s aversion to collective action is 
fundamental to understanding Chinese politics (King et al., 2013). For the state, collective action 
is the antithesis of social stability, so much so that officials have sought to stamp out collective 
action even when it may not have political or contentious overtones. The state has consistently 
responded to collective gatherings for religious (Chung et al., 2006; Tong, 2009), political 
(Wright, 2001), and even leisure (Guardian, 2015) purposes with moves to control, discipline, 
and sometimes prohibit such activities.  
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 But while the state’s antipathy to collective action may be useful as a general principle, 
its response and attitude toward collective action around labor issues appears to be less 
straightforward. Regulations around strike action have remained ambiguous, with the right to 
strike formally removed from the Constitution in 1982 but with no specific legislation in place 
strictly prohibiting strike action. The 2000 Laws for Collective Wage Negotiations formalized 
procedures for collective negotiations to set wages, but these hardly received as much attention 
or state promotion as the 2008 National Labor Contract Law. The 2008 National Labor Contract 
Law was heralded as an important achievement for labor rights because it mandated the use of 
labor contracts among companies. While this legislation included a nod toward collective labor 
contracts, the state has largely favored the use of individual contracts and a legal system that 
adjudicates grievances on an individual bases (Gallagher, 2006). There was no move to build 
organizational infrastructure substantively supporting collective negotiations or the collective 
interests of workers.  
  Thus, while the state has not completely shut down the potential for collective labor 
activity and has at least made perfunctory references to the use of collective negotiation and 
collective contracts as means to improve labor relations, it has primarily encouraged the use of 
atomizing methods—individualized legal rights, individual labor contracts, and legal action—as 
the best practices for improving working conditions.  
 These perfunctory references to collective negotiations, however, are important for 
understanding the state’s role in the beginnings of collective bargaining as a contentious practice 
in China. We can trace these beginnings to the central All-China Federation of Trade Unions’ 
(ACFTU’s) 2009 publication Guiding Perspectives on Developing Collective Negotiations for 
Industry Wages (the “ACFTU Guide”). While the ACFTU Guide had no substantive legal power 
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to compel the use of negotiations across the country, it did signal the state’s willingness to 
experiment with the processes of collective negotiations and collective contracts. Importantly, 
the state’s own vision of collective negotiations positions state agents as leading meetings and 
outcomes. Workers —who do not act as substantive players within union organizations, do not 
elect the union bureaucrats who would ostensibly speak on their behalf, and whose interests are 
not necessarily considered the priority of unions (Friedman, 2014)—are conspicuously absent in 
the state’s conceptualization of negotiation processes. 
 A brief examination of the ACFTU Guide illuminates the central role given to the 
ACFTU in negotiation processes. In the section on “Constructing and Improving the System of 
Collective Negotiations for Industry Wages,” union and firm representatives are the principle 
agents in the negotiation process. The industry-union selects representatives for negotiations, 
with the “primary negotiator for workers held by the trade union chair” (ACFTU, Guide 2009). 
 Even more telling is the ACFTU Guide’s instruction in cases of a “controversy” or 
dispute. In such circumstances, the union leading the negotiations is instructed to apply to the 
Labor Bureau for assistance with negotiations. The guide instructs union officials to “contact 
local organizations for mediating labor disputes or institutions for arbitrating labor disputes.” If 
none of these entities are able to resolve the dispute, “the union can then begin litigation with the 
People’s Court.” And finally: “During the labor dispute, mediation, arbitration, and litigation 
period, the union should educate workers in order to establish a mindset to resolve disputes 
through law and order, and to avoid adopting radical behavior” (ACFTU, 2009) Thus, in a 
notable departure from Western labor practices that pair collective bargaining with disruptive 
power to provide additional leverage for workers during bargaining processes, Chinese collective 
negotiations are coupled with legal action. This confirms the state’s continued preference for 
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legal channels that, as state-managed institutions, are able to maintain strict control over workers 
and labor rights through legal channels (Gallagher, 2014).  
 Indeed, the ACFTU Guide is explicit in giving primacy to the state in the development 
and outcomes of collective labor processes:  
“Unions at all levels must win over the party committees and (local) governments 
and coordinate support for a tripartite consultative system…It must promote the 
development of relevant laws and policies, and work to strengthen the National 
People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
enforcement and supervision of industry’s compliance with collective wage 
contracts. And it must promote all levels of government’s leadership in collective 
wage negotiation, assisting the government to strengthen broad control of a firm’s 
distribution of wages” (ACFTU, 2009).  
 
Given the Chinese union’s status as a de-facto agent of the state rather than a representative of 
workers’ interests, union-led collective negotiation is ultimately state-led bargaining (Chan & 
Hui, 2014), and workers interests are unlikely to have much priority.  
 Earlier studies have compared efforts to implement state-led collective negotiations 
between regional industry associations and regional ACFTU branches in 2009. In Zhejiang 
Province, where these were most successful, workers were notably absent from the process—and 
generally unaware of it—and received limited benefits. In Guangdong province, collective 
negotiations to set industry-wide collective contracts never materialized, in large part due to the 
fractious nature of Guangdong’s manufacturing industry and the absence of a unified association 
that could represent the diverse array of firms and companies during bargaining (Friedman, 
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2014). 
 Instead, in answer to the central government’s signaling around collective negotiations, 
the Guangdong provincial government issued its own modified statement pushing for these 
collective negotiations at the firm level. The 2010 Guangdong Guide for Firm-Level Collective 
Negotiations (the “Guangdong Guide”) details how collective negotiations within companies 
should proceed. The Guangdong Guide draws heavily from earlier regulations and legal codes, 
often referencing the 2000 Experimental Scheme for Collective Wage Negotiations, the Labor 
Contract Law, and Regulations for Collective Contracts, much in keeping with the legalistic 
political culture the province is known for (Lee, 2007). Like the ACFTU Guide, in the event of a 
labor dispute or contentious disagreement that cannot be resolved through negotiations, the  
Guangdong Guide directs negotiating parties to apply to government offices (such as the Labor 
Bureau) for assistance in mediating the issue.  
 There are some interesting differences between the 2009 ACFTU Guide and the 2010 
Guangdong Guide. Compared to the central ACFTU Guide, state agents and actors, while not 
absent, are not mentioned as prominently in the Guangdong Guide in actual negotiation 
processes. Instead, the Guangdong Guide provides much more detail on the logistics and 
mechanics of collective negotiations, which would allow negotiating principles to set the process 
in motion on their own if they were so inclined, with limited government interference. This 
underscores the province’s reputation as a more liberalized region within China, where the 
provincial government is characterized by less unified state agencies and tends to intervene 
relatively less in market affairs and to encourage greater competition (Lei, 2016).  
 In muting the role of the state, the 2010 Guangdong Guide provides some extra space for 
worker involvement, even if marginal. According to the document, while “the company union 
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should select a representative for workers during negotiations, in cases when there is no union 
within the company, workers may elect their own representative.” This departs from the 2009 
ACFTU Guide, which simply instructs negotiating parties to look to other union offices in the 
province, such as the county- or city-level unions, if the preferred union entity is unavailable. 
Furthermore, the 2010 Guangdong Guide explicitly delineates that representatives “enjoy equal 
rights to make suggestions, refuse, and make claims” during negotiations. Interestingly, any such 
rights language is completely absent in the 2009 ACFTU Guide. While the Guangdong Guide is 
not necessarily a manifesto for worker empowerment, its use of rights terminology did create a 
fissure of space within the national bedrock of heavily state-controlled labor relations.  
 The 2009 central ACFTU and 2010 Guangdong Province guides represent the state’s 
signaling of its approval for collective negotiations. Despite the parameters placed on how 
collective negotiation should be carried out, these edicts created the space for NGOs’ contentious 
collective bargaining. More specifically, they gave state officials the latitude to permit and even 
facilitate the practice. Indeed, starting in 2011, labor NGOs’ concerted promotion of contentious 
collective bargaining was met with a degree of tolerance by the city-level union officials. I argue 
that signals from central and provincial state actors encouraging collective negotiation allowed 
state officials to tolerate NGOs’ promotion of collective bargaining, and gave way to its 
emergence as a repertoire of contention.  
  
Labor NGOs: Seeding Working-Led Collective Bargaining as Contentious Practice  
 Though the central and provincial state created a space for collective negotiations, it was 
labor NGOs that most actively promoted collective bargaining among workers as a means to 
resolve their labor disputes. While labor NGOs can be found scattered across the country, the 
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majority of them are located in Guangdong Province, in large part because this province still 
continues to be China’s center for low-wage manufacturing and production, where poor working 
conditions and industry malfeasance abound. In Li’s (2016) dataset of 100 Chinese labor NGOs, 
over 50% were located in Guangdong Province. Thus far, there is no definitive count of labor 
NGOs in China. Not only are NGOs—and labor NGOs in particular—subject to a precarious 
existence, constantly under state scrutiny and repression, they may also forgo registration and 
highly visible activities precisely to avoid unwanted attention. Thus, numbers are likely to 
fluctuate from year to year as some NGOs shutter under government pressure and other 
organizations attempt to operate beyond the purview of official counts. 
 Among the general labor NGOs in Guangdong Province, NGOs promoting collective 
bargain were clustered here as well. Below, I discuss the two organizations in China most 
prominently involved in advocating for collective bargaining from 2011-2015 as well as an 
international organization that provided financial support for their activities. These NGOs 
operated as separate entities but were in close contact with each other, sharing information and, 
at times, partnering to handle cases as necessary. In order to provide some protection to the 




 Foremost among the network of labor NGOs promoting collective bargaining was 
Shenzhen Law, a law firm-cum-NGO that specializes in labor law and in providing legal aid to 
workers. From its founding in 2005 until 2015, Shenzhen Law was located in the heart of 
Shenzhen’s bustling inner-city district in a typical high-rise alongside other local, white-collar 
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companies. In contrast to other labor-law firms that may represent either management or workers 
in the courts, Shenzhen Law’s policy is to forgo representing management against workers in 
labor law suites. The 1000-square-foot Shenzhen Law office was equipped with two conference 
rooms (one small and one mid-sized), additional executive space, and 15 brown wooden cubicles 
for employees and associates. Bookshelves filled with books, journals, and thick, brown folders 
of case documents lined the walls.  
 Although the organization is officially registered and does operate as a law firm with 
accredited lawyers handling its cases, it deviates from typical firms in that much of its labor 
cases are offered to workers pro bono. In addition to the part-time and full-time lawyers and 
administrative staff who work there, Shenzhen Law drew like-minded activists, academics, and 
interns from different parts of the country, who were invited to work and study at the office.  
 Shenzhen Law is headed by a prominent lawyer who credits himself as having been 
responsible for bringing worker-led collective bargaining to China and spreading the practice to 
workers and other NGOs in Guangdong. By his own account, after years of representing workers 
in courts, he found the legal system ineffective for bringing substantive improvements to 
worker’s labor conditions; his turn toward collective bargaining was largely inspired by his time 
spent consulting and researching abroad, and it was there he came upon the concept of collective 
bargaining. A cause lawyer for workers’ rights, his educational and political pedigree in many 
ways sets him apart from other activists and has managed thus far to protect him from the 
harshest modes of repression doled out to other activists advocating collective bargaining (Li, 
2016).  
 While this study is unable to verify whether the lawyer was indeed the sole originator of 
collective bargaining in China and the first to advise workers in the practice, there is no evidence 
	 44 
to contradict that at the very least he was an early adopter; he is certainly one of the more 
prominent and visible proponents of the practice. When promoting collective bargaining among 
workers, the lawyer encourages workers to organize in order to reclaim their power in solidarity 
and, ostensibly, to gain more equal footing against their companies in labor disputes. Unlike 
many of the other NGOs advocating collective bargaining, Shenzhen Law was able to offer pro 
bono legal representation for workers. However, this was often on the condition that workers 
agreed to organize and attempt to engage in collective bargaining.  
 
South City Labor Organization  
 Another labor organization deeply involved in promoting collective bargaining operated 
out of Guangzhou, its office located at the southern edge of the city near the medium- and small-
sized factories that clustered in the area. In order to maintain anonymity to the activists who 
worked there, I will refer to this NGO as the “South City Labor Organization” or “South City.” 
Unlike Shenzhen Law, South City typifies many of the grassroots labor NGOs in China. At the 
time of my fieldwork in 2014, the office was tucked away in the alley of popular pedestrian 
shopping area.  
 Like many grassroots NGOs operating on a limited budget, the offices were no more than 
850 square feet. Upon entering, guests would find themselves in a large open room that served as 
the main work area. Two computers hunched up against one wall, and a dusty bookcase filled 
with documents and paperwork occupied the far wall near the entrance. A long table for 
receiving guests occupied half the room. One extra room served as the office space for South 
City’s head. With its stark white tile flooring from one windowless wall to another, South City 
was ultimately a no-frills operation, unadorned by any extra accouterments beyond what were 
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necessary to do its work with minimal staff and limited budget. 
 South City was one of the few NGOs in Guangzhou that explicitly advocated collective 
bargaining during the time of my fieldwork. Founded in 1998, the NGO initially focused on 
providing legal aid and assistance to workers. However, in 2011 it came under the fold of an 
international labor organization that supports local Chinese labor NGOs in promoting and 
guiding workers through collective bargaining (Li, 2016). South City thus made its turn toward 
collective bargaining advocacy. The NGO would encourage workers who approached the firm 
for assistance in their labor dispute to organize among themselves and resolve their problems 
through negotiation with management. While much of its work involved supporting the different 
workers throughout their disputes, South City would also hold general training sessions on 
organizing and collective bargaining. It was also able to connect workers from different factories 
to share their own experiences and to further advocate collective bargaining. The organization 
was actively involved in the first case in which workers attempted to engage in collective 
bargaining.  
 Far from operating in isolation, South City was part of larger network of NGOs 
advocating collective bargaining. These organizations shared stories and information and sought 
each other out for assistance. Across this network of advocates and organizations promoting 
collective bargaining, the most visible unifying features among them was their consensus on 
collective bargaining as a valuable method for resolving labor disputes and their emphasis on 
labor power and solidarity over legal rights and legal awareness among workers. However, their 
shared programmatic focus did not come about from independent realizations of each NGO on 
value of collective bargaining. Rather, it was the result of the concerted effort of a third-party 
donor, an international labor advocacy organization that supports Chinese grassroots NGOs in 
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their efforts to promote collective bargaining (Li, 2016).  
 
Labor International 
  Perhaps the most compelling linchpin uniting these NGOs was their shared international 
funding source, which I will refer to as Labor International. While it is technically an 
international organization, Labor International has deep ties within China—a former Chinese 
dissident who is permanently banned from reentry into China founded and leads the 
organization, and a number of its core staff and leadership hail from China, some commuting 
back and forth between Labor International offices and the mainland. Labor International 
originally focused on publishing journal articles explicitly criticizing Chinese state policies and 
advocating a workers’ movement, predominantly for an international audience. While Labor 
International continues to report on events and to publish annual reviews of labor in China, its 
support of Chinese labor NGOs and focus on collective bargaining and union reforms constitute 
the main thrust of its operations. Its patronage of Chinese labor NGOs allows it to push forward 
its own agenda within the mainland: to create and drive a network of organizational agents 
promoting collective bargaining. And as labor NGOs pass along information and provide easy 
access to the workers and activists involved in labor disputes, Labor International is able to keep 
an ear to the ground in order to maintain rich data for its reporting and publishing functions. In 
turn, local Chinese NGOs are able to access and receive much-needed financial support.  
 In addition to providing financial support to Chinese labor NGOs, Labor International 
also hosts training sessions for both workers and activists. Training for workers involves 
introducing workers to collective bargaining and attempting to cultivate a collective 
consciousness and worker-leaders. Labor International also hosts gatherings and trainings for 
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dedicated NGO activists themselves. These gatherings give activists a space to come together to 
share successes and troubleshoot ongoing problems with their peers, as well as to bolster a sense 
of community among these labor NGOs. 
 At an NGO training session I attended in 2014, the founder of the organization made 
clear that he sees his organization as part of a much larger project to expand Chinese workers’ 
rights. The organization’s ultimate goals, if not a revolutionary overturning of current labor 
relations and the political system that enables them, at least aim for broad-based labor reforms 
pushed forward by workers and their allied partners. Collective bargaining was, in many ways, a 
grand experiment for achieving this end. For Labor International, workers who engaged in 
collective bargaining would gain practice in consensus building, pooling funds, tactical planning, 
and collective action. As well, collective bargaining was the seedbed in which NGOs sought to 
cultivate labor leaders who could testify to collective bargaining’s effectiveness and the 
importance of solidarity for achieving labor rights. Successful cases of collective bargaining 
served as proof of workers’ capacity to unify independent of the state-run union. And each 
instance of workers’ organizing within the immediate circle of their colleagues could, ideally, 
lead to the building of their capacities to do so on an even larger scale. 
 By 2010, Labor International was able to successfully recruit mainland Chinese 
organizations like Shenzhen Law and South City as partners in promoting collective bargaining. 
Indeed, it was through financial assistance from Labor International that the lawyer of Shenzhen 
Law was able to conduct his early travels, during which he learned more about collective 
bargaining as a labor practice. For other labor NGOs, such as South City, Labor International 
provided the necessary financial support to maintain their organization’s operations. And with 
Labor International’s encouragement and support, these mainland Chinese NGOs began 
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promoting collective bargaining.  This is not to say that labor activists were simply “bought” by 
Labor International to promote collective bargaining; on the contrary, the individuals I spoke to 
were quite sincere in their belief in the power and efficacy of collective bargaining to expand 
workers’ collective rights. Nevertheless, the financial ties that link Labor International to 
mainland Chinese NGOs are part and partial to the emergence of collective bargaining in 
southern China.  
 
Connecting the Dots: State Signaling and Labor NGOs 
  With the state’s endorsement of collective negotiations, Labor International and its 
network of Chinese were given the latitude to promote collective bargaining. It is important to 
keep in mind that, in this case, the extent to which state signaling directly influenced labor NGOs 
is unclear. Chinese activists did not see themselves as attempting to align with state policies and 
goals. Rather, their promotion of collective bargaining is best traced to the influence support of 
Labor International. They regarded collective bargaining as a contentious tactic that they had 
modified so that workers in China could be empowered with collective strength and expand their 
rights.  
 Furthermore, activists make distinctions between the state’s use of the term “collective 
negotiations” (jí tǐ xié shāng集体协商) and their own promotion of “collective bargaining”( jí tǐ 
tán pàn 集体谈判). As they see it, in addition to differences in terminology, there are also 
important differences in how the two processes should be understood. “Negotiations” are 
neutral—even friendly—meetings between capital and labor, and the term aligns with the state’s 
idealization of harmonious relationships among all industrial actors. The use of the term 
“bargaining,” on the other hand, recognizes a conflictual relationship between capital and labor. 
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And for the activists most fervently promoting contentious bargaining, the goal of bargaining is 
not to promote harmonious labor relations but to empower workers against capital and a 
government they view as complicit in workers’ exploitation. 
 Nevertheless, because the central and provincial government indicated a willingness to 
implement a system for addressing the collective interests of workers, officials at lower levels, 
who were charged with managing and preventing labor incidents, tolerated labor NGOs’ 
advocacy of collective bargaining. After all, collective bargaining appeared quite similar to 
collective negotiations. Perhaps, like collective negotiations, it could be a means to uphold labor 
laws and prevent disruptive activity.  
 Thus, the interests of contentious labor NGOs and local state actors briefly converged, 
creating a space where labor NGOs could promote collective bargaining relatively unhindered. 
Labor NGOs were poised to spread collective bargaining to Chinese workers across the province. 
All they needed now was to convince workers themselves. How workers themselves became 
amenable to collective bargaining constitutes the final piece of the origin story of worker-led 
bargaining. I turn now to the first known case in which workers attempted to engage in collective 
bargaining under the guidance of labor NGOs. 
 
Explaining Why Chinese Workers Tried Collective Bargaining 
 The first attempt by Chinese workers to use collective bargaining took place at a 
company which I refer to as Diamond Corp. Diamond Corp is located on the southern edge of 
Guangzhou in a district that is home to various manufacturing factories. It is a medium-sized, 
Hong-Kong owned company working in the manufacture and production of jewelry. The labor 
dispute at this company ultimately revolved around workers’ claims to years of unpaid social 
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insurance. However, even before the onset of the dispute, Diamond Corp’s business had been in 
decline. The company had terminated some of its workers, who then proceeded to sue the 
company for wrongful dismissal. Remaining workers became concerned for their own futures at 
the company (Interview 20140109 115622). The workers’ claims for their unpaid social 
insurance was itself motivated by an attempt to capture a modicum of security, as social 
insurance represents a source of financial security that was otherwise absent for them.  
 Workers’ decision to use collective bargaining to reclaim their social insurance came 
from a confluence of interests that made the practice viable given their circumstances. State 
actors hoped the practice could minimize mounting incidents of labor strikes. Labor NGOs 
hoped to use collective bargaining to develop workers’ capacities and expand labor rights. And 
workers simply hoped that it could help them find recourse since legal avenues and strike action 
could not.  
 In addition to this confluence of interests, legal political opportunities—specifically, legal 
reforms around social insurance policies— provided a legitimate legal claim around which 
several workers could unify. However, workers faced constraints with using institutional 
channels to make good on their claim. In these circumstances, the labor advocate South City was 
able to intervene and introduce collective bargaining to workers. Earlier signaling from the state 
for collective negotiations engendered the state’s tolerance of South City’s activities and 
officials’ eventual involvement in the case.  
 
Supportive Political Opportunities: Law on the Books  
 In response to pervasive labor problems that have followed the economic restructuring of 
the past thirty years, the Chinese central government brought forward the National Labor 
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Contract Law in 2008 and encouraged workers to make use of the legal system to resolve 
disputes. Labor laws are designed to provide greater protection to Chinese migrant workers who 
leave their homes to work in another city as nonresidents—living without assistance for housing, 
medical care, or education, and further subject to more tenuous employment conditions. By 
requiring employers to use work contracts, the labor law binds firms to a set of standards and 
responsibilities, such as the payment of minimum wage, contract renewal and termination 
procedures, and mandatory contributions to social insurance funds. Ideally, then, the labor law is 
meant to mitigate the otherwise precarious existence of migrant workers by providing universal 
employment standards for workers, applied regardless of residency. 
 Among the most important legislative articles for migrant workers are those concerning 
social insurance funds. Workers’ individual pension funds are accumulated over the duration of 
their employment, and their fund is linked to the city where they work, with the local 
government paying in a significant portion of the fund. In the past, migrant workers who decided 
to close out their account, either to return home or to move to another region for work, would 
have retained only their own individual contributions (about 8% of wages, accumulated over 
employment tenure). Employer contributions (20% of wages) and government contributions 
would remain in the local state coffers (Wallace, 2014; Chan, 2010). Given the tendency for 
migrant workers to move frequently, pension funds carried minimal real benefits for the majority. 
Many companies that neglected to make their contribution to social insurance did not meet with 
confrontation, as workers would not be eligible to draw on these benefits, anyway. Because they 
were unable to accumulate a substantial amount of social insurance due to relatively short 
tenures in a given region and/or company, social insurance was more of an abstract benefit than 
an actual safety net that workers could accumulate for themselves. 
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 But newly promulgated 2010 legal codes for pensions changed this. Reforms now 
allowed accumulated funds (including employer contributions) to be transferred to rural or 
county bureaus where workers held residency, to be disbursed upon retirement (China National 
Insurance Law 2010, Chapter 2 Article 16). The payment of employer contributions now 
mattered, as they constituted a significant portion of pension funds that workers were able to 
draw upon.  
 Because of this, more and more workers have moved to claim their long-unpaid social 
insurance funds from their companies. And national labor laws provide a necessary basis of 
legitimacy for workers to pursue their claims. The Diamond Corp case examined here is in truth 
only one labor dispute among many in which workers have sought to pursue their social 
insurance arrears. When discussing what motivated their claims, a Diamond Corp worker 
reiterated several times, “We had principle on our side” [Interview 20140308 102101]. However, 
this worker’s emphasis on “principle” belies the salience of the law for galvanizing workers to 
make social insurance their central demand in the first place. After all, the decision to claim 
social insurance arrears came on the heels of China’s 2010 legal reforms. The timing of these 
disputes would indicate that these legal reforms were a necessary precondition for them.  
 Not only did these reforms give legal legitimacy to their claims, they also provided a 
common cause around which workers in a given company could come together. Diamond Corp 
workers also emphasized the importance of social insurance as a unifying grievance. Said one, 
“When it comes to collective [action], if there are no shared interests, it’s very difficult to 
collectively organize….Within a factory,…the core issue is whether there are shared interests, 
shared demand…; only then can you organize.…We had a shared interest.… [But] without a 
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common cause [of pursuing social insurance], we definitely wouldn’t have been able to come 
together” [Interview 2014111 103446).  
 However, despite the extant political opportunity brought forward through the law, 
workers faced constraints in how to go about realizing their claim. The next section discusses the 
political and economic constraints that pushed workers away from more typical forms for 
pursing claims, such as legal action and strike. 
 
Political Constraints: Courts and Institutions   
 Even as the Chinese government promulgated the 2008 National Labor Law to improve 
working conditions and established a court system for workers to resolve their labor disputes, the 
law has hardly been a panacea for all labor struggles—especially collective grievances. Indeed, a 
fundamental characteristic of the Chinese legal system is its atomizing of claimants. Chinese 
workers are unable to file class-action suites, and lawsuits that are collectively filed are 
individually processed, with each worker’s case evaluated separately. This procedural practice is 
not accidental; it is a purposeful idiosyncrasy of the Chinese legal system that works to 
discourage collective action. The state has promoted legal processes as a best practice for dispute 
resolution in large part because workers are effectively atomized and fragmented under the law 
(Lee, 2002; Gallagher, 2006). Also, labor activists and workers alike increasingly recognize the 
court system as both costly and inefficient. Companies with more time and resources are able to 
hire better legal counsel and prolong hearings, at great cost to workers. 
 The Diamond Corp workers explained their own reluctance to take legal action, some of 
which echo the general constraints affecting low-wage workers. Said one, “Why would we 
sue?…We wouldn’t be able to afford a lawyer. A month’s pay isn’t enough to live on. Where 
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would one have the money to hire a lawyer?” (Interview 20140109 115622). Clearly, the 
financial costs involved were one deterrent for Diamond Corp workers.  
 Diamond Corp workers were also acutely aware of the limits of their own power against 
the firm in a court of law. This was made clear to them as other employees’ lawsuits played out. 
Before the collective dispute at Diamond Corp began, workers watched as a group of lower-level 
workers were dismissed from the company. According to the worker interviewed for this study, 
“The boss saw that they had no power; they [the workers] were filing a law suit with the help of 
the NGO ” (Interview 20140308 102101). And in the end, these workers were “compensated 
very little.” To the other Diamond Corp workers watching these events unfold and considering 
their own course of action it seemed clear that “split up into individual cases, we wouldn’t be 
strong enough. Most people could see the situation” (Interview 20140308 102101). Diamond 
Corp workers felt that the potential benefits of legal action were minimal. Not only were the 
paltry winnings a deterrent to legal action; workers’ recognition of the atomizing effects of the 
legal system also made legal action unappealing.  
  Finally, Diamond Corp workers had little prospect of winning their case because they 
would have been unable to provide substantive evidence in court. To recover the full value of 
their insurance arrears, plaintiffs must present some proof of employment—ideally a labor 
contract indicating their start date at the company. Most of the workers involved in the Diamond 
Corp case had been at the company since 1998 (Interview 201401909 115622) and would be 
suing for significant sums of money. But they were confronted with a common problem among 
low-wage workers employed prior to the 2008 Labor Contract Law: companies often either 
completely neglected to provide official contracts at the outset of hiring or, in the Diamond Corp 
workers’ case, did maintain such documentation but withheld it from workers.  
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 Without evidence of their employment relationship, workers were unlikely to be 
successful in legal action.  
“If we sued, we would need evidence….It needed to be very comprehensive, 
but…we really didn’t have proof. So for example, each person would have needed 
detailed documents on when they entered the factory to begin work, but many 
couldn’t prove when we did, and the factory also couldn’t prove it.…A lawyer 
had told us it was possible we would lose, there was a high frequency of 
losing…If you sue, you need evidence. Once we heard this, [we thought] where 
on earth would we have such documents, even though we knew in our heads 
when we had started at the factory. We all knew [how long] we had been working 
there…and the company knew too, but…those original documents, we didn’t 
have those in our hands.” (Interview 20140308 102101) 
 
 Without the necessary evidence with which to confront the company in a court of law, 
Diamond Corp workers then turned to local state actors for assistance. Though lack of evidence 
in and of itself did not constitute a political constraint for Diamond Corp workers, the response 
they received as they turned to local government institutions for assistance exemplifies how 
political actors and institutions further constrain workers. When approaching the Labor Bureau, a 
Diamond worker recounts how  
“they recommended us to use procedure, but we had said all along that that 
would be impossible. We requested the Labor Bureau to have the company 
get out our documents. Since they wouldn’t, we didn’t take legal action 
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because we couldn’t guarantee that our documents were complete. But the 
Labor Bureau itself is also at fault.” (Interview 20140308 102101)  
 
“The Labor Bureau knew, [too],” they said. In other words, according to Diamond Corp workers, 
the Labor Bureau knew full well that they had been at the company for several years. “The Labor 
Bureau knew, so we were even more unwilling to take legal action.…We had legitimate rights. 
But legally, we weren’t allowed…to claim to them” (Interview 20140308 102101). Given the 
local officials’ complicity in the company’s withholding of vital evidence, workers felt that they 
were unlikely to fair any better in a state-directed legal system: “We were justified in our 
claims…but if we followed procedure, we definitely wouldn’t win.”  
 The recommendation of the Labor Bureau to “use procedure”—to file a complaint against 
the company through formal, legal channels—and its refusal to push the company to provide the 
necessary documents to workers illustrates how local state officials attempted to block workers 
from achieving their claims. In offering no other suggestions and no assistance to workers in 
moving through legal channels, the local state offices restricted workers’ capacity to realize the 
claims promised to them through national laws. 
 Thus, despite the political opportunity offered through legal reforms, workers faced 
significant constraints in realizing their legal rights through institutional channels. These 
included high costs and the marginal benefits available through the legal system due to 
individualization through legal processes (Gallagher, 2006). The local Labor Bureau’s attempt to 
redirect Diamond Corp workers to formal legal channels and its unwillingness to provide 
workers with assistance in recovering documents that were needed to make their case underlines 
how state officials further constrain workers through bureaucratic blockading.  
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Economic Constraints: Avoiding Strike Action 
  If workers regarded legal action as untenable, why then did they not turn to strike action 
instead? After all, recent studies have noted the increasing frequency of strike action among 
Chinese workers as a response to the legal system’s inadequacy for resolving collective labor 
disputes (Elfstrom & Kuruvilla, 2014; Su & He, 2010). Because of national policies heralding 
“social stability” as the mandate of local authorities, judicial and local state officials alike 
worked to quell public disruptions, sometimes fast-tracking cases through informal legal 
channels and occasionally providing financial payments to workers if the corporate entity is 
unable to. In this analysis, streets become courtrooms where workers can find redress (Su & He, 
2010).  
 But Diamond Corp workers decided not to go on strike. The decision complicates 
assumptions that disruptive street action is a prudent course of action for all workers. Other 
narratives explaining workers’ strike action emphasize the capacity of workers to leverage 
disruptive power at the point of production (Silver, 2003; Kimeldorf, 2013). These studies show 
how workers’ power stems from their structural positions within the firm or industry processes. 
In industries where workers are easily replaced, strike action has little ability to bring gains for 
workers (Silver, 2003). Under these economistic frameworks, it made sense for Diamond Corp 
workers to opt against strike action on account of the nature of their industry and the conditions 
of their firm: a relatively small firm requiring low-skill work in a discretely divided production 
process (Silver, 2003).  
  But additional complexities were at play in the Diamond Corp case. When describing 
their situation, a Diamond Corp worker said,  
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“In the beginning, in May, there were seven or nine big deliveries to make. At that 
time, [one of the leaders] suggested to go on strike. But at the time, many workers’ 
salaries were high; they weren’t willing to go on strike. If we had gone on strike 
at that time, we wouldn’t have been able to wait so long.…When they were 
rushing to put out orders, they wouldn’t dare put us on leave.” (Interview 
2014111 102446) 
 
Diamond Corp workers found themselves in a position to exploit a time-sensitive opportunity to 
pressure their company (Kimeldorf, 2013). But they decided to forgo strike action. Their 
decision thus complicates structural narratives that presume workers would automatically take 
advantage of such a position. For Diamond Corp workers, taking strike action would have 
consequences beyond simply pressuring the company. It would also reduce workers’ incomes, as 
they could expect to lose pay for the time they would have spent striking. The high income they 
received also meant that the relative costs of striking would be high, and workers were unwilling 
to bear these costs for an indeterminate amount of time.  
 Diamond Corp workers decided against strike action largely because of an unwillingness 
to accept the costs associated with striking. While there may be little that can be generalized with 
respect to ongoing conversations around workers’ disruptive power, these disputes do show the 
highly contingent nature of strike action for Chinese workers. Most germane to the study here, 
however, is that disruptive action was deemed unpalatable to workers.  
 Ineffective legal institutions and costly strike action formed the political and economic 
constraints that worked in conjunction with legislative opportunities to place workers in a space 
of ambiguous political opportunity. In this space of ambiguity, Diamond Corp workers faced 
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uncertainty as to the best course of action for recourse. And it is within this space that labor 
NGOs were able to intervene and introduce collective bargaining.  
 
Intervening Entities  
 Diamond Corp workers did not turn to collective bargaining on their own. Rather, their 
decision to attempt this new tactic required the intervention of labor NGOs. These NGOs are the 
final explanatory piece of the puzzle of why Diamond Corp workers attempted this unfamiliar 
practice and how collective bargaining took its place in Chinese workers’ repertoire of 
contention. 
  It was Diamond Corp workers who first approached South City in 2010. They were, in 
fact, hoping to inquire about the potential of taking legal action to recover their social insurance 
arrears. But activists within the organization counseled workers to avoid the courts, to organize 
themselves, and to confront management directly. In fact, it was through conversations with 
South City activists that workers learned that without the necessary evidence for their case, they 
would in all likelihood fail (Interview 201401909 115622).  
 Here we see how activists eschewed workers’ “default” option—legal action—by 
reiterating to workers that the courts are an institutional barrier to achieving their interests. 
Rather than suing for their arrears, it was recommended that Diamond Corp workers harness 
their collective power and pressure management to negotiate with them for the payment of 
arrears.  
 Soon after this initial meeting, South City invited Diamond Corp workers to participate in 
a training activity abroad, hosted by Labor International. As one of the workers recalled,  
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“At that time, [South City] had an activity.…They told us it was a training. They 
said there was an opportunity to go to [another country] to participate.…I had just 
gotten my travel permit, and I had never been [to that country]. It included meals 
and accommodation, and I thought I would just go for some fun, that was my 
attitude.”  
However, this training event would prove to be a pivotal experience for him. He further 
explained how  
the most fundamental thing that changed me was going [there] for the first 
training….It was the first training on collective bargaining for local workers. I had 
just joined, and I was the only one from [Diamond Corp] that went. It really 
affected me deeply. Compared to before, my perspective had really been 
broadened. Now, so many people were concerned with us workers, and we 
learned so many things that we didn’t know before, and it really drew us in to 
continue studying more.….After I went [there], I felt that us workers have a lot to 
learn. I wanted to spread these things to other workers. But…to just depend on 
words is difficult. Without any real experience, each worker is only half hearted, 
half trusting, there isn’t any real movement, and they really don’t trust you. It 
isn’t like us who went to [there] and saw directly. They didn’t see [a famous labor 
lawyer] themselves, they didn’t see the teachers, students, and see so many people 
who are so high among us….They say anything and it is very easy to believe. 
(Interview 2014111 102446)  
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 His identification that he was an object of concern to labor activists and scholars alike 
and his exposure to a cast of dynamic activists promoting collective bargaining galvanized this 
worker to undertake a new and unfamiliar tactic. Such exposure was a non-trivial factor in 
broadening his perspective and convincing him of the merits of collective bargaining. As he sees 
it, most other workers at Diamond Corp were less trusting and less willing to engage in such an 
activity. Another leader recalled how “At the time, when we moved everyone to pursue arrears 
together, there were some who didn’t believe, who were suspicious. Sometimes, we would offer 
to pay them to come to the NGO to study, but they weren’t willing” (Interview 2014111 
102446).  
 Nevertheless, the successful intervention of South City among a few workers was 
enough. Ten Diamond Corp workers continued to participate in training at the South City offices 
and to consult with activists for guidance. They were able to organize 130 workers in collective 
bargaining for the recovery of their social insurance arrears in a protracted dispute lasting over a 
year. As they were the first set of workers to engage in grassroots collective bargaining, and 
having no prior models to follow, the involvement of South City in galvanizing them toward 
collective bargaining was critical. According to another Diamond Corp worker, 
Very few workers know about the method of collective bargaining, the reason for 
collective bargaining, what is bargaining—they basically don’t know. If those 
before them know and tell them how to do it, then maybe they would still have to 
find an NGO. I think the main difference from us and other workers: we know 
[the South City] activist; he took us to [another country] to learn.” (Interview 
201401909 115622)  
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While many of the workers I interviewed about this and many other cases were profusely 
grateful to NGOs and activists for their help, it is clear that a connection to and partnership with 
an NGO does not ensure that workers will actually be able to engage in collective bargaining. 
Indeed, NGO’s are only one actor in a complex network of institutional relationships that 
workers must manage. As the Diamond Corp dispute will show, management and government 
actors are just as crucial, if not more so, for the implementation of bargaining.  
 
Bureaucratic Blockading 
 Over the next month, after repeated petitioning to management and despite the growing 
number of workers joining collective efforts, the company resolutely refused to make any 
concessions. It was at this time that workers began to pressure government entities, sending 
written appeals for assistance to provincial, city-level, and regional unions for assistance 
(Interview 20140109 115622).  
 The overall response of the ACFTU, China’s official trade union, displays how the 
organization uses its own multi-tiered apparatus to prevent any substantive assistance to workers 
on the ground. Federal union officials told workers that they would do their best to further assess 
the situation as soon as possible and that they should return home and wait for further news. 
Provincial union officials also assured workers that they were giving the case their close 
attention but that workers must respect the process involved in managing such situations; 
subsequently, they turned the case over to the district and county unions. As for the union within 
the company itself, it wasn’t even on workers’ radar as a viable source of counsel or aid. “We 
didn’t even know the company had a union…, but they weren’t any help at all to us workers” 
(Interview 20140109 115622). Indeed, once the dispute was underway, the union represented 
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management (Interview 20140109 115622). Not to be deterred, workers continued to press union 
offices at higher levels, requesting that an official statement for their case be made.  
 It was not until July 13, about a month and a half after they had submitted their list of 
demands to management, that workers sat down with union officials—not the company or 
management—to discuss their case. But union officials were not particularly interested in 
helping workers bargain with management, nor did they assist workers in recovering pension 
arrears. Echoing management’s suggestions to the workers, the union simply recommended that 
workers turn their case over to the court and allow the judiciary to decide whether and how much 
of their pension was owed. 
 By the end of July, workers sent a letter of complaint to the Labor Bureau at both the city 
and district levels and petitioned the county level Labor Bureau’s Inspection Unit in August. 
Upon receiving no response, workers made their way down to the Labor Bureau offices, only to 
be told that their petition had been received and that they should wait for more news. Given that 
it had been three months since workers had first petitioned union agencies to intervene on their 
behalf, workers felt they were at least owed a timeframe for when they could expect a more 
substantive response. Instead, they were directed to the Social Security Bureau, which also 
acknowledged receipt of an appeal they had sent some two weeks earlier.  
 The procedural delays and bureaucratic blockading by various government agencies 
underline the challenges workers face against a local state apparatus that, for all intents and 
purposes, has little inclination to help workers. Rather, the local government’s reluctance to 
assist workers in this case attests to a kind of soft enforcement of local policies that seek to 
protect business interests. Diamond Corp, along with the multitude of privately owned foreign 
and local businesses in the Pearl River Delta, represent important revenue resources fueling the 
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local economy. From the state’s perspective, conceding to one set of workers might have risked 
bringing an onslaught of similar demands from other workers in different factories. Furthermore, 
under residency (hukou) regulations, the local state is hardly beholden to the transient population 
of migrant workers living in their region, and it has almost no incentive to assist workers in 
recouping funds from employers. But they have every reason to protect businesses and maintain 
the flow of capital for continued economic development.  
 Finally, in the first week of September, over three months since the initial submission of 
their grievances and demands to management, workers received a written response from the 
county’s Labor Bureau relaying the company’s message to the workers that it would first 
confirm the length of service of workers who had submitted their complaint and, in accordance 
with Chinese national laws for social insurance, that it would do its best to make its share of 
payments to these workers the next month. Following this, the Labor Bureau informed workers 
that they needed to negotiate directly with the company. Officials instructed them to draft a 
document if they were unable to come to agreement with the company; from there they could 
proceed with an application. At the very least, these two notices signaled the local state’s 
willingness to involve itself in the case and the company’s concession to state pressure to 
respond to workers.  
 
Finale  
 But circumstances did not improve once workers began to directly confront management.  
Even while the company agreed to pay some arrears, it refused to pay workers the entire amount 
owed to them according to their length of service. At most, it would give a few select workers 
their payments dating back to 2004. Workers refused to accept these terms. And over the next 
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few weeks, workers were let go and sent on “vacation leave,” at first individually and in small 
groups, then in increasing numbers until at one point, the company made an announcement that it 
had plans to release 200–300 more. And when workers turned to government officials for 
support, state authorities merely sent workers back to confront management. At one point, in the 
midst of the company’s retaliatory layoffs, workers met with management in county government 
offices and under the supervision of local state officials. When workers requested that the 
company respond to their demands for social insurance, it was state officials who were able to 
compel the company to issue a response within two days’ time. But the company’s response, 
relayed to the workers through a government official, said nothing of pension arrears; instead, it 
stated that with the consent of the county government, the company would give “vacation leave” 
to another round of workers. 
 In a particularly dramatic incident, the company convened a meeting to present a record 
of over 100 workers’ service tenures as proof that only a select few workers had begun working 
at the company on or before 2004; all other workers who asserted that they had begun working 
there before 2008 were, in fact, wrong. According to workers’ memos of events (Zhu & Cai, 
2012), some workers who had been at the company for over ten years were listed as having 
started working in 2008. After this announcement, the company set up a table in the cafeteria in 
order to help workers through the process and paperwork of securing their insurance; a journalist 
was also on site to video events. Management began reading off names of workers to enter the 
cafeteria to begin the process. Not a single worker moved.  
 By December, over six months after the initial submission of grievances to the company, 
very little real progress around the issue of social insurance had been made. Yet again, workers 
sought the assistance of the state authorities, this time petitioning the city-level offices, where 
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they spoke with an official working at the regional office who encouraged them to speak with 
county officials. At the same time, the official promised he would help workers to resolve their 
problem. Though workers had their doubts, the conversation with this authority actually proved 
productive. 
 On December 9, the company announced that it would pay its share for social insurance 
to all 141 workers who demanded payments according to the year in which each began at the 
company. The workers, who attributed this success to their perseverance, struggle, and solidarity, 
received the news with considerable optimism. “It was because we were able to unite together, 
we showed the company the power of workers; they had no other alternative but to concede [to 
our demands]” (Zhu & Cai, 2012). 
 As uplifting as the sentiment may have been, however, it seems more the case that the 
company had the upper hand throughout the dispute. It was able to force workers to go on leave, 
refuse demands, and deny workers even a space for discussion. And rather than use their 
collective power to pressure the company, workers repeatedly pressured state officials to force 
the company to meet with them. The intervention of the state authorities in pushing the company 
to meet with workers, respond to their requests, and finally concede to their demand was critical 
to any movement forward for workers.  
 Unfortunately, even this success was fleeting. After three months, the company had not 
lived up to its promise. It was only at this moment that workers moved to confront management 
rather than to petition or appeal to government authorities. Reports document that over 130 
workers gathered outside the company office, effectively blocking the manager from leaving 
until he provided them with a statement on the company’s payment of arrears. And while police 
were sent to the scene and labor authorities arrived, promising to assist workers to resolve the 
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situation, in the end, events culminated in the physical assault of two workers by the manager 
and the subsequent arrest of two lead representatives.   
 Many of the accounts of the Diamond Corp labor dispute typically highlight the arrest as 
the focal point and climax of the case, detailing the hours and minutes up to the altercation with 
the manager. Following the incident, workers began a new campaign, decrying the wrongful 
detainment of their colleague and demanding his release. It is difficult to know the extent to 
which the arrest might have served as a purposeful distraction. Little is said about whether and 
how workers received their pension arrears, but in speaking with activists involved with the case, 
I was told that management did make its payments in the end, though according to mumblings 
among workers, payment was withheld from the worker who was detained the longest and who 
was most prominently active during the dispute.  
 If anything, then, the arrest represented a final stand between capital and state against 
workers, a clear testimony of where allegiances lay. But even though they could not depend on 
the state for support or protection, workers had few other options than to continue asking for 
state assistance in hopes that after enough appeals, they would finally be heard. Throughout all 
this, NGOs provided some tactical advice for workers but could do little to influence either state 
or management’s action. Diamond Corp workers’ eventual success in recovering their social 
insurance arrears ultimately required a city official’s intervention to force the company to make 
good on agreements made during negotiations. As we will see in later chapters, without the 






 State signaling around collective negotiations ultimately gave labor NGOs the space to 
promote collective bargaining. It did so by allowing government officials to simply allow labor 
NGOs to intervene in workers’ disputes. While I was not able to speak with state officials 
directly about their participation in the Diamond Corp case, we can make an informed 
speculation that NGOs were being surveilled and that the state was at least generally aware of 
their activities. And certainly, once workers began appealing to the various government agencies, 
they made their demands and activities a matter of public record. But state officials did not move 
to directly shut down or arrest workers or activists at the outset. Instead, for all intents and 
purposes, state officials tolerated labor NGOs and workers, even while they provided them little 
real support.  
 To be sure, the state’s move to bureaucratically blockade workers indicates a 
disinclination toward collective bargaining—but not an outright move to stop it. Had workers’ 
collective activities been regarded as completely unacceptable, it is unlikely that they would have 
been able to continue for so long without facing reprisals. With the state’s earlier signaling on 
the desirability of collective negotiations, collective bargaining fell into a gray zone of 
permissibility. And the provincial union’s move to finally intervene and facilitate negotiations 
between workers and the company would not have happened at all had there been no political 
space for them to do so.  
 For their part, workers’ decision to engage in collective bargaining was a product of 
ambiguous political opportunities and subsequent intervention of civil-society actors. The state 
implemented legal reforms supporting workers’ interests but allowed few viable pathways 
through which to realize these legal rights. Within the context of China’s labor struggle, legal 
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reforms provided institutional support for workers to make claims on certain interests. 
Specifically, regulations requiring companies to pay into employees’ social insurance funds 
provided the legal support for workers to claim long-overdue payments into their insurance 
accounts. Furthermore, because a company’s negligence to make payments is rarely (if ever) on 
an individual basis but instead affects a significant proportion of the workforce, workers found a 
common grievance that was amenable to collective action. While social-insurance laws were 
national in reach, the response of workers has been scattered, as not all firms have been in 
violation and not all employees were made immediately aware of reforms. And in the absence of 
a sustained and coordinated labor movement (Friedman, 2014), there is little consensus on what 
might be the best course of action, even when workers of a given firm find themselves facing the 
same grievance. The available options, be it legal mobilization or strike and protest, subject 
workers to risks in the form of either high costs or repression. These are the makings of 
ambiguous political opportunity: legal support for claims on the one hand, few appealing means 
for realizing claims on the other. It is in this setting that an unfamiliar and untried option—
collective bargaining—is able to gain occasional acceptance by workers. 
 Social movement organizations—specifically labor NGOs—were then able to intervene, 
emphasizing problems with legal action and steering workers toward a new but relatively 
unproven tactic.  But while labor activists and certain scholarly analyses (Li, 2016) may point to 
Labor International and South City as driving and enabling collective bargaining among workers, 
I argue that this interpretation of collective bargaining’s rise in China obscures the continued 
importance of the state in the practice’s emergence. The necessity for state intervention in 
collective bargaining stems from its position as a non-institutionalized practice in China. While 
the state has encouraged negotiations between management and workers, it has not put in place 
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the requisite infrastructure to actually enable negotiations or to ensure an even playing field 
between capital and labor. Even while Labor International may provide financial and advisory 
support to labor activists, who in turn provide human resources and tactical advice to workers, 
there do not appear to be similarly dedicated resources for capital to engage in negotiations. 
More to the point: There are no incentives for capital to participate in bargaining. In many cases, 
management has little interest or need to meet with workers; companies may even welcome a 
reduction in the labor force, and striking workers could give a company just the rationale it needs 
to terminate workers without having to pay mandatory compensation fees. Without a legal 
mandate or interest incentives for companies to participate in collective bargaining, no grand 
vision on the part of international and local labor activists to bring a sea change in labor 
organizing through collective bargaining can be realized because no collective bargaining 
without company’s cooperation can occur. Thus, even while other analysts have sought to 
present collective bargaining as driven by labor NGOs and international funders, and while I 
submit that these are indeed critical players in collective bargaining’s origin story, state actors 
also played an important role in the emergence of collective bargaining—even if they had not 
intended to.  
  
Conclusion 
 In attempting to explain why actors opted for a new and untried tactic to find recourse for 
their grievances, the study offers a more nuanced perspective on the structural factors that shape 
movement tactics. Signals from the state worked in tandem with international influences and 
local actors who sought to make collective bargaining a repertoire of contention. The 
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contravening opportunities and constraints that workers faced in achieving their demands made 
collective bargaining a viable option, thus giving rise to its emergence in China. 
  Recognizing the ambiguity of the political structure moves our conceptualization of this 
concept beyond an open/closed categorization. While some have measured levels of openness 
via variable indicators of democracy, civil society, and access to information (Caraway, 2006), 
levels do not adequately capture complexity of political opportunity structures. Furthermore, 
they are almost entirely based on Western democratic assumptions of what a political 
opportunity structure can look like. “Ambiguous political opportunity,” on the other hand, not 
only provides for greater flexibility to capture a variety of regimes that may exist, it also allows 
the possibility of a complex political structure that can offer both political opportunities and 
political constraints at the same time. This study emphasizes the legal components of the 
political structure, as these elucidate most clearly the ways in which the political structures create 
conditions of ambiguity. Finally, while other studies deploying more typical usage of political 
opportunity structure are often unable to move beyond meta- and macro-level analyses, 
ambiguous political opportunity offers a prism through which we can understand the decisions 















From 2010 to 2015, worker-led collective bargaining appeared to hold real promise as a means 
for workers to avoid the legal labyrinth of China’s court systems and to engage in a practice that 
could expand their rights and capacities to organize collectively. While labor NGOs had limited 
reach in promoting collective bargaining, by 2012 they were able to claim several successful 
instances in which they had been able to persuade workers to use collective bargaining and 
successful outcomes for workers through their use of the practice.  
 To hear labor activists tell the story, they (and workers) are the central figures in workers’ 
success and in the implementation and spread of collective bargaining. However, a closer 
examination of events makes clear that even while labor NGOs do the necessary work of 
introducing and guiding workers through bargaining, their involvement is insufficient for the 
actual implementation of collective bargaining. And even when workers agree to come together 
to pool funds, elect representatives, and present their demands to management, there is little to 
compel management to participate in bargaining sessions with workers. No actual laws are in 
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place requiring companies to join workers at the bargaining table. Though the ACFTU and the 
provincial government in Guangdong have drafted protocols for collective negotiations, these are 
little more than recommendations.  
 Indeed, when workers present their demands to companies and request meetings with 
management, management consistently refuses any such engagement. It is only when workers 
are able to persuade state agents to intervene on their behalf that managers concede to negotiate 
with workers. While labor activists and scholarly analysis (Li, 2016) may point to labor NGOs or 
workers’ solidarity as driving and enabling collective bargaining among workers, I argue that 
this interpretation of collective bargaining’s rise in China obscures the continued importance of 
the state in the actual implementation of collective bargaining.  
 The cases discussed in this chapter further underline the importance of state intervention 
in the implementation of worker-led bargaining. Regardless of workers’ willingness, solidarity, 
and tactical strategizing, it is only when they are able to secure the support of state actors that 
any kind of bargaining with a company can occur. Given the importance of the state’s 
involvement for the implementation of collective bargaining, this chapter asks, under what 
conditions were local government actors willing to intervene in labor disputes to support 
workers’ use of collective bargaining? 
 Earlier studies make clear that the central state’s imperative for social stability drives 
much of the local government actors’ response to collective action (Shue, 2004; Birney, 2014; 
Wang and Minzner, 2015). While popular imagination of authoritarian governance may reify the 
heavy-handed use of repression as the default means for control in China, more recently, 
dedicated scholarship on how the Chinese government has maintained its control reveals a much 
more nuanced and flexible approach (Lee and Zhang, 2013; Su & He, 2010; Tong & Lei, 2010). 
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For example, even while the state has encouraged the use of legal channels and individualized 
labor contracts (Chan & Selden, 2014; Gallagher, 2006), in 2009 the ACFTU began signaling 
support for collective negotiations for industry-wide wage contracts.  
 Starting in 2010, labor NGOs in China began promoting collective bargaining as means 
for dispute resolution, counseling workers to bargain outside institutional confines that limited 
their collective gains. Early on, state agents did not immediately move to stifle these NGOs 
activities. Instead, on certain occasions, they intervened in workers’ labor disputes to facilitate 
collective bargaining. I ask when and why they did so.  
 To understand the conditions in which state actors were willing to intervene and support 
collective bargaining, I consider three cases that capture different levels of state support for 
collective bargaining. In the first case, the state responded relatively quickly to workers’ appeals 
for their intervention and facilitation of collective bargaining. In the second case, workers did not 
appeal to state actors at the outset, but state actors intervened during workers’ strikes and 
encouraged workers and management to resolve their problem using collective bargaining. 
However, as we will see, collective bargaining would not provide the control and appeasement 
that the state had hoped for. Local officials would later prove quite reluctant to continue to 
involve themselves or support workers who sought additional concessions from their company. 
In the third case, local state actors remained absent during the course of workers’ labor dispute. 
And while these workers partnered with one of the most prominent cause lawyers in China 
promoting collective bargaining and were themselves willing to engage in bargaining with their 
company, they were unable to compel management’s participation.  
 Understanding when and why local state actors in China were willing to support a 
practice like collective bargaining speaks to the larger question of when elites, or those in 
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positions of power, decide to offer their support to social movements. Although political process 
theory has recognized well enough the importance of elite and organizational allies for 
movement success (Cress & Snow, 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973), studies 
specifying the terms and conditions of their intervention have been limited. Furthermore, studies 
of protest in authoritarian states rarely if ever deploy the framework of “elite allies” or 
“patronage.” In authoritarian regimes, local domestic support is conceptualized as 
“accommodating state intervention.” Studying cases of worker-led collective bargaining in China 
offers an opportunity to begin filling this gap in the literature.   
 
Literature Review 
 Social movement scholars conceptualize elite allies as critical in providing political 
opportunities and key to the political-opportunity structure (McAdam, 1996; McCammon et al., 
2001; Skrentny, 2006; Tarrow, 1998). Elite actors include bureaucrats (Amenta et al., 1999), 
policy decision makers (Skrentny, 2006), judiciaries (Su & He, 2010), government agencies, and 
private foundations (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986). Because of the position elites occupy within the 
social structure, their power and influence over legislation, and the tangible and intangible 
resources they can offer to movement actors, the ability to gain the support elite allies can be 
critical to movement success (Almeida & Stearns, 1998).   
 But when do elite allies support social-movement actors? Previous studies have found 
that elite support depends on the extent to which a movement’s goals can function within the 
broader institutional structure (Wilser & Guigni, 1996) or align with the state’s own political 
mission (Amenta et al., 1999; Su & He, 2010). Others have found that the extent to which a 
given elite actor perceives movement goals as acceptable (McCammon et al., 2001) and in 
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alignment with their own categorical perceptions and meanings of the relevant issues at stake 
(Skrentny, 2006) also influences their decisions to support social-movement actors. Jenkins and 
Eckert’s 1986 study on elite patronage of social-movement organizations analyzed when 
government agencies and private foundations gave financial support to movement organizations 
and which kinds of movement organizations were more likely to receive these resources. They 
find that elite patronage stems in large part from a desire to maintain social control in the face of 
potential social upheaval. Even when elites may offer support to social-movement organizations 
working for social change, the pattern of their patronage suggests that they are “politically 
cautious in their support for social reform. At minimum their conscience donations will typically 
be socially circumscribed by their class interests in political stability and the preservation of 
capitalist institutions” (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986, p. 819). On the whole, and perhaps rather 
unsurprisingly, elites provide support when it is in their political interests to do so.  
 While much of this scholarship has focused on movements within the US political 
context, studies of elite patronage and support in authoritarian regimes tell a similar story. Of 
course, the language of “elite allies” and “patronage” is rarely deployed. Instead, “state 
intervention” is the more commonly seen terminology. Nevertheless, while there are important 
differences in the shape of political interests across different political structures, political 
interests also motivate Chinese elite actors—bureaucrats, government officials, and government 
agents like the ACFTU—and determine when and how they offer support during collective 
disputes. 
 In China, “social stability” and “harmonious society” are the contemporary state’s 
guiding principles. These two principles undergird its policies, regulations, and proclamations. 
As a rubric for state action, the mandate for social stability has been the state’s answer to the 
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unrest and discontent that has followed reform and marked much of China’s transition toward a 
market economy. Generally, the state regards expressions of discontent that are seen across many 
spheres of China’s socio-political landscape as potential threats to the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s ruling authority. To maintain social stability is to reduce and minimize any 
such dissent, particularly collective dissent that may occur outside institutional channels for 
resolving problems. At the same time, maintaining social stability does not necessarily translate 
to the outright repression of insurgency (Tong & Lei, 2010), at least not in all cases. Instead, the 
state has in some circumstances taken a more accommodating approach (Su & He, 2010; Tong & 
Lei, 2010). Rather than using direct force to silence incidents of unrest, local government 
officials, bureaucrats, and even judiciaries have been instructed to intervene directly, making 
themselves present and available at the site of a dispute, to resolve issues as peaceably as 
possible (Chan & Selden 2014; Gallagher, 2014 ; Su & He, 2010). Lee and Zhang (2013) detail a 
process of “non-zero sum bargaining” which local officials use to maintain social stability. This 
includes making direct payments to the aggrieved, engaging in “emotion control” to calm 
agitated workers and persuade them to take more “practical” measures, and attempting to 
reconstruct workers’ ideas of rights toward a more “pragmatic” rendering on the premise that 
“legal rights cannot be realized given the objective realities of China  (Lee & Zhang, 2013, p. 
1490 ).  
 However, even while it is important to recognize that China’s authoritarian rule can take 
on a more accommodating, even adaptive (Tong & Lei, 2010), response to insurgency, the state 
does not unilaterally move in support of all claims. Indeed, some have noted that settlement 
appears ad hoc (Gallagher, 2014). While it is clear that, in general, the central government 
encourages local government actors and agents to give their support to claimants in order to 
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maintain social stability—and in doing so, maintain their own good standing within the political 
apparatus—how the local political elites decide which specific instances deserve their support is 
still an open question that few have addressed so far. Su and He’s (2010) piece on local judicial 
intervention in labor disputes delineates several criteria motivating supportive state intervention 
that include the size of protests, the availability of funds, the desire to reduce paperwork, and the 
obscurity of protest leaders, which prevents the state from simply arresting leaders to put an end 
to strikes. Others have shown that protesters’ capacity to escalate activities by deploying 
increasingly intensified activities or by creating greater public spectacle has also forced the state 
to intervene and to appease challengers (Gallagher, 2014; Liebman, 2013; O’Brien & Li, 2006;).  
 This chapter adds to this literature by considering three different labor disputes that each 
received different responses from the state. Importantly, in considering the state’s occasional 
involvement in the implementation of worker-led bargaining, this study moves beyond instances 
in which the state simply intervened to provide financial concessions. Instead, for these cases, 
when the state did support or encourage worker-led bargaining, it acted as more of an inadvertent 
ally to labor NGOs who were promoting collective bargaining to expand workers’ rights. We are 
thus able to explore when and under what circumstances political elites in an authoritarian 
context move to support movement-esque organizations by facilitating rights-expanding 
activities. While Su and He’s (2010) study provides granular explanations for state intervention, 
the cases in this chapter argue that a more generalizable pattern exists to explain state support. 
State intervention for collective bargaining is not necessarily ad hoc but can be understood 
through a more specified framework of legality as it allowed the convergence of political 
interests. Legal legitimacy, preventing strike and insurgences, and their own institutional 
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interests anchored state actors’ decisions on whether or not they would support a non-legal, non-
institutional activity.  
 Local state actors were much more willing to intervene and support collective bargaining 
when workers’ demands remained within legal boundaries set by the national labor laws. 
Collective bargaining was made a part of the state’s repertoire of conciliation, and as with other 
measures, its deployment had a very specific purpose: preventing disruptive action and 
maintaining workers’ rights within existing legal parameters. When workers began to agitate for 
interests beyond legal limits or sought to address needs and injustices outside of strict legal 
terms, state actors were much more reluctant to involve themselves. In these circumstances, 
workers’ ability to strategically escalate their tactics and threaten the veneer of social stability 
would in some cases work to bring in supportive state intervention. But not in all cases. If strikes 
could be snuffed out through capital’s pressure and maneuverings, state actors were less likely to 
intervene, often resulting in the preservation of a legal status quo that limits workers collective 
rights and fails to provide them with adequate redress. 
  
Data and Methods 
 Three cases are used for analysis in this chapter. These cases were chosen because all 
companies were located in Guangdong Province and all were positioned in a low-wage 
manufacturing sector. The labor NGOs that promoted collective bargaining as a rights-expanding 
activity were involved in each of these cases, and activists encouraged workers to use collective 
bargaining. However, state involvement and support for collective bargaining varied in the 
different disputes as did workers’ ability to implement collective bargaining. Thus, my analysis 
focuses on parsing why the state varied in its support, and I am able to compare across these 
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cases to do so. Rather than attempt to link discrete variables or factors to state support, I narrate 
the course of events of each labor dispute in order to provide a holistic account of how workers’ 
grievances, the actions of both capital and labor, and the broader legal-political and industrial 
context in contemporary China are brought to bear on the decisions of ACFTU and labor bureau 
officials—who act as potential elite allies—to provide or withhold assistance to workers in 
facilitating collective bargaining. 
 The first labor dispute unfolded in 2012 at a company I refer to as Elegance Company. In 
this case, union officials in the city of Guangzhou were quick to offer their support for collective 
bargaining upon workers’ requests. The second labor dispute took place in mid-2013 at a 
company I refer to as Golden Company. Here, the state’s response evolved as the dispute ran its 
course, moving from swift support, to withholding support, and finally to reluctant support. In 
both these cases, workers were able to use collective bargaining to claim their demands. The 
third labor dispute started in late 2013 and extended to mid-2014, unfolding at a company I call 
MobileTech. In this case, the local union refused to involve itself, even though workers 
requested its support early, and workers were unable to use collective bargaining.  
Table 3: Spectrums of State Support Across Three Labor Disputes 




Grievance State Support 
Elegance 



















 Both Elegance Company and Golden Company are located in the city of Guangzhou in a 
district at the southern edge of the city that is home to many small- and medium-sized firms 
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working in textiles. MobileTech is located in the city of Dongguan, another hub for 
manufacturing in the province, and is a larger electronics manufacturing firm that produced cell 
phones. Although the companies do not match precisely based on manufacturing sector and city, 
the similarities insofar as provincial location, industry, and workers’ skill level allow for 
reasonable comparisons across these different cases.  
 South City, the same NGO that had been involved in the Diamond labor dispute, had also 
worked closely with Elegance Company and Golden Company workers through much of their 
disputes, and my connections with activists at South City allowed introductions and access to 
interviews with workers.  
 For the Elegance Company case, I interviewed four workers involved in the dispute. Two 
of these were men and two were women, all in their mid-thirties. On the whole, I sought to 
establish a “culturally typical relationship” and met respondents on terms with which they were 
most comfortable (Harper, 1992). One of the interviews took place in the offices of a labor NGO, 
with one of the South City activists present, as well as another Chinese student who was studying 
labor. The second interview took place at a restaurant, where the worker agreed to meet me and 
the student for breakfast. The two women whom I interviewed invited me to their homes, once 
allowing me to purchase groceries and then preparing a meal for me as I asked them about their 
experience during the labor dispute. I was able to follow up with one of them for a second 
interview a couple of months after our first meeting. Without question, there was a greater sense 
of ease and rapport with the two women relative to the two men. As well, workers tended to be 
more frank and less laudatory of their experiences when not in the presence of the labor activists;  
this was true of all workers across all different labor disputes.  
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 For the Golden Company case, the labor activist introduced me to the workers via a 
larger dinner gathering at a restaurant in the district. Early in the evening, I arrived at the 
restaurant with the activist and fellow student and met two workers who had also arrived early. I 
was able to speak with them about their experience and involvement in the labor dispute. After 
about an hour, many more workers arrived. In total, there were three women and four men from 
Golden Company, as well as a few other activists and workers who had not been involved in the 
labor dispute. In many ways, the dinner seemed to be an informal reunion for the workers who 
had come, a raucous and lively event. I did not attempt to conduct a controlled interview, and 
workers shared their experience as they chose; my recorder was left on. Men certainly spoke 
more than women. I was fortunate to be seated next to an extroverted worker who spoke at 
length of his experience. At the end of the evening, I asked workers if they would be willing to 
share their contact information with me, and a few did. I was able to secure a follow-up 
interview with another one of the men a few months later and met him at a coffee shop to ask 
more directed questions about the labor dispute.  
 I was able to interview five different workers who were involved with the MobileTech 
labor dispute. At the time that I met the workers, they were in the process of suing their firm for 
wrongful dismissal and had secured the pro-bono services of Shenzhen Law, the law firm-cum-
NGO where I was interning. The lawyer handling the case allowed me to accompany him to 
meet with the workers on a routine visit. Our first meeting was at a restaurant, and I was able to 
speak with five of the workers who joined us for the lunch. I was also able to obtain the contact 
information of one of the workers, who agreed to meet with me again three months later and 
spoke with me in a park near his home with one of his colleagues sitting with us but saying little. 
My time at the law firm allowed me to speak with the lawyers involved in the case and to hear 
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their perspectives on its legal merits and its importance in the landscape of labor disputes at the 
time. I also interviewed an activist who had connected with the workers at the beginning of the 
case, during the initial strikes, to learn more about the early stages of the labor dispute.  
 In the summer of 2016, I returned to China and was able to interview the former 
Guangdong provincial union chair, who had retired in 2014 but would have been the sitting chair 
during the time that the Elegance Company and Golden Company labor disputes had taken place 
and when the MobileTech labor dispute had begun. The interview was nearly two hours long, 
held over tea at a hotel-restaurant in Guangzhou. Though he was not directly involved in these 
cases, the union official provided invaluable insight into how a prominent leader in the 
provincial union understands collective bargaining and sheds some light on the decisions of local 
officials. Altogether, interviews, conversations, and media reports were used to piece together 
the events and to provide an empirical analysis of why local state agents decided to support 
collective bargaining in some circumstances but not others. 
   
Case Studies: A Spectrum of Elite Support and Varying Success in Collective Bargaining 
 In my earlier chapter, I discussed the first case of pioneering workers who attempted to 
use collective bargaining to claim their social insurance arrears. Though these workers had 
legitimate legal claims, they faced considerable difficulties in securing the local state authorities’ 
support in facilitating negotiations with the company. It was only after months of a protracted 
labor dispute that the provincial union chair agreed to intervene and broker bargaining sessions 
between workers and management, ultimately assisting workers in claiming their arrears. 
 Subsequent labor disputes, however, indicate a shift in local government authorities’ 
attitude toward collective bargaining. While initially hesitant, local state agents appeared to make 
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a turn toward collective bargaining as an acceptable activity. But their willingness to support it 
was not unconditional. In examining cases in which workers used—or failed to use—collective 
bargaining, we find that the state’s willingness to enable the implementation of collective 
bargaining revolved on the legal merits of workers’ claims.  
 
Elegance Company Labor Dispute  
 The 2012 Elegance Company labor dispute was centered on workers’ unpaid social 
insurance funds. Interviews with Elegance Company workers revealed that news of the first set 
of workers who used collective bargaining to claim social insurance encouraged them to pursue 
their own social insurance arrears. Said one, “We had heard of [their] success” (Interview 
20140109 115622), referring to those workers. When asked what motivated them to take action, 
another said, “[The other workers] had more people, their situation was more complicated, and 
they were able to get their arrears. Why couldn’t we?” (Interview 20140112 18051). 
  When Elegance Company workers first began exploring how to claim their arrears, they 
found the local state offices unhelpful—even obstructive. Elegance Company workers described 
how, when they turned to the labor bureau for assistance, “The government office ignored us. 
The government office said, ‘Go back and we’ll notify you’ but they never got back to us….[We 
were] ignored and disregarded” (Interview 20140109 115622). Another said how he had  
 
submitted an official complaint but they didn’t take it, they didn’t take the 
documents. We didn’t understand. They just said our documents weren’t complete, 
but they didn’t say which documents were complete. And then they just pushed us 
	 85 
out, with no other answer. Afterward, we found other documents, and they said 
this isn’t right, that isn’t right. (Interview 20140110 074601)  
 
Such bureaucratic blockading made continuing along formal institutional channels or working 
under the auspices of the labor bureau untenable for workers. 
 When confronting management, workers were simply told that providing social insurance 
would be “impossible.” Workers had few options left. Moving to strike action was deemed 
useless. According to one worker, strike action would do little to pressure capital because  
the boss [could] take those work orders and give it to others as overtime. We 
didn’t have much retaliatory power over the boss. If hypothetically we didn’t do 
work, there were other departments that could do our work, so the harm that we 
could do was not that big. (Interview 20140112 18051)  
 
Clearly, then, workers had little disruptive power at their disposal. They could not afford to 
threaten their company’s operations. 
 It was at this point that one of the Elegance Company workers, whom I refer to as Yijie, 
decided to contact the labor NGO South City Labor Advocacy Org— a labor NGO promoting 
collective bargaining among workers. As far as Yijie knew, this was the organization that had 
helped other workers recover their arrears. With the state proving to be unhelpful, and strike 
action a non-starter, South City was the next (perhaps only) best option. By her own account, a 
friend provided her with the phone number of the South City activist and recommended she 
contact him for assistance.  
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 Yijie recalled her first trip to meet the organization: “That first day when I was going 
over [to the office] I brought two friends along. Actually, as we were on our way, they were both 
saying, ‘Is this some kind of scam?’…They said, ‘Pies don’t drop from the sky’ and ‘There’s no 
free lunch’” (Interview 20140112 180510). Even with favorable recommendations, workers 
regarded the labor NGO with considerable caution. The initial doubts of these workers reveal, at 
best, a general unfamiliarity with non-governmental organizations among most workers. More 
often, workers are highly suspicious of the organizations and activists who offer services for free 
when, as Yijie’s friend put it, nothing can be for free.  
 My earlier chapter discussed how ambiguous political opportunities—those situations in 
which workers had legal rights to a claim like social insurance but no viable channels for 
pursuing these claims—situated workers in a state of uncertainty. Under these conditions, 
workers felt that they had nothing else they could do but approach the labor NGOs. Elegance 
Company workers were similarly confronted with ambiguous political opportunities. And it was 
in this space of uncertainty created by ambiguous political opportunities that Yijie contacted 
South City.  
  When she first decided to reach out to South City, Yijie herself was not particularly 
interested in collective bargaining. Instead, by her own admission, she originally went to seek 
assistance with filling out forms for submission to the Social Security Bureau (Interview 
20140112 180510). But as she spoke with the South City activist, she “talked about all the 
different situations and issues in our group, and [he] said ‘I can’t help each and every issue, with 
so many people.’ The best thing to do then, would be for us to organize ourselves more, gather 
those documents, and send them together” (Interview 20140112 180510). 
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 Since the labor activist made clear that he could not assist all the Elegance Company 
workers with their individual claims in a court of law, he presented them with an alternative 
action—collective bargaining. In fact, collective bargaining was the only option for workers if 
they were to secure South City’s assistance. Of course, Yijie could have walked away at this 
point, but South City represented the last available resource she had at her disposal. Her decision 
to go along with the NGO’s suggestion and organize her fellow colleagues had little to do with a 
deeply felt connection to them or even a desire to expand the rights of workers. And she did not 
regard her relationship to management as a particularly adversarial one. In fact, one of her 
relatives held a management position, which, if anything, made her quite reluctant to take on any 
kind of leadership role.  Nevertheless, working with South City and organizing her colleagues 
appeared to be the only option left for Yijie. And eventually, the South City activist was able to 
earn her trust. When describing the advice of the South City activist, she recalled how 
 
He said how we should do things. Gathering our documents. And everyone 
contributing 100 RMB. But that money would not be for [the activist], it was for 
our own expenses, like when we would have our big meetings, gathering together 
for our meetings, money for meals….that money wasn’t going to the NGO, but it 
was for our own protection. “You have to be clear on your accounts, you can’t not 
know how to be accountable to others.” So actually, I didn’t think at all that we 
were being cheated or anything. (Interview 20140112 180510) 
 
 But even while Yijie and her colleagues were willing to partner with South City, 
persuading the larger group of workers to do so would prove more difficult. Indeed, as Yijie 
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returned to rally her colleagues into an organized collective, she was met with considerable 
doubt and dissension from the larger group of workers at Elegance Company. And not only did 
the majority of workers doubt the labor NGO, they also doubted their methods. One worker 
recalled how “Everyone had questions. Actually I didn’t trust [the labor NGO]. Now we trust 
them. But in the beginning, not really. In the beginning, most people didn’t trust them” 
(Interview 20140112 180510B). Yijie described how “There were some who said ‘We’re giving 
you our IDs to copy, you’re taking everything. Will some people use our IDs to do something? 
We aren’t sure.’ They really were like this, and really there were many of them” (Interview 
20140112 180510). Another recounted how 
 
Each and every kind of opinion was there…. some were afraid we wouldn’t be able to get 
it, and would lose our jobs…others were afraid we wouldn’t succeed….[And] because we 
would go to different places, and there were costs, and so we had to have everyone 
contribute 200 kuai (RMB). There were some that were worried that after making these 
payments and then we weren’t able to get our arrears, what would happen then.  
(Interview 20140110 074601) 
 
Faced with the pervasive doubt and reluctance of her fellow Elegance Company workers, Yijie 
recalls how she resolved the issue: “I said, let’s all have a meeting for everyone, have a big 
meeting. And [the activist] came out, and after that, people weren’t so wary” (Interview 
20140112 180510).  
 Once Elegance Company workers agreed to work with South City and organize among 
themselves, they presented a formal letter of their demands to the company, which the company 
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refused to consider. From there, Elegance Company workers focused much of their energies on 
appealing to management. Their ability to put any real pressure on the company, however, was 
limited. It was not long before the company began retaliatory measures—further decreasing their 
workloads and sending orders to other departments and workers who were uninvolved in the 
dispute (Lan 2013). Work stoppages had little effect, since it was easy enough to transfer orders 
to other workers and reward non-participants with overtime. “There really wasn’t much we could 
do to management…We didn’t have much power to hurt them at all” said one worker (Interview 
20140112 180510).  
 With the company refusing demands, the group began fragmenting. Elegance Company 
representatives then appealed to the Guangzhou City Union, who dispatched a county union 
official to the company. After a push from union officials, management at Elegance Company 
agreed to meet with elected representatives on the factory grounds. The union’s intervention was 
an important force compelling management to meet with workers; a second meeting with 
representatives began soon after, and several more rounds followed. 
 Throughout my interviews with them, activists and workers alike rarely discussed the 
role of the union and its intervention. Often, it was only after direct questioning about whether 
the union or state was involved in bargaining efforts that a worker mentioned the union’s 
assistance in pressuring the company to engage in bargaining. They did emphasize their 
solidarity and the importance of maintaining this at all costs. As well, they point to the assistance 
and support of local NGOs as critical to their success. However, little else besides the union’s 
intervention adequately accounts for management’s about-face in its decision to meet with 
workers. While the assistance of South City and the solidarity of workers was clearly necessary 
in initiating the demand for collective bargaining, this brief moment of official intervention in 
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the labor dispute was ultimately what enabled workers to engage in collective bargaining and 
reclaim their insurance. As such, it speaks to the critical role of elite allies —in this case, state 
agents represented by the provincial ACFTU—in making collective bargaining a reality for 
workers. The Elegance Company labor dispute shows how the ACFTU is the only leverage 
workers have for bringing capital to the table, despite their own proclamations that the union is 
“useless.”  
 But why did union officials offer their support so readily? I argue that state support of 
collective bargaining hinged on the legality of workers’ demands. Union officials are only ever 
willing to intervene and facilitate collective bargaining if workers’ demands have a legal basis. 
The Guangzhou provincial union official, who was the sitting chair during the time of the 
Elegance Company dispute and whom I interviewed in the summer of 2016, was able to offer 
some insight into this. While he had not been directly involved in facilitating bargaining 
sessions, he was well aware of the company and its history of labor contention. I asked him 
specifically about the Elegance Company labor dispute, mentioning that the union helped 
workers to engage in collective bargaining in this case. As he put it, Elegance Company workers  
 
were able to harness the law (弄法)—their case was within the law. When you’re 
within  the law, the union can play a role, and the situation is often much easier to 
handle. So there are cases like [the Elegance Company labor dispute]…where the 
union promoted collective bargaining and we followed bargaining procedure. 
(Interview 20160727)  
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 My interview with the union official covered a wide range of topics, but the importance 
of legality wound its way through our conversation. At one point, he discussed how building 
workers’ legal knowledge was part of union officials’ duties and key to maintaining the peace. 
Providing legal education could help to prevent workers from taking matters into their own 
hands and engaging in strike action:  
 
I told [union cadres]: no matter what, in the end you are the union. You are a 
representative of workers. So [during a labor dispute] you can’t hide, you need to 
get involved. If you know the law, tell the workers what they can do, what their 
legal rights are, and what is illegal. Help them and teach them how to secure their 
rights through  rational means (理性的维权). And at the same time you can 
represent workers and bargain with the company and resolve the problem…So 
only if the union is effective will things work out. If in these kinds of cases, the 
union is hiding, is unwilling to stick its head out, then it is ineffective. If the union 
is hiding, then workers will start acting on their own, spontaneously, and often 
what they’re doing is illegal. (Interview 20160727) 
  
 The official’s use of the term “acting spontaneously” is, in fact, a euphemism for 
workers’ use of strike action. Earlier in our conversation, the official had remarked that when 
“companies don’t have a union…workers are more free and independent, they are able to move 
spontaneously…Most of those strikes are spontaneous.” And, despite much ambiguity around 
whether strike action is strictly illegal or not, the union officials’ consistent tethering of illegal 
action to spontaneous action and spontaneous action to strikes reveals that he certainly regarded 
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strikes as illegal. Preventing illegal action—strikes—and promoting legal methods motivated the 
union official’s support for collective bargaining. 
 Support of workers is further justified as a means to educate workers, uphold the law, and 
teach them “rational” action. The issue of rationality figured prominently in my discussion with 
the official, and underlined how the state official’s assessments of workers—and whether or not 
to offer support—rested on workers’ lawfulness and their capacity to abide by the law. Rational 
action was contrasted with “irrational” action, which he explained as “following its own logic, 
regardless of what kind of law is in place.” One example of irrational action included “taking to 
the streets.” Thus, legality determined the boundary between rational and irrational action. 
Workers’ needs, their circumstances and experiences, their position within the industrial 
structure in China, were largely irrelevant.  
 In presenting workers as given to “irrational” illegal behaviors—specifically, strike 
action—the union official constructs a narrative in which workers are in need of legal education 
in order to be made into rational, law-abiding subjects. Structural failings of the court system or 
industrial policies, neither of which address collective problems, are simply left out of his 
problematization. Instead, workers’ insufficient knowledge of the proper actions to take 
explained their propensity to take “irrational” action. And state intervention was the solution to 
prevent this. Typically, the state promoted legal channels as the preferred route for dispute 
resolution. But they were also willing to support collective action—so long as it could be used to 
maintain order, and so long as workers could keep their demands and actions within the confines 
of the law.  
 In the end, after several sessions of bargaining, management agreed to pay Elegance 
Company workers their arrears back to 2004. In other words, workers could recover a maximum 
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of seven years of their unpaid social insurance. While the Elegance case represents an instance in 
which workers were able to successfully win their claims using collective bargaining, whether 
the experience of bargaining itself empowered workers is questionable. When I spoke to workers 
privately, without the presence of the South City activist, workers expressed ambivalence toward 
collective bargaining. These collective-bargaining meetings were not necessarily empowering 
moments where they felt themselves afforded respect and were treated by management as equals. 
Said one worker who had represented and lead her colleagues, there was little back-and-forth 
exchange at all (Interview 20140316 195612). The capacity for collective bargaining to put 
workers on an equal playing field with management as labor activists envisioned appears limited. 
 As well, according to workers, the material wins in the Elegance Company case were 
minimal. For those who had been with the company over 10 years, receiving only seven years of 
arrears represented a weak victory at best. When speaking of their win, they called it mere 
“compensation,” saying with a sigh that they had not been able to recover as much as workers in 
another factory (Interview 20140112 180510). In fact, according to one woman, in the end, the 
company remitted only about 70,000 RMB, or approximately $11,667 US, which was split 
among all 49 workers. Although she had worked at the company for 13 years, her share of this 
came to 8,000 RMB, or $1,333 US (Interview 20140316 195612). Considering that the minimum 
wage at that time was 1,500 RMB per month, if we calculate employee contributions at a 
conservative rate of 20% of wages, this represents a recovery of just over two years of the 
employer contributions that were due this worker.  
 Nevertheless, the Elegance Company labor dispute is considered among labor activists to 
be one of the more successful instances of collective bargaining. According to a South City 
activist involved in the case, “the Elegance dispute let workers really know about collective 
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bargaining and that they could negotiate things” (Interview 20140109 115622). Certainly, the 
case is one example of successfully implemented worker-led bargaining, since workers were able 
to engage in several face-to-face meetings with management and achieve their demands.  
 It also appeared to further encourage local state agents to make collective bargaining a 
part of their repertoire of conciliation. As we will see, in a case that followed the Elegance 
Company dispute, local state intervention to facilitate collective bargaining came even more 
swiftly. However, workers’ use of collective bargaining in this next case—the Golden Company 
labor dispute—did not prevent the marches and disruptive actions. Rather, after they were able to 
successfully engage in bargaining with management, workers’ escalated their demands and 
activities. They organized more protests and strikes and sought to use collective bargaining for 
claims that went beyond the legal minimum.  
 
Golden Company Labor Dispute  
 Like the Elegance Company, the Golden Manufacturing Company (Golden Company) 
was a mid-sized, Hong Kong-owned manufacturing company at the southern edge of the city of 
Guangzhou. The company was founded in 1993, and according to interviews with workers, at its 
peak in 2000 employed over 2,500 workers. The company’s decline began in the wake of the 
2008 global economic recession. By 2012, the company had overhauled its wage system, moving 
from an hourly to a per-piece-rate system whereby workers would be paid according to the 
number of items they completed rather than by the hours they worked. Though the company was 
required to ask workers to sign new labor contracts agreeing to these changes, those who did not 
agree were given fewer orders and ultimately fewer work hours and income. Even those who did 
agree to work under the piece-rate system found themselves short changed: the company did not 
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settle unit prices with its contractors in advance, and workers who worked on a completed order 
would find that their actual income (after the unit prices were settled) were less than they had 
expected.  
 On top of this, the company began restricting overtime hours for many workers. 
However, income from normal hours at the legal rate was considered inadequate. Low-wage 
workers in China operate under the tacit understanding that their incomes will be supplemented 
by overtime work and regard this extra income as critical to their livelihood. As one Golden 
Company worker put it, “There’s a saying—Chinese workers love overtime. Why do they love 
overtime? Because overtime is money…without overtime there’s no money” (Interview 
20140109 164355/Ref 2.3.1+2). Said another, “Every hour was a bit more money” (Interview 
20140109 164355/Ref 2.3.1+2 E). The cuts in overtime were tantamount to a one-third reduction 
in what they had been accustomed to earning. A worker I spoke to described how their incomes 
dropped precipitously under this new wage structure:  
 
Let’s say before you could get 3,000 RMB; Now you could only get 1,000 RMB 
per month. Basically you don’t have living expenses. Let’s say you have a kid in 
kindergarten, that’s 800 each month, how are you suppose to live? It’s like the 
company just doesn’t want you. If they wanted us, they wouldn’t have done that. 
(Interview 20140109 164355/Ref 2.3.1+2).  
 
 Golden Company workers quit in droves. By 2013, when the dispute unfolded, there were 
only 700 employees. Then, in May of  2013, newly promulgated labor laws required an increase 
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in minimum wage to 1,555 RMB per month. Golden Company duly increased its workers’ 
minimum wages but cut workers’ housing benefits. A worker explained to me:  
  
It was like this: before, the minimum wage was around 1,000 RMB per month, 
but then it increased to 1,550 RMB. But what they did was take the housing 
subsidies….Our income was minimum wage, overtime, housing subsidies, and 
they cut the housing subsidies, and reallocated that amount to the minimum 
wage… we got an increase in wages but no increase in our income. (Interview 
20140109 164355/Ref 2.3.1+2 E) 
 
 With the earlier changes in wage structure and the decline in access to overtime hours, 
the company’s retrenchment of housing subsidies was the final straw for workers. Strikes and 
protests erupted across factory grounds, lasting for six days in June and involving over 300 
workers (CLB, 2013). In the midst of the strikes, management called local government to the 
scene (Interview March 2014). Officials from the township union and the Department of Labor 
and Social Security intervened and facilitated negotiations between workers and management. 
After these discussions, the company agreed to comply with minimum-wage regulations and to 
reinstate housing subsidies.  
 A few things are worth noting here. First, it was the company that sought the assistance 
of local authorities. The company’s initiative to bring in local government was likely an attempt 
to use state forces to end workers’ strikes. However, since the government officials did not side 
with management but rather sought to bring workers and management together into negotiations, 
this clearly backfired. Second, workers engaged in collective bargaining with their company 
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without guidance from labor NGOs. And third, it was state actors (not labor activists) who 
encouraged workers and management to negotiate with each other in this particular dispute. 
According to workers, state officials told them to select representatives, write a list of their 
demands, and set a date for negotiations (Interview 20140109 164355/Interview 2.3.1+2E)—
essentially following the same playbook that labor NGOs had articulated in their own trainings 
on collective bargaining. Afterward, the state acted as a liaison between workers and 
management, who, workers said, refused to meet face-to-face with them. In the end, officials 
held the company to legal standards, requiring that they reinstate housing subsidies. In a similar 
vein to the Elegance Company labor dispute, workers were able to level a legitimate legal case 
against the company, and this facilitated local state actors’ support of workers. While I was 
unable to speak to the authorities who had been directly involved, I argue that workers’ legally 
bounded claims were a contributing factor of the state’s willingness to intervene on their behalf. 
 The swift intervention of local state actors and their willingness to facilitate collective 
bargaining on their own accord indicate that the practice was gaining acceptability among 
political authorities. In the Golden Company labor dispute, state authorities used collective 
bargaining as a means to redirect workers away from strike activity. In many ways, collective 
bargaining was deployed in the same manner as the “street as courtroom” tactics described by Su 
and He (2010), where local state and judicial officials intervene in street protests and provide a 
street-level adjudication process. Studies on this discuss how local officials turned streets into 
“courts,” to avoid more time-consuming, costly, and potentially ineffective court processes and 
put an end to workers’ strike activity, often by appeasing workers with financial payments from 
dedicated government funds (Su & He 2010). 
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 This time, rather than making streets into courtrooms, local authorities facilitated extra-
legal negotiations between workers, ending strikes and keeping workers’ demands within legal 
boundaries. Though he was not referring to the Golden Company case specifically, the union 
official spoke of collective bargaining’s utility in quelling strikes:  
 
Using bargaining to resolve strikes was something that came from the highest 
level of authority in Guangdong Province. And we thought this was a good idea, 
to use bargaining and negotiations. That way we don’t need to detain people; 
workers don’t  need to be dismissed. (Interview 20160727) 
 
Even more, rather than drawing from government coffers to assuage workers, collective 
bargaining processes forced the company (rather than the state) to make payments that were due 
to workers.   
 But the Golden Company labor dispute did not end there. Despite management’s 
concessions, about 100 workers subsequently demanded that the company expand its allowance 
for overtime hours. While the company claimed that it could not provide overtime due to slowing 
business, these workers contended that others were, in fact, given preferential treatment, with 
overtime on the weekends and during the week. And the retrenchment of overtime had been a 
long-festering sore spot for workers.  
  
Yes, five days a week, eight hours a day. When we were bargaining with the 
company, we admitted that this was legal, no one said that it was illegal. But it 
was unreasonable. It was unprincipled. You work there for over 10 
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years….Before 2005 there was a time when I wouldn’t even want to work 
overtime, and they forced me to do overtime. Now I definitely would do overtime 
and they don’t give it to me. That time when they forced me to work extra, they 
added three or four hours. Now we all want things to do, and they abandon me. It 
wasn’t me that abandoned them (Interview 20140109 164355/Ref 2.3.1+2 E). 
 
 
For workers, the loss of overtime was an affront to their own sense of justice and fairness, 
regardless of its legality. Their repeated references to the bygone days when they were able to 
make a living wage at the company underscores a sense of loss for which they faulted the 
company, and which would later figure into the course of their dispute.  
 Unfortunately, insofar as their overtime allocations were concerned, the company was 
acting in total compliance with labor laws. Since workers had no legal claims to overtime work, 
government officials declined to support workers’ demands. And since the company agreed to 
abide by their legal obligations for minimum wage and housing benefits, government officials 
recommended that workers accept these terms and return to work. Repeated appeals to the 
provincial union had little effect. With the company refusing to negotiate and the local 
government refusing to assist any further, Golden Company workers then turned to South City 
for advice on how to proceed.  
 According to reports of activists familiar with the labor dispute, Golden Company 
workers began to use collective action strategically as a means to continue to draw attention to 
their case. They began peaceably, with sit-ins and banner displays, and then slowly escalated to 
marching and disruptive activity, haranguing workers who remained on the production line. 
	 100 
Under the advisement of South City, they avoided bringing protests out into the streets, keeping 
marches within the factory compound lest they be arrested for “disturbing the public order,” a 
handy label for public dissent that local enforcement can use to quash insurgency.  
 Golden Company workers’ were unique in their willingness to take on such action 
despite their weak positional power. After all, the company’s moves to reduce labor costs 
stemmed from its own declining profit. Indeed, as workers demanded more overtime, they 
learned that when the company had made its initial changes to the wage structure, it had done so 
with the aim of reducing the work force; the voluntary departure of hundreds of workers prior to 
the labor dispute had, in fact, been part of the company’s strategy to cut back on its labor force 
without initiating dismissals that would have required it to pay additional compensation to 
workers for terminating work contracts earlier than original legal agreements would have 
allowed. Going on strike for overtime might have given the company yet another opportunity to 
dismiss more workers and avoid compensation on the premise that management was within its 
legal rights to terminate workers who were not fulfilling their work obligations. Furthermore, 
workers admitted that their strikes did little to disrupt production. “It didn’t affect normal 
operations. There were over 700 workers at the time. The hundred-odd workers on strike really 
weren’t doing any damage. You’d need at least four, five hundred before you could do that” 
(Interview 20140109 164355/Ref 2.3.1+2 E). 
 
 Nevertheless, workers persisted. And, upon hearing that the company had wanted 
workers to quit, they switched their demands. Rather than overtime, workers requested that the 
company provide severance payments for workers who would agree to leave the company. Said 
one worker,  
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The intention for our collective action wasn’t just to get our money and go. We 
were asking for more work, more things to do, more shifts. We wanted to earn our 
money. We didn’t just want to take our money and go. We had worked there for 
over 10 years, we didn’t want to just go to some new place. But they said there 
was nothing to do. They could only follow management’s orders; whatever work 
we got was what we got. But  how could we live on this? We couldn’t live on this. 
So there was nothing else to do. We went on strike, took to the streets (Interview 
20140109 164355/Ref 2.3.1+2 E). 
 
Workers continued to protest and march. But this did not appear to sway or pressure 
management at all. In one particularly dramatic incident, the company locked the factory gates, 
shutting the workers out of the factory and hiring sixty extra men for enforcement. Workers 
described being roughed up and physically attacked.  
 What did eventually bear fruit for workers were their concurrent appeals to local officials. 
The 100 workers who were involved made their way to government buildings to pressure 
government officials to support their case. Just as they had escalated their protest tactics around 
the factory, workers steadily climbed the regional bureaucracy in their petitions, first heading to 
the township offices, then the district level, and then the city level. “We were just short of 
heading to the provincial level,” recalled one. After about a month of this, government officials 
finally relented. Workers were able to hold negotiations with officials in the labor bureau and 
with district officials who then spoke to Golden Company about workers’ demands. In the end, 
the company agreed to dismiss the workers and to pay their severance.  
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 In a report on the labor dispute, one worker is quoted saying, “We slapped the boss in the 
face; he used to say that he will ‘fix’ us no matter how high the price might be, but now he pays 
us severance packages for the first time in his life! We also slapped the government in the face; it 
used to reject our right to represent the workers, and now it pressures the company to sign this 
agreement with us on equal grounds” (CLB, 2013). The worker’s contention that they “slapped” 
both their boss and the government into submission positions workers in an adversarial position 
with both the company and the state and makes workers the driving agents of dispute outcomes. 
In a similar vein, labor activists have emphasized the importance of workers’ solidarity and 
strength as key in workers’ success. They have also emphasized South City’s role in helping to 
strategically guide workers through the protests and appeals to government officials.  
 While it’s true that workers maintained their solidarity and that South City provided 
important advice that helped workers avoid detainment, such accounts mute the role of the state, 
both in facilitating collective bargaining early on, even before the entry of the labor NGO, and in 
eventually helping the workers to pressure the company for their severance packages. The 
Golden Company dispute reveals an instance in which state actors were not necessarily wholly 
set against the interest of workers—especially if workers’ demands were aligned with legal 
standards. While the quote above makes for an exciting sound-bite for labor activists, it risks 
misrepresenting a more complex relationship between the state and workers. When I spoke to 
Golden Company workers myself a couple of years later, they did not express the same 
vehemence against state actors. Rather, they readily acknowledged that it was government 
officials who organized collective bargaining sessions, passed on their demands, and eventually 
forced the company to concede.  
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 The evolution of the state’s response to and involvement with the Golden Company labor 
dispute is particularly illuminating. Although I was unable to speak to the authorities who had 
been directly involved, it is clear that the legality of workers’ demands figured prominently in 
local authorities’ involvement and support of workers. When workers’ demands stayed within 
legal boundaries, local authorities were much more willing to intervene and facilitate collective 
bargaining, empowering workers with permission to organize and elect their own representatives 
and compelling the company to adhere to labor laws. Local authorities hoped that if management 
and workers could peaceably engage in negotiations, their dispute could be resolved and that 
could be the end. Speaking generally of collective bargaining, the union official discussed how  
 
collective bargaining is good for avoiding “irrational” behavior. If workers don’t 
have a communication channel with their employers, they may take to the 
streets…, and that will have a bad influence on society. In this situation, they 
should use collective negotiation to resolve issues. If you can use collective 
negotiation right, then that is less trouble for the state. (Interview 20160727) 
 
 However, rather than making less trouble for the state, collective bargaining opened the 
door to more contention, emboldening Golden Company workers to put more demands on the 
table in the expectation that the state would continue to facilitate negotiations. But when 
workers’ claims went beyond the legal minimum, local authorities declined to further involve 
themselves or to further facilitate collective bargaining.  
 While legal scholars have argued that alternative dispute-resolution processes are most 
beneficial for “interests or needs that often differ from or go beyond legally justifiable claims” 
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(Edelman et al., 1993, p. 503), it is clear that local state actors in China did not regard collective 
bargaining as such. Rather, their support of collective bargaining was firmly based in their own 
expectations that the practice could be used to maintain social order, prevent workers’ disruptive 
action, and subdue strikes already underway. Once workers themselves sought to use collective 
bargaining as labor activists and advocates intended—to expand workers’ rights and make gains 
for workers’ interests—the state withdrew its support.  
 Without the state’s willing support, workers renewed their protests and marches and 
began a targeted offensive to pressure the state to intervene, sending collective appeals up the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. The Golden Company workers’ steady escalation up the regional chain of 
command is a well-worn tactical strategy in which challengers “reach upwards” (Brian & Li, 
2006, p. 92) to leverage the power of higher authorities. “Reaching upwards” comes from the 
historical conceptualization of a reciprocal state and society relationship in China, wherein 
subjects’ recognition of the state’s authority is contingent on the state’s recognition of its 
obligation to fulfill subjects’ needs (Brian & Li, 2006). Golden Company workers, like many 
others before them, drew on this deeply embedded sense of their right to make claims for issues 
that affected their livelihoods—regardless of contemporary legal codes—to higher levels of 
authority. 
 For their part, local authorities’ eventual facilitation of negotiations for demands outside 
legal boundaries was likely motivated by the need to avoid what could turn into an explosive 
crisis. Unfortunately, I was unable to secure direct commentary from local state officials’ on why  
they finally agreed to give their support to those directly involved. However, we can speculate 
that the authorities were aware of workers’ marches on factory grounds and the scuffles between 
workers and management. From the perspective of the local authorities, allowing protests to 
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continue would have risked the possibility that they would take a public turn, spilling into the 
streets and having a “bad influence on society” (Interview 20160727). And attempts to compel 
workers to break rank through bribes and threats had failed (CLB, 2013 November 7). 
Furthermore, previous scholarship has discussed that it is not in lower-level officials’ interests to 
allow collective grievances to work up to higher levels, as this reflects poorly on their 
performance and could harm career advancement that is tied to social stability maintenance 
(Chan & Selden, 2014; Chen, 2012). 
 Labor activists regard the Golden Company labor dispute as one of the most successful 
instances of worker-led collective bargaining, praising their solidarity against temptations and 
obstacles. And workers from other companies who knew of the case would sometimes refer to it 
during interviews with a mixture of wistfulness and awe, remarking that the wins of Golden 
Company workers had been the greatest. But the Golden Company labor dispute is especially 
remarkable as a case in which workers used collective bargaining in conjunction with strikes and 
protests (which were explicitly prohibited in official guides on collective negotiations), avoided 
arrests, and, most importantly, bargained for claims that went beyond legal minimums or what 
was strictly due to them through the law or in their original contracts. This was the realization of 
collective bargaining as a means to expand labor rights: to enable gains for workers outside the 
state-controlled legal system that was (and is) failing workers (Gallagher, 2006).  
 From the vantage point of local state officials, however, the Golden Company labor 
dispute could very well be read as something of a minor disaster. The state’s initial support of 
workers in the first set of bargaining sessions for minimum wage did nothing to prevent further 
contention, settle grievances, or subdue workers. If anything, it only encouraged workers to 
ratchet up their demands and use collective bargaining as a means to move beyond legal 
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minimums. This was precisely the opposite of the state’s intentions. To make matters worse, 
disruptive action renewed and continued on factory grounds. And this time, under the 
advisement of South City, workers coupled their disruptive action with direct appeals to 
government officials for intervention. This tactical escalation and “reaching up” the regional 
chain of state authorities was certainly not what officials had hoped would come out of their 
initial support of workers in collective bargaining. Rather than resulting in less trouble, collective 
bargaining seemed to result in more. Indeed, almost all the events that followed that first round 
of collective bargaining represented a set of unintended—and for local authorities, undesirable—
consequences of the state’s early support for the practice.  
 This chapter cannot claim that the 2013 Golden Company labor dispute alone brought a 
diminishment of the state’s embrace of collective bargaining. However, to my knowledge, none 
of the labor disputes that followed it enjoyed the same level of success. During my own 
fieldwork during 2013-2014, labor organizations promoting collective bargaining were at their 
height in terms of growing public attention, prominence, and optimism for the viability of 
collective bargaining as a means to bring real social change for low-wage workers in China. 
However, the labor disputes that unfolded during my time in the field ultimately ended in failures 
to bring management and workers to the bargaining table together. One of these cases was the 
MobileTech labor dispute. This dispute underscores the importance of legality in the state’s 
willingness to intervene in support of workers. It also shows how, without the state’s willingness 





MobileTech Labor Dispute 
 Established in 1995, the MobileTech plant in southern China manufactured cellphones 
and employed over 6,000 workers in its heyday. Once a premier electronics firm with global 
reach in both sales and operations, MobileTech has been in decline over the past several years, 
primarily due to the rise of smartphone technologies that have decimated the cellular market. As 
MobileTech has sought to downscale its production and sales, one of its manufacturing plants in 
Dongguan was slated for sale and acquisition to another company in 2014. On September 2, 
2014, workers received official notice that the buying company would acquire the factory and its 
attendant technologies. Despite promises that this would not result in any substantive changes for 
workers, it is clear that such news was the source of much worry. After all, management at this 
particular plant had changed three times in recent years. And it was only a month before, in 
August, when nearly 100 workers, including managers, technicians, and senior workers, had 
been dismissed as part of organizational restructuring, or as the company put it, for 
“improvements in factory efficiency.”  
 If news of the pending acquisition undermined MobileTech workers’ sense of security, 
the arrival of a new cohort of workers in October only served to heighten anxieties—and to 
incense workers as well. According to workers interviewed for this study, the new cohort 
received higher pay rates than senior employees, even as they required training from more 
experienced workers. Furthermore, the new cohort’s presence confirmed suspicions that the firm 
was attempting to force older workers out while skirting compensation fees that would be legally 
due to workers dismissed for restructuring purposes (Interview 20140416 121529).  
 Tensions boiled over when the company published a new worker’s manual. According to 
workers, the new manual was simply another attempt to reduce the labor force by forcing new 
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regulations and protocols that would drive workers to quit of their own accord (thus downsizing 
the number of workers while avoiding compensatory fees otherwise required for dismissing 
workers for reasons unrelated to their work performance or conduct). One of the changes 
included the beginning of a cumulative demerit system. Although it had previously been the 
practice that demerits for poor conduct were cleared at the end of the year, now charges against 
workers would be cumulative over the course of a worker’s tenure at the factory. Other issues 
involved a reduction of payment for workers on leave. Ultimately, the manual provided a 
rallying point for workers, a concrete point of contention that brought workers off the production 
line and into action.  
 Strikes involving over 3,000 workers erupted on November 19 2014. Protests centered on 
the “sale of workers to [another company] without providing compensation.” In other words, 
workers linked the changes in employees’ policies, the arrival of new workers, and the release of 
the new worker’s manual to the pending acquisition. As they understood it, the curtailing of 
favorable employee policies would provide savings for the acquiring company at the expense of 
workers themselves. They blamed MobileTech for cheapening its sale by enacting these policies 
and its attempt to shrink its labor force while shirking the legal compensation required in such 
circumstances. In addition to their protest activity, workers contacted the city union, seeking 
their intervention and assistance. But the union refused to involve itself or provide any assistance 
to workers.  
 When strikes broke out within the factory, local activists from an NGO based in 
Shenzhen entered the scene to introduce themselves. Activists sought to offer workers their 
assistance and advise them to organize themselves. Workers seemed willing enough to hear them 
out and at first seemed on board when advised to elect representatives. However, when push 
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came to shove, there was ultimately very little movement on the part of workers to do so. As 
workers saw it, they each stood for their own individual interests: “what need was there to have a 
representative?” (Interview 20140725).  
 Strikes did not last long. Within a few days, management offered workers 1,000 RMB—
approximately $150 US—in a “gratitude fee” if they returned to production. Agreeing to this, 
worker participation in strikes abated, and by November 26, strike activity had all but ended.  
 However, unbeknown to the workers, the dispute was far from over. The next day, 240 
workers were fired—the largest known number of workers dismissed for participating in strike 
action in China’s contemporary labor history. In addition to sending text messages to the 
dismissed workers, the company also posted a public notice near the entryway, listing the 
terminated employees’ numbers (Interview 20140721). When attempting to enter the factory, 
these workers found their employee cards had been disabled. At the time, the company gave no 
information as to why workers had been terminated. It was not until later, when a few workers 
took their case to arbitration, that the company produced an official written statement citing 
“employee absenteeism and disruption to factory production processes” (Case Documents, 
Evidence 1). 
 Soon after their dismissal, most of the 240 workers scattered. Some accepted the loss and 
moved on to find other employment. In the current labor market, this is not terribly difficult, and 
workers have mentioned that on the whole, finding work is easy enough (albeit finding well-
paying work is more difficult). Others went on to hire their own lawyers to file their own 
independent lawsuits against the company.  
 However, seventy workers banded together and collectively sought out legal aid. These 
seventy had kept in contact with the Shenzhen-based labor activists and now sought their help in 
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securing legal aid to bring the company to court. In both early and subsequent discussions with 
MobileTech workers, activists encouraged workers to organize themselves. However, it was not 
until after they were dismissed from the company that workers began to act on labor NGO’s 
advice. But by this point, even though workers were more willing to organize and were even 
open to collective bargaining, doing so was no longer a viable option. Because workers no longer 
held positions as employees, the firm was hardly under any pressure to meet with them, let alone 
consider their demands. Workers’ willingness to try collective bargaining was moot. Only legal 
action was logistically feasible. 
 Labor activists referred workers to Shenzhen Law, the prominent law firm-cum-NGO 
headquartered in Shenzhen. The lawyer heading the firm, one of the most active and outspoken 
proponents of collective bargaining, offered workers a deal: his firm would represent workers 
pro bono, but under one condition—rather than sue for compensation, workers would have to sue 
for the reinstatement of their work positions (Interview 2014072014). When explaining the 
merits of this strategy, the lawyer compared workers’ situation to a marriage and divorce. “Isn’t 
it more frightening if the other party doesn’t accept the divorce, if they refuse the divorce and say 
they want to stay married? You know there is trouble ahead, that it isn’t over. The company 
wants to be done with you, to have this all be over. But we won’t give them the satisfaction.” 
 According to activists, demanding reinstatement would provide workers with greater 
leverage to push the company to eventually engage in collective bargaining. And it is through 
collective bargaining that workers would be able to make demands for compensation that would 
exceed the standards set by legal framework. Another lawyer working at Shenzhen Law told me 
that courts may view workers who sue for reinstatement more favorably, since plaintiffs would 
portray themselves as laborers pursuing a substantive livelihood rather than just monetary gains. 
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While workers agreed to these conditions, it is unlikely that they would have sued for 
reinstatement on their own accord or if they had been working with other lawyers. As for 
Shenzhen Law, involvement in the MobileTech labor dispute represented an opportunity to take 
part in shaping the outcome of a prominent case that had already made considerable waves 
throughout the media and among concerned labor advocates. In their view, winning this case 
would be a significant symbolic victory for worker rights.  
 What followed was a nearly year-long process of arbitration and then litigation against 
the company. When I spoke with workers a few months after the trial had begun, it was clear that 
the trial process was not going as well as had been hoped and that the realities of a protracted 
legal suite were wearing workers thin. Their demand for reinstatement barred them from finding 
other gainful employment as they were, ostensibly, hoping to work for MobileTech in the near 
future. Thus, workers were simultaneously unemployed and unable to find work with another 
company, which would have jeopardized their case in court. While some took on informal, odd 
jobs, it was clearly a difficult situation for many of them. Workers varied in their degree of 
despondency; some were deeply frustrated while others maintained faith in the power of their 
collective strength.  
 Furthermore, while workers maintained contact with one other and may very well have 
brought their case to court as a collective, workers were tried and processed on an individual 
basis. This not only added to the complexity of handling the cases but also brought into full relief 
the reality of individualistic legal processes, which increased the administrative burdens for 
Shenzhen Law and weakened the workers’ case against the company. Early on, the court ruled in 
favor of one worker, finding that he had indeed been wrongfully dismissed, while ruling against 
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all the others. MobileTech Company then appealed the ruling in favor of the one employee. In 
turn, the remaining sixty-nine workers then appealed the court’s decision against them.  
 Despite the efforts of workers and activists alike, after several months of delay and more 
appeals, in July 2014, the court ultimately ruled against workers, finding that the company had 
been within its rights to dismiss workers for striking. Throughout the MobileTech labor dispute, 
local government authorities, including the ACFTU officials to whom workers had initially 
reached out, were completely absent from the course of events. They did not move to support 
workers in any capacity, let alone to facilitate collective-bargaining sessions.  
 From the outset, the MobileTech workers did not have a particularly strong legal case, 
and this likely contributed to the local government’s refusal to provide assistance to workers. 
Workers protested the “sale of workers without providing compensation,” but this is not an 
entirely accurate portrayal of the merger plans. MobileTech workers had officially been assured 
that there would not be layoffs or substantive changes to their incomes. Furthermore, media 
reports about MobileTech suggested that the infamous worker’s manual that had set off the 
strikes had nothing to do with the merger-and-acquisition plans (Zhang, 2013) as workers had 
claimed. Rather, the company’s move to change its policies for workers stemmed from its own 
failure to meet production capacity due to its dwindling market presence. According to this 
report, in the summer before the merger-and-acquisition deal had been made, production was not 
even at half its capacity.  
 But MobileTech workers’ were not incorrect in their suspicion that the company sought 
to remove them without having to pay the legally required compensation fees. The company 
needed to cut costs, specifically labor costs. According to one expert, “Sales of [MobileTech] 
phones have fallen 20%, cell phones are in surplus, and if the factory doesn’t cut down on its 
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workers, it will definitely be harmed” (Zhang, 2013). The strikes ultimately gave the company 
the rationale it needed to reduce its workforce on the basis that workers had not fulfilled their 
contractual duties and that it was within the company’s rights to terminate them without 
compensation. Without clear legal codes permitting (or prohibiting) strike action, it was up to 
local judiciaries to make their legal interpretations as to whether this was an instance of unfair 
corporate retaliation or whether the company was acting in accordance with its legal rights. 
Studies have shown that courts often protect management decisions to fire workers that have 
gone on strike and that, on the whole, courts rarely look into the details of a labor dispute or 
company procedures to find favor with workers (Estlund & Wang, forthcoming). The outcome of 
the MobileTech case further confirms these findings. 
 Without a strong legal case from workers, and with the company able to settle strikes 
through its own means, local government actors had little incentive to intervene. Indeed, they 
had every reason not to involve themselves. By allowing the case to run its course, local state 
authorities saved themselves the trouble of having to use any additional manpower or create 
bureaucratic inconvenience for themselves.  
 Finally, siding with workers might have sent a negative signal to businesses and 
companies, whose revenue and investments local authorities still seek to maintain. It would have 
signaled a departure from the friendly relations between state and capital in late-industrial 
countries like China, where local authorities offer tax breaks, preferred treatment, relaxed 
regulations, and above all cheap labor in exchange for companies’ investments and business in 
the area. In the MobileTech labor dispute, if the state had intervened to support workers, it is 
possible that they would have been supporting demands for a payout similar to the one Golden 
Company had been forced to make or costly labor contracts that would have exacerbated the 
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company’s financial troubles. In withholding their involvement, however, local government 
actors gave the company their tacit support and continued assurance that business relationships 
would remain friendly.  
 The MobileTech labor dispute, as a case of withheld state intervention and a failed 
attempt to implement collective bargaining, underlines the importance of legality in the state’s 
decision to offer its support. While workers’ did not specifically request the state’s support in 
collective bargaining, union officials refused to assist workers in any capacity. I argue that this 
was because workers’ had no legal basis for their grievances.  
 Furthermore, MobileTech stands out as a company that had greater financial capacity to 
resolve its dispute as well as greater legal acumen, which allowed it to stay within the boundaries 
of the law and to avoid negative legal repercussions. In contrast to both Elegance Company and 
Golden Company, MobileTech was acting in full accordance with the law in all its operations 
leading up to the strikes. And, in contrast to Golden Company, MobileTech was equipped to 
settle strikes on its own. Where Golden Company’s management had called in the local labor 
bureau in the hopes they would squelch workers’ strikes, MobileTech was able to mollify 
workers with token payments and to end strikes on its own. State actors may have recognized 
that there was no need for their involvement. Indeed, the company’s maneuverings went hand-in-
hand with the legal weakness of workers’ claims and are part and parcel of the state’s ability to 
make itself scare throughout the dispute.  
 One could ask whether MobileTech’s brand recognition and status as a Western company 
explains the local state’s reluctance to intervene on workers’ behalf. But to explain the state’s 
support as influenced by firm characteristics misses the bigger picture of state-capital relations 
and how this has influenced the state’s willingness to support collective bargaining more 
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generally. Rather than the firm’s descriptive status, the state’s lack of intervention throughout the 
MobileTech labor dispute captures the importance of maintaining an environment that is 
business-friendly to capital investments. After all, the state’s withholding of support in this case 
worked to the advantage of the company, which was able to make the needed reductions in its 
workforce and still avoid costly compensation fees.  
 The ability to maneuver as such has drawn many companies from all over the world to 
locate facilities and production in Guangdong Province. Beyond the specifics of the MobileTech 
labor dispute, preserving this business environment has figured prominently in the state’s 
reluctance to support collective bargaining through formal legislation. In 2014, the provincial 
government attempted to promulgate legislation for collective negotiations for collective 
contracts to make a legal framework for collective negotiations with the Draft Regulations on 
Enterprise Collective Consultations and Collective Contracts. In response, the Hong Kong 
Chamber of Commerce put forward a full-bore effort to prevent these regulations from moving 
forward (CLB, 2014 May 20; Lau 2014; July 6 South China Morning Post) and was successful 
in staving off the institutionalization of these regulations. The ACFTU official with whom I 
spoke revealed that union officials are deeply mindful of the interests of companies. Indeed, 
throughout the conversation, the perspective of capital—which, unlike workers, was never 
referred to as irrational—was one that he was quite familiar with. As he said,  
 
The reason [companies] came to China was for a more relaxed regulatory 
environment, a more free environment. They didn’t think that we would have 
taken this foreign concept [of collective bargaining] and try to use it. 
Fundamentally they did not want this. (Interview 20160727) 
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And even while he himself took a more neutral position toward collective bargaining and 
recognized its value in creating a more equitable system for dispute resolution, he admitted that 
the inability to implement meaningful regulations for collective negations was due to capital’s 
opposition:  
The opposition from capital firms was quite strong. We had to listen to what 
many of the firms were saying, and their suggestions, and make changes to what 
we have now….Because, you know, in Guangdong, capital power is too strong. 
That’s how it is. (Interview 20160727) 
 
Capital was able to successfully pressure the provincial authorities and prevent the 
institutionalization of collective negotiations. Collective bargaining as a tool to expand workers 




 The implementation of collective bargaining in China required the involvement of several 
players: companies, labor NGOs, workers, and the state. Each of these actors had its own 
separate perspective on the purpose of collective bargaining and what it could do for them. For 
their part, companies recognized full well that collective bargaining would do nothing to further 
their interests, and they resisted it at every turn. Their participation came only by coercion from 
state actors.  
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 For the labor activists who promoted it most ardently, contentious collective bargaining 
in China would empower workers with a sense of their collective power, build their organizing 
and leadership capacities, and put workers on an equal playing field with capital when settling a 
dispute. In order to spread collective bargaining as a method for dispute resolution among 
workers, these labor NGOs would suggest the practice to workers who came to them for 
assistance, often requiring workers to attempt collective bargaining in order to secure NGO 
services. Sometimes, labor activists would hear of an ongoing strike or labor dispute and initiate 
introductions, attempting to gain workers’ trust in order to make recommendations and convince 
workers to use collective bargaining.  
 When persuading workers to use collective bargaining, activists extolled the advantages 
of bargaining, particularly in contrast to legal action. Where legal fees and court processes were 
costly and inefficient, collective bargaining harnessed workers’ existing resources as it required 
them to select representatives among themselves or pool money to support the efforts of their 
leaders. And rather than depend on a rigged court system, collective bargaining allowed workers 
to drive resolution processes. Most of all, activists emphasized workers’ solidarity as a key to 
their success and heralded collective power as investing workers with a measure of parity with 
management where the legal system would not. 
 Workers I spoke to during my fieldwork said that they had been unfamiliar with 
collective bargaining prior to their own experience with it and that, as far as they were 
concerned, most workers in China had no idea what collective bargaining was. It was labor 
activists who introduced this concept to them and guided them through bargaining with their 
companies. In the cases presented here, using collective bargaining was not something workers 
were particularly interested in at the outset. And even among the labor disputes in which workers 
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did agree to organize collectively and were able to successfully bargain for their demands, 
retrospective interviews made clear that many workers were primarily interested in achieving 
their demands and measured their success by their ability to find recourse for their grievances 
rather than by the actual engagement with collective bargaining itself. For workers, collective 
bargaining was simply another means to make their demands known and hopefully to find 
recourse for their grievances. 
 For local government agents, preventing and resolving collective insurgences is directly 
tied to their political interests; indeed, their performance reviews and potential to move up the 
ladders of government are informed by their ability to fulfill the central government’s mandate to 
maintain social stability (Chan & Selden, 2014; Chen 2012). Collective bargaining thus became 
a tool that could be added to the state’s repertoire of conciliation—a means to quell workers’ 
insurgencies, resolve disputes, and compel companies to take up some of the procedural and 
financial burdens, all while avoiding costly legal procedures and even reducing the 
administrative burdens incurred when officials involve themselves in settling workers’ 
grievances. 
 While the advocacy of labor NGOs and their guidance to workers was clearly important, 
and while workers own agreement to unify, organize, and maintain solidarity was fundamental, 
state intervention in compelling companies to participate and its facilitation of the actual 
collective-bargaining processes is what allowed the implementation of bargaining at all. 
Understanding these particular actors’ perspectives on collective bargaining and when they were 
willing to support it is thus key to understanding how collective bargaining was implemented.  
 Studies on elite patronage of social movements make it clear that maintaining current 
power structures and their own political interests motivates elite support of movement 
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organizations, and the findings in this chapter certainly exemplify this general phenomenon. 
Union officials, the potential elite allies whose support was necessary for the implementation of 
collective bargaining, would only intervene to assist workers when they perceived collective 
bargaining as being able to peaceably settle disputes. They did not regard collective bargaining 
as a means to expand workers’ rights. Quite the opposite. Collective bargaining’s utility lay in 
preventing or minimizing disruptive action. Even though workers’ frustrations with the inability 
to achieve adequate economic security or to move through existing institutional channels for 
recourse often led to strike action, collective bargaining was not meant to resolve any of these 
underlying problems but merely to treat the symptom of strikes itself.  
 Because collective bargaining was a non-institutional activity with merely tangential 
approval from the central and provincial governments, union officials and labor bureaucrats were 
able to exercise their own discretion about whether to support it or not. As both the Elegance 
Company and Golden Company labor disputes show, the legality of workers’ claims figured 
prominently in state actors’ decisions and willingness to support them in bargaining. Again, 
collective bargaining was not meant to be a stepping-stone to legal reforms or laws that would 
more substantively support workers’ collective interests. Rather, for state agents, it was only 
useful insofar as it could maintain the laws that were currently in place. 
   
Conclusion 
 There is an undeniable arch in the chronology of these cases and the levels of state 
support. Including the case of the first set of workers to use collective bargaining, we find that 
state response cycled from reluctant support to responsive support, promotion, back to reluctant 
support, and finally to refusal. Because these labor disputes happened in such close regional 
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proximity to one other, it is likely that state agents were aware of these disputes, even if they 
were not directly involved or were located in a different city. State agents very likely used 
lessons learned from one case to inform their decisions in the next. 
 To the extent that the collective bargaining may have been useful for preventing 
disruptive action and maintaining legal standards, local authorities were willing to extend their 
hand in support. But when advocates sought to use collective bargaining to provide substantive 
change for workers’ interests and move beyond current legal minimums, they met a retrenchment 
in state support of the practice. This pattern in state support for collective bargaining not only 
played itself out in the three cases examined here but also echoes in the failure to pass 
regulations institutionalizing collective negotiations. These regulations would have represented 
significant progress toward collective labor rights. This failure, however, is not simply an 
indication of capital’s power, as the ACFTU official would have it, but also a result of the state’s 
understanding of the purposes of collective negotiations. Collective negotiations were not meant 
to serve workers’ collective interests but to provide another state-controlled venue to set 
collective labor contracts and, in doing so, to potentially reduce labor insurgencies, which have 
steadily increased since 2008 (Elfstrom & Kuruvilla, 2014).  
 That the state buckled under pressure from capital, modifying the original draft 
regulations to a toothless version that would do nothing to set workers on a more equal playing 
field with capital, is telling. Rather than risk further dissent from capital, the provincial 
government opted to withdraw its support and maintain the current structures of power, even 
while this system of labor relations has created the conditions for much of the labor unrest it 
















Despite encouraging signs of collective bargaining’s potential—its active promotion by 
NGOs, the willingness among Chinese workers to engage in its practice, and its occasional 
support by state actors—collective bargaining has failed to bring greater social, economic, or 
political benefits to workers. Why did collective bargaining fail to work as a tool for expanding 
workers’ rights? I argue that China’s corporatist system has allowed the state to sideline and 
contain radical proponents of collective bargaining and to neuter collective bargaining as a 
repertoire of contention. I refer to these collective maneuverings by the state as a 
“representational fix,” which I define as “the state’s structuring of institutional entities in order to 
effectively dismantle collective action and disempower social movement actors during instances 
of dispute and conflict.”  
 This chapter’s primary contribution is its specification of the two modalities of the 
representational fix: 1) the official Chinese trade union’s monopolization of the space for labor 
representation and, relatedly, 2) the weak position of civil-society organizations such as labor 
NGOs. The weak social position of labor NGOs hampers the ability of such organizations to 
	 122 
engage with workers and renders them vulnerable to the ire of local state actors, who regard 
NGOs as representing a threat to their governing authority.  
The chapter here draws heavily from a forthcoming, co-authored paper with Mary 
Gallagher that asks why no labor movement in China has occurred; in addition to highlighting 
the representational fix, that paper also points to workers’ fragmentation through legal processes. 
In this paper, I focus on the role of the representational fix alone because it is most directly 
related to the undermining of the labor NGOs who promoted contentious collective bargaining 
among workers.  
The term “representational fix” borrows from the work of Beverly Silver’s (2003) 
“capital fixes,” the ability of capital to implement spatial, organizational, and production fixes in 
order to curb the bargaining power of workers. While recognizing that capital in China has 
readily used such fixes against workers, I argue that the state-driven representational fix also 
operates to curb workers’ organized, collective action and prevent the diffusion of contentious 
collective bargaining.  
To be sure, I do not claim that the state’s maneuverings were the only factor preventing 
collective bargaining’s spread; neither am I able to claim that it is the most salient. Indeed, other 
crucial factors are also at play in determining the viability of such movement-esque activities, 
including historical legacies configuring the political structure and the potential for bottom-up 
movements (Tilly, 2006; Tocqueville, 1955); the development (or lack thereof) of a necessary 
class consciousness (Lee, 2007; Thompson, 1966); and ongoing capital fixes that continue to 
curtail labor power (Chan et al., 2013; Ngai & Chan 2012).  
Nevertheless, I argue that the representational fix is an important causal piece explaining 
the failure of collective bargaining to meet its potential as a tool for expanding collective labor 
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rights for Chinese workers. Like ambiguous political opportunities, the representational fix is 
largely state-driven. Just as the confluence of opportunities and constraints gave way to workers’ 
willingness to try collective bargaining, contradictions within the state-built organizational 
infrastructure in China contributed to contentious collective bargaining’s undoing.   
 
Literature Review 
 Much of the literature and political process theory of social movements give causal 
primacy to the political opportunity structure when explaining the occurrence of social 
movements (McAdam, 1982; Snow et al., 1998; Tarrow, 1994; Tocqueville, 1955). Additionally, 
resources are needed to build and enhance movement actors’ capacities. Frames deployed by a 
movement campaign are critical for galvanizing support and lending legitimacy (Snow et al., 
1986). 
 The law constitutes a potent political opportunity and also serves as a resonant 
framework through which claimants can articulate their grievances (Gallagher, 2004; McAdam, 
1996, 1983; McCann, 1994; Scheingold, [1974] 2004; Silbey, 1998). Studies have shown how 
the implementation of laws has transformed entire fields (Dobbin, 2009; Pedriana & Stryker, 
2004;) and spurred movement activity with far-reaching outcomes (Eskridge, 2001; McAdam, 
1983; McCann, 2006; Pedriana, 2004). As a motivating framework, the law can embolden 
constituents to take action through legal mobilization or other forms of protest (Edelman & 
Suchman, 1997; Ewick, 1998; Lee, 2007; O’Brien & Li, 2006). The language of law and rights is 
used to galvanize solidarity, motivate action, and sometimes win support (Pedriana, 2006; 
Scheingold [1974] 2004; Stryker, 2007; Vanhala, 2012). 
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 In China, the codification of strong legal provisions in favor of workers’ interests has 
signaled the state’s general support of pro-labor policies. The 2008 National Labor Contract Law 
in particular was hailed as improving the lives of the most vulnerable group—migrant workers 
from rural China (H. Wang et al., 2009; Zhao, 2009)—through its mandate that firms and 
employees sign labor contracts. And not only has the state broadly disseminated information 
about labor rights, it has also encouraged workers to use arbitration or mediation in the face of 
workplace violations. Workers have certainly grown in their legal knowledge, using the law to 
frame their grievances (Lee, 2007) and the court systems to find recourse. More recently, draft 
regulations and guides promoting collective negotiation in 2010 signaled the state’s openness to 
these non-legal, more collective methods for labor and capital. These signals created the political 
opportunity for workers to articulate collective interests and confront management as a more 
powerful, unified group. They constituted essential building blocks that could create the pathway 
toward more substantive reform.  
 Whereas the state, through signaling and regulatory devices, provides political 
opportunities and a powerful frame, non-state organizations provide the necessary resources to 
mobilize the aggrieved. Though their operations and capacities may be attenuated by the broader 
political structure (Almeida, 2003), organizations are vital for steering and sustaining movement 
activities (Cress & Snow, 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). They recruit, communicate, connect, 
and coordinate movement participants. At the upper echelons of activity, they may set the 
broader strategic course of a social movement; they may articulate—or even determine—the 
framing of grievances and goals of a movement itself (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004). Insofar as we 
understand social movements as collective action using non-institutionalized methods to realize 
the expansion of a group’s political rights, organizations do the work of delineating a 
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movement’s goals and specific courses of action. Such organizing makes social movements 
purposive action rather than mere behavior.  
 Strictly nongovernmental labor organizations that operate as movement-esque 
organizations do exist in China (C. Chan, 2013; Cheng, Ngok, & Zhuang 2010; Gransow & Zhu, 
2014; He & Huang, 2014). Though scattered across multiple provinces, most labor NGOs are 
concentrated in the southern province of Guangdong. Many of these labor NGOs take a non-
confrontational position in their work, portraying their activities as both aligning with state 
policies and meeting workers’ needs (Howell 2015; Spires 2011). But a subset of these labor 
NGOs attempts to engage in rights expansion for workers, advocating for worker-led collective 
bargaining as a means to expand workers rights and taking a critical stance toward the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and the state. These advocacy organizations closely 
approximate the organizational support structure necessary for a movement (Epp, 1998), moving 
beyond symbiotic activities that are carefully structured to align with state policies (Spires, 2011) 
in their advocacy for the expansion of workers rights. 
 With political opportunities that enabled collective bargaining and movement-esque labor 
NGOs that promoted its practice and guided workers through it, why did collective bargaining 
fail to become a viable tool for expanding Chinese workers’ collective rights? I argue that the 
Chinese state was able to deploy a representational fix to prevent collective bargaining from 
mainstreaming among workers. The representational fix entails the ACFTU’s representational 
monopoly on the one hand and the marginalization of labor NGOs on the other. These are, in 
fact, two closely related aspects in the structuring of organizations in China, but I make an 
analytical distinction between them in this chapter.   
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 The ACFTU has been able to use its representative monopoly in the midst of contentious 
action to create pathways back to institutional legal channels, fragmenting workers and 
forestalling attempts for rights expansion.  As well, state agents like the ACFTU or the labor 
bureau steer workers away from collective bargaining and prevent them from interacting with 
labor NGOs. 
 As well, regulations for labor NGOs marginalize these organizations, making them all the 
more vulnerable to the state’s repressive measures. The weak institutional position of these 
organizations allows the state to target labor activists. Even more, workers themselves are less 
inclined to partner with labor NGOs and regard these organizations with some uncertainty. 
 The representational fix limited collective bargaining’s reach and sent its more radical 
proponents into retreat. Although the Chinese authoritarian state does take repressive measures, 
repression is not ad hoc nor at the total discretion of enforcement agents. Indeed, repression is 
doled out in quite predictable fashion. Importantly, the state does not directly repress workers’ 
who express an interest in using collective bargaining. Rather, by empowering the ACFTU with 
representational monopoly and marginalizing labor NGOs, the state was able to take a more 
indirect approach to the neutering of collective bargaining. 
 This chapter presents two labor disputes that unfolded in 2014 in Guangdong Province. In 
both cases, workers were able to connect with labor activists promoting collective bargaining and 
were amenable to using the practice to find recourse for their grievances. But in both cases, 
collective bargaining fell to the wayside, made untenable via the representational fix that 
incapacitated these labor activists and turned workers toward state-controlled measures for 
resolving disputes.  
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 In order to provide more context for the broader institutional setting that enables the 
representational fix, I turn now to a brief discussion of the corporatist relationship between the 
state and the official trade union, as well as the regulation of civil society in China.  
 
 Incapacitated Resources: The ACFTU and Regulation of Civil Society  
The ACFTU: A One-Way Transmission  
 As the official trade union, the ACFTU should ostensibly serve as the go-to 
organizational entity for workers to find support and representation. However, the corporatist 
relationship—in which non-state organizations operate under the control of the state and in 
alignment with state policy—incapacitates the potential for the union to advocate for workers’ 
interests. Indeed, as a de facto state agency tasked with meeting party goals, the ACFTU is 
understood by workers and labor scholars alike to represent state interests more than labor 
interests (Friedman, 2014a). It operates in coordination with and under the command of the 
Chinese Communist Party state, staying in line with state policies and goals (A. Chan, 1993; 
Panitch, 1980). 
 Rather than a representative of workers’ interests alone, the union in China is 
conceptualized as a “two-way conduit between the party center and the workers. The ACFTU is 
assigned two functions: by top-down transmission, mobilization of workers for labor production 
on behalf of the nation’s collective good; and by bottom-up transmission, protection of workers 
rights and interest” (A. Chan, 1993, p. 36). However, in practice, transmission is typically 
unidirectional, with the party-state interests and goals sent down but little to none of workers’ 
concerns or interests making their way up. Scholars have argued that the state uses the ACFTU 
to prevent “horizontal linkages” among workers, pointing out that “workers in a communist 
	 128 
party-state are not allowed to establish horizontal linkages freely. Their functional interests are to 
be channeled through the official trade union” (A. Chan, 1993, p. 36).  
 And in keeping with general policy to prevent collective gatherings outside of strict state 
control (King et al., 2013), the ACFTU eschews strike action or any kind of disruptive activity 
that might undermine social stability. Nevertheless, the ACFTU remains the only 
institutionalized support structure available to workers. This contradiction—of neither wholly 
representing workers’ interests yet also enjoying representative monopoly over workers’ 
interests—is at the heart of the representational fix.  
 The first case discussed in this chapter showcases how the ACFTU’s monopolization of 
labor representation allows the union to steer workers toward the legal system and away from 
collective bargaining. In this case, workers were taken under the wing of the ACFTU but only on 
the condition that they disavow connections to any labor NGO with which they had consulted 
earlier. In exchange for this, the union agreed to provide workers with a lawyer who would 
handle their case pro bono and represent workers in court. 
 
Regulation of Civil Society 
 The representative monopoly granted to the ACFTU requires that any other organization 
seeking to represent workers is regarded as a threat to the institutional order. Labor NGOs are 
certainly considered as such. And in response to these NGOs’ efforts to collaborate with 
workers, the ACFTU occasionally uses its standing as a politically connected, well-resourced 
organization to shunt these NGOs to the sidelines.  
 This aspect of the representational fix, however, is not simply a matter of preserving 
monopolistic representation for the ACFTU; it also keeps labor NGOs under strict control. From 
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the state’s perspective, such organizations may undermine the state’s authority, since they offer 
visions for an alternative structuring of power and social ordering. Early on, the Chinese 
Communist Party sought to constrain the proliferation of these organizations. The 1989 
Regulation on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations limits the number of 
social organizations that can legally register and requires sponsorship with a “professional 
supervisory unit”—a government agency for each organization (Wu & Chan, 2013). These 
regulations effectively limit the number of organizations that can attain legal status and stunt the 
development of a robust civil society. The few organizations that are able to gain legitimate legal 
status engage in innocuous activities that are non-threatening to the status quo (Grasnow & Zhu, 
2014); all the rest, regardless of what they may do, face a precarious existence as illegal entities 
subject to the local government’s mercy as to whether they will be allowed to operate or not.  
 In 2012, the Guangdong provincial government relinquished sponsorship requirements 
(Wu & Chan, 2013). However, despite this apparent loosening of the state’s restraints, NGOs do 
not appear to enjoy more freedom or flexibility. Instead, the state’s close supervision and control 
of NGOs—especially labor NGOs—persists. Scholars have noted that without a single state 
agent tasked with supervising and controlling social organizations, the duty falls to several 
different state agencies that deploy different methods to enforce regulations, with little 
coordination among them (Wu & Chan, 2013, Fu 2016). This has ironically allowed for a more 
effective regulation of NGOs as “control on the ground has become more diversified and thus 
responsive to the particulars of local conditions and the targeted NGOs” (Wu & Chan, 2013). 
Different agencies make their own interpretations of the central government’s mandate for social 
stability, acting in line with their own missions and interests as they deploy various enforcement 
methods to control NGOs. This “fragmented control” ultimately leads to a more uncertain 
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environment for labor NGOs (Fu, 2016). Labor NGOs in particular face soft repression in the 
form of surveillance and interrogation from the Public Security Bureau, and co-optation and 
encroachment from the ACFTU (Fu, 2016).  
 Altogether, these regulations and mechanisms for control marginalize labor NGOs and 
weaken their position with workers. Not only do labor NGOs face difficulties making in-roads 
with workers to promote collective bargaining, they are easily detained and kept from further 
contacting workers if local officials decide that their activities are undesirable. The second case 
discussed in this chapter highlights the ease with which the state is able to block labor activists 
from communicating with workers by constraining their interaction. And just as some workers 
appeared interested in organizing beyond strike action to engage in collective bargaining, the 
labor bureau moved to appease workers’ grievances with cash payouts, diffusing the mass 
insurgency and making collective bargaining irrelevant. 
 The ACFTU’s representational monopoly over workers’ interests and the marginalization 
of labor NGOs are two, interrelated strands constituting the representational fix that sent labor 
NGOs into retreat neutered collective bargaining as a repertoire of contention. The efficacy of 
the representational fix, its ability to return control to the state, stems from the contradictions that 
it is built on. As the official union, the ACFTU is the only entity given the institutional 
legitimacy to represent workers’ interests. At the same time, by design the ACFTU does not 
represent workers’ interests alone, but most balance those of capital and the state as well— often 
at the expense of workers’ interests.  
 The inability for the ACFTU to adequately represent workers has created an opportunity 
for labor NGOs to step in and provide dedicated support to labor. However, in doing so, these 
labor NGOs undermined ACFTU’s representative monopoly and encroached on the ACFTU’s 
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role as the arbiter of workers’ interests. Furthermore, because they were not beholden to state—
and took a confrontational stance toward local state actors and the ACFTU— these labor NGOs 
represented a direct threat to the current power structures. Once it was clear that the brand of 
collective bargaining they promoted could shake the current industrial relations of power, these 
NGOs would not be tolerated.  
 Just as the legal political structure built by the state created ambiguous political 
opportunities, the organizational infrastructure built by the state created the contradictions 
fueling the representational fix. And as the state moved to further marginalize and disenfranchise 
these NGOs, contentious collective bargaining fell by the way side, too. The two cases below 
show how the representational fix operated on the ground, in the midst of workers’ labor 
disputes, to steer workers away from labor NGOs and collective bargaining.  
 
Data and Methods 
The two cases discussed in this chapter were selected because in both of them, workers 
met with activists and lawyers promoting worker-led collective bargaining. Workers were either 
quite willing to take such collective action, or they attempted to do so but were barred from 
engaging in it. These cases thus represent instances in which diffusion processes for collective 
bargaining were initiated, but were followed by a failure to actually see the implementation of 
collective bargaining through. 
While the two cases share a similar outcome, they differ in the dimensions of ownership, 
locality, and claims. The first case features a multinational electronics corporation located in 
Shenzhen, which I call CompuTech, from which workers sought demands above the legal 
minimum in a dispute over settlement terms following a merger and acquisition. The second case 
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involves a Taiwanese-owned footwear manufacturing company located in Dongguan, which I 
refer to as ShoePro, from which workers sought their legal rights for social insurance. Workers at 
both companies were in contact with activists who encouraged them to use collective bargaining. 
And in both cases, collective bargaining fell to the wayside as the various state agencies 
intervened, broke connections between workers and activists, and rendered collective bargaining 
irrelevant or unfeasible for dispute resolution.  
Both disputes took place in 2014. Activists served as gatekeepers to my research and 
controlled whether I were allowed or denied introductions to the workers or other organizing 
activities. Data for the first case (CompuTech) was drawn from participant observation at 
meetings between workers and activists, at workers’ organizing efforts, and through discussions 
among activists themselves concerning the labor dispute. Serving as a research intern to 
participating activists allowed me access to these events and conversations. Due to the political 
sensitivity of the case, however, I was not able to secure interviews with the workers themselves.  
Data for the second case (ShoePro) was drawn from reports and conversations with 
activists who had been involved with workers. Again, I was not granted introductions to these 
workers due to the politically sensitive nature of the case. The information here is drawn 
primarily from an interview with an activist who was present at the strikes, connected with the 
workers online, and spoke with workers about using collective bargaining to resolve their issue.   
While this data is not without its limitations, I nevertheless contend that I have been able 
to tell the stories of these labor disputes and to capture the interplay among different social actors 
operating within a highly constrained legal-political structure. This data allows me to discuss 
how workers interacted with labor activists, how activists introduced collective bargaining to 
workers and advocated its practice, and the extent to which workers were willing to attempt 
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worker-led bargaining. Data from reports and media provide more background information and 
illuminate events that may not have been discussed explicitly during meetings I attended. 
Interview data from conversations with activists provided an insider’s account of activists’ 
motivations and allowed me to incorporate Chinese expert understandings of the political context 
and motivations of the workers and state actors involved. Though the details of each case cannot 
be generalized, I nevertheless believe the case studies selected for this chapter typify issues and 
phenomena that are common across the landscape of Chinese industrial relations.  
 
Case Studies: Representational Fixes in Action 
CompuTech Factory, Shenzhen 
The Communist Party’s control of the union has disabled the capacity of the union as a 
site for achieving substantive labor reforms. During labor disputes, workers seeking the union’s 
assistance find themselves quickly redirected to the legal system. The CompuTech labor dispute 
that unfolded in 2014 is a case in point. While the ACFTU withheld intervention in other cases, 
when it did intervene on behalf of CompuTech workers, it actively routed them to the courts. But 
for disputes over interests, as occurred in the CompuTech conflict, the legal system is almost 
sure to disappoint claimants, since it is able to satisfy only claims for legal minimums and not 
claims that rise above that threshold.  
 As other electronics firms have risen to become new leaders in the field, CompuTech has 
been in steady decline, as is documented in the 2013 and 2014 annual fiscal reports, which both 
show falling net income (Company Annual Reports 2014 and 2013). Recent public-media 
reports further detailed how the company’s business practices are becoming increasingly 
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unsustainable (Denning, 2014). Subsequently, the company has scaled down of many of its 
operations and moved away from manufacturing hardware. 
It is in this context that CompuTech slated one of its production facilities in Shenzhen for 
merger and acquisition in 2014. In early January, the company notified workers of the pending 
sale and offered them a choice of either taking a severance package or transferring as employees 
to the buying company “under the terms and conditions comparable in aggregate to what they are 
currently receiving” (WantChinaTimes, 2014). However, workers took umbrage at their 
exclusion from the drafting of settlement terms and with the vagaries of the claim that they 
would maintain wages and benefits “comparable in aggregate.” In response to what they 
considered dubious settlement terms, nearly 1,000 workers went on strike for approximately 
seven days in early March 2014. 
According to workers, company executives ignored their requests to meet with the 
company’s legal representation. Workers reported that the company also harassed them and their 
families, threatening punishment and dismissal if they continued striking. The company also 
installed cameras to monitor the site, cut off electricity and water, and hired men to intimidate 
strikers. After four days, management declared that it would arrange a bargaining session with 
workers, but no meetings took place between them and any lower-level production workers, let 
alone with the workers on strike (CaijingWang, 2014). 
After seven days, with the company refusing to budge, strikes eventually abated. 
However, two days after normal work duties had resumed, 20 workers who had been involved in 
strike activities received notices of termination from the company. It was at this point that 
workers contacted a local labor NGO cum labor-law firm to seek assistance, which I refer to as 
Shenzhen Law. In fact, the cause lawyer heading Shenzhen Law had attempted to offer his 
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services to workers earlier but had been refused. Now, upon their dismissal from the company, 
the 20 workers agreed to meet with the lawyer.   
CompuTech workers and activists met in a private room of a restaurant not far from the 
factory. The 20 workers, the cause lawyer and his assistant, and four other activists and 
researchers who had been allowed to observe shared lunch as workers debriefed the activists on 
their situation and concerns. The conversation captured common features of Chinese workers’ 
demands and how workers are—or are not—able to effectively organize and take action to 
achieve these demands. Said one,  
 
Negotiating is our first strategy. Finding a lawyer to provide legal aid is our 
second…[Let’s say] the company is willing to talk to us. How would we bargain 
with them, how would we be able to profit more from those talks? We really don’t 
have a strategy for this, we aren’t organized. So for this we need some guidance 
from you….Right now the issue that we’re facing is how to increase our gains. 
They fired us even though we were within our rights to protest, so now we want 
to know how we can benefit from this. (Fieldnote 20140311 121248)  
 
The worker was confident that the company violated what he considered to be the workers’ 
legitimate right to protest and voiced what most are concerned with: monetary compensation and 
a means to turn their grievance toward a financial benefit.  
But CompuTech workers were undecided about precisely what action to take; even 
among a relatively small group of 20, they did not perceive themselves as sharing much beyond 
their common predicament as dismissed workers. Said one, 
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There are 20 of us, but it is not the case that we’ve reached any kind of consensus. 
Some are willing to spend their time and money, some are not…If the company 
gives us reasonable terms, there will be some who will take it and there will be 
some who will continue to seek out other outside assistance to take care of their 
problems. (Field note 20140311 121248) 
 
Given their diverse interests, the group’s solidarity was tentative at best and their ties to the labor 
NGO weak.   
Nevertheless, labor activists sought to promote collective bargaining to them. The lawyer 
launched into an introduction of his firm and its focus on collective-labor disputes. He then 
recommended that CompuTech workers band together in organized, collective action, 
emphasizing the importance of their solidarity and collective strength in order to more 
effectively pressure the company to reinstate workers to their positions within the company. He 
said that they could proceed later with collective bargaining with the company and make their 
demands as reinstated employees. During their meeting, he told them, “Do you have two or three 
friends still working the company? I’m sure everyone here has at least two or three friends they 
can ask for support. Form a collective, with 1,000—even 500—workers united to pressure the 
company to give you back your jobs” (Field note 20140311 121248). If necessary, he would 
provide legal representation “without a penny’s cost” to them. But workers should first and 
foremost pressure the company collectively. 
At the time, several workers expressed doubt that the company could be pressured to 
rehire them, and one remarked on the unlikely prospect of rallying 1,000 other workers to their 
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cause. After all, only weeks earlier the company had been unmoved, despite the 1,000-odd 
workers striking and the considerable media attention that followed. Another worker rose to 
speak, laying out the terms for their involvement with the lawyer:  
 
First, we want a guarantee that we will not do anything illegal, we will not have a 
negative social or national impact, including any negative media reports. Second, 
we want to prevent someone from mucking things up. These are our main goals. 
We are not an organization, we are just an organized group of workers….I want to 
tell you something: Workers are afraid to bargain when they are in a closed 
environment. They are afraid that a representative will sell out, and they aren’t 
very trusting (Field note 20140311 121248). 
 
CompuTech workers openly regarded the lawyer and his methods with suspicion, and they 
approached collective bargaining with much caution.  
 Even so, after a 90-minute meeting with the cause lawyer during which they were further 
regaled with stories of other workers who had successfully pressured their companies into 
concessions, the CompuTech workers agreed to partner with the lawyer and follow his advice. 
Later that afternoon, they returned to the company grounds to collect signatures of support for 
their case, which they planned to take to the city union the next day per the cause lawyer’s 
recommendation. Splitting into groups of two and three and spreading themselves out along the 
factory gates to catch passersby, workers approached their colleagues for signatures, some 
calling after them to “Come sign!” (Field notes 20140311). 
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Workers collected 170 signatures. The next day, they requested the union’s help and 
support in pressuring the company for reinstatement. While the local government and union had 
earlier expressed very little interest in the case, allowing events to play out without intervention, 
the city union now agreed to step in and help workers.  
The union recommended that workers take their case to court and assigned them a lawyer 
to represent them in trial, pointedly steering workers toward legal action. In addition, as a 
condition for their receiving union assistance, workers were required to cut ties with the cause 
lawyer. Workers agreed, and after phoning the cause lawyer to relay the latest development and 
withdraw their request for his services. From what I could observe, the cause lawyer heard little 
from them afterwards. With the support of the city union, the dismissed workers submitted their 
case to arbitration, claiming wrongful dismissal and demanding compensation from the 
company. 
What accounts for this about-face in terms of the workers’ decisions? After all, workers 
had openly denigrated the prospect of legal action when they met with the cause lawyer and 
collected signatures. Now, however, not only did they eschew further contact with the cause 
lawyer, they also agreed to bring their case to court. Union officials offered the workers free 
legal representation, but then so had the cause lawyer. As such, concern about legal fees cannot 
account for the workers’ decision. Instead, it is more likely that the union’s privileged position as 
an institutionalized entity offered a sense of legitimacy for CompuTech workers and their case. 
 Because I was unable to gain access to CompuTech workers after they had agreed to 
work with the ACFTU, I am unable to provide workers’ rationale in their own words. 
Nevertheless, workers’ decision to cut ties with the labor NGO and to work with the official 
union made sense given that the state gives the ACFTU alone institutional legitimacy as the 
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representational entity for labor. Indeed, even while workers in China by and large recognize the 
failings of the union to provide substantive representation and benefits, they are nevertheless 
cognizant of its power as a de facto agent of the state. Furthermore, in this particular instance, the 
union was indeed offering the workers assistance through the provision of a lawyer to take their 
case. 
In contrast to the ACFTU, the cause lawyer and his firm represented an unknown entity, 
one the workers had discounted until it seemed they had no other choice. Compared to the 
unproven tactic suggested by the cause lawyer to harness workers’ collective power to pressure 
the company for reinstatement of their jobs, partnership with the union would situate workers 
within the more familiar territory of a state-sanctioned legal action for compensation at the legal 
minimum. Workers themselves agreed to shunt labor NGOs to the sidelines. 
Even though workers preferred working with the ACFTU over a partnership with a 
relatively unknown labor NGO, in the end, the ACFTU did little for them, and in court, workers 
were given no extra advantage. Ultimately, their case ended unsuccessfully, with the court ruling 
in favor of the company. This ruling confirms the findings of other studies that courts often 
protect management decisions to fire workers who have gone on strike and that, on the whole, 
courts rarely probe the details of a labor dispute or company procedures (Wang & Estlund, n.d.). 
The union’s intervention and their monopolization of representation allowed it to reroute 
workers back to the courts, where they were unlikely to be successful in claims that exceeded the 
legal minimums. The failings of the legal system to adequately protect labor is captured in the 
absence of clear legislation for strike action, which allowed capital to engage in retaliatory 
termination of workers without reprisal. As well, the monopolization of representation and 
marginalization of labor NGOs are, in this case, two sides of the same coin preventing movement 
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action. The ACFTU’s support was contingent on workers’ cutting contact with the Shenzhen 
Law—effectively marginalizing this NGO. Once under ACFTU auspices, workers were 
demobilized through court procedures. 
 The CompuTech case shows how the union continues to direct workers toward legal 
action, reifying the court system as the preferred method of dispute resolution. The redirecting of 
workers’ energies back into the legal system constitutes a key feedback mechanism embedded in 
China’s political structure that disables the potential for labor movements and limited the spread 
of collective bargaining. The figure below illustrates how the pathway from collective bargaining 
back to the legal system unfolds. When embroiled in a labor dispute, most workers are inclined 
at the outset to take legal action. In some cases, however, we find workers mobilizing 
collectively; a limited number of such cases may find their way to labor NGOs. However, with 
little capacity or leverage to influence dispute outcomes themselves, labor NGOs then encourage 
workers to appeal to the city-level or provincial-level ACFTU for assistance. While there were 
instances in which the ACFTU helped facilitate collective bargaining in the past, more recently, 




















Figure 1: Pathways to Legal Action in the Representational Fix (From Chen and Gallagher article in review ) 
 
Thus, the union’s representational monopoly has allowed a pathway to form that takes mobilized 
workers back to the courts, where they are subject to the atomizing effects of court procedures. 
This feedback mechanism traps workers in a cycle that necessarily precludes collective 
bargaining, even when workers are initially united as a group, are involved in collective action 
together, and are willing to engage in rights-expanding activities such as contentious collective 
bargaining. 
 
ShoePro Factory, Dongguan  
In addition to illustrating how the union monopolizes worker representation and steers 
workers toward the courts, the union’s condition that workers should cut ties with the cause 
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lawyer illustrates two additional and important points. First, it underlines the adversarial 
relationship between the state (or in this case, the ACFTU as an agent of the state) and the set of 
labor organizations that advocate collective bargaining. Rather than operating in “contingent 
symbiosis” with the state (Spires, 2011), these particular labor organizations are seen as working 
against state policies and goals.  
Second, as discussed above, the state continues to construct a hostile environment for 
labor-advocacy organizations in China. To the extent that these labor organizations constitute an 
important element within the resource structure necessary for workers, their marginalization 
limits the extent to which an additional (or alternative) pool of information, tactical knowledge, 
and network of human resources is available to workers. Insofar as contentious collective 
bargaining is concerned, the continued repression of activists and the barring of workers’ access 
to labor NGOs has halted the use of collective bargaining as a means to expand labor rights..  
The ShoePro Factory strikes illustrate clearly how the direct repression of labor NGOs 
limited their ability to promote collective bargaining. Beginning in early April 2014, the strikes 
at the Dongguan ShoePro shoe factory garnered international media attention as one of the 
largest incidents of labor unrest in China in recent years. A Taiwanese-owned factory established 
in 1999 in Dongguan’s Gaobu district, ShoePro manufactures shoes for global brands such as 
Nike and Adidas. The 2014 strikes erupted on April 14 over the company’s failure to make the 
appropriate payments into workers’ social insurance accounts and because employment contracts 
that had not been written “according to standard” (Nanzao Chinese Web, 2014). Indeed, the local 
insurance bureau found that ShoePro had been making payments for all its workers according to 
rates meant for temporary hires only; these lower rates were applied even to workers who been 
working for over 10 years or had been serving as regularly contracted workers. Additionally, the 
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company had not paid the required subsidies for workers’ housing expenses. With nearly 60,000 
workers employed at the factory, a mid-level manager estimated that the company owed “as 
much as one billion yuan” (over $160 million US) (China Labour Bulletin, 2014b). When 
workers brought their grievances to company management, the company agreed to provide 
workers with new contracts starting May 1 but refused to pay the arrears for social insurance and 
housing subsidies. 
 Disputes over social insurance have been growing in recent years in the PRC, indicating 
that ShoePro was not alone in giving short shrift to their employees’ insurance funds. Such cost-
cutting measures were enabled by collusive relationships between capital and local authorities. 
Compared to the CompuTech case, in which workers did not have a particularly strong legal 
case, ShoePro workers had much more straightforward legal claims and clear legal rights to their 
social insurance and housing subsidies. Protests erupted across the factory on April 14, 2014. 
Headcounts of participants vary, with some reports ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 workers 
(Nanzao Chinese Web, 2014; China Labour Bulletin, 2014b). 
Strikes continued over the next few days, during which workers were contacted by a local 
grassroots NGO located in a nearby city, hereinafter referred to as the Labor Service Center. The 
Labor Service Center encourages workers to organize collectively and to demand collective 
bargaining, and on occasion, even advises workers about strike activity. Since they move in the 
same close-knit circle of collective bargaining advocates, the activists at the Labor Service 
Center were well acquainted with Shenzhen Law and the lawyer involved in the CompuTech 
case discussed above. While they are distinct organizational entities, the Labor Service Center 
has referred cases in need of legal representation Shenzhen Law. As well, both organizations 
share the same funding source from an international labor organization dedicated to promoting 
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collective bargaining in China. However, unlike the law firm and the lawyer that were discussed 
in the prior cases, the Labor Service Center, whose staff members have much less in the way of 
clout or connections, is a much more vulnerable grassroots organization. Because of this, they 
are more likely to be subject to the state’s heavy-handed control and outright repression. 
Soon after the April 14 strikes, the Labor Service Center contacted workers in an attempt 
to offer support and advice. However, such direct contact with workers resulted in almost 
immediate punishment as authorities made clear that activists’ involvement with workers would 
not be tolerated. On April 15, after traveling to Dongguan to meet with workers at the factory, 
Labor Service Center staff were immediately taken into custody and detained. The same day, 
officials from Dongguan arrived at the Labor Service Center office and directly informed the 
NGO’s head that they should quit their involvement in the ShoePro case. After replying to 
authorities that they were within their legal rights, the Labor Service Center received a request 
from their landlord asking them to vacate as soon as possible (WeChat Report 20140415 02112). 
Such intimidation and material deprivation via eviction are common measures used to 
incapacitate labor NGOs.  
Despite this early confrontation, Labor Service Center activists maintained contact with 
ShoePro workers. Avoiding onsite meetings, they instead connected with workers through a 
publicly available and widely used Chinese messaging platform (QQ), where workers had forged 
social groups to facilitate communications early on. In these early stages of contact, Labor 
Service Center activists primarily sought to gain workers’ trust, even though the activists were 
unable to meet with workers directly. Recounting how they had made their initial introductions 
online, a Labor Service Center staff member who had been involved in these activities (whom 
we refer to as “L”), described some of the difficulties in making connections with workers:   
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There really was very little organization among the workers. During the strikes, small 
groups form within the larger mass of workers. Often, within each group there is what we 
call the “head”.…Sometimes it can be hard to know whether there is even a head at all. 
For us, the main task was to figure out who the person of influence was, and try to get in 
touch with that person. (Interview 20140530 132506)  
 
What is implied but left unspoken here is the activists’ difficulty in gaining enough trust 
so that the “head,” the de facto leader of a workers’ clique, reveals him- or herself. Often, among 
a group of workers, no decision or action—especially one concerning collaboration with an 
outsider—can be made without the approval of the head. And in order to provide protection to 
the head, a set of workers may communicate and meet with activists while the leader remains 
hidden. General distrust and wariness toward labor activists and NGOs is not uncommon. As the 
state continues to shunt NGOs to the periphery of labor relations, these organizations face an 
uphill battle in terms of making necessary reputational gains to broaden their reach among 
workers.  
Eventually, L (the Labor Service Center activist) was able to make enough progress to 
arrange a dinner meeting on April 21, a week after the April 14 strikes, with nine workers who 
appeared open to taking more organized action (specifically, by electing representatives and 
establishing themselves as a formal group to attempt collective bargaining). However, whatever 
success may have come from this was short-lived.  
According to L, “The next day [after meeting with the workers] I was arrested. The day 
after that, everybody [the ShoePro workers] went back to work. The company agreed to pay 
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workers’ social insurance arrears and housing subsidies”(Interview 20140530 132506). In fact, 
both L and the head of the Labor Service Center were arrested. While the latter was released 
within two days, L spent thirty days in detention (China Labour Bulletin, 2014a). Workers’ 
interest in collective bargaining faded.  
In capitulating to the workers’ demands, both management and local authorities assured 
workers that they would receive their social insurance arrears (China Labour Bulletin, 2014a). 
Additionally, the company threatened to dismiss workers for absenteeism if they were to 
continue strikes past three working days (WeChat Report 20140415 02112). Thus, while workers 
expressed doubt as to whether the company would uphold its promise to pay arrears, there was 
little justification to continue with protests. Strikes subsided, and in less than two weeks, they 
came to an end.  
The barring of the Labor Service Center from involvement with ShoePro workers 
indicated the state’s intolerance for labor NGOs involving themselves in labor disputes to 
promote collective bargaining. Furthermore, because the collective bargaining that activists 
promote would ideally make dispute resolution strictly between labor and capital and potentially 
allow workers to demand and achieve claims beyond the legal minimum, the practice found little 
support among state authorities. As the ShoePro case shows, the state seeks to stamp out any 
potential for such action and to disable the activists who may encourage workers toward it. 
 
Discussion 
 Social movement theory makes clear that organizations and the resources they bring are 
critical to both the inception and success of movements (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; 
Wang & Soule, 2012; Zald & McCarthy, 2002). While the activities of labor NGOs and the 
	 147 
attempts of workers to use collective bargaining cannot strictly be classified as a social 
movement per se, activists regarded their advocacy and workers’ organizing efforts as building 
blocks toward developing more substantively mobilized workers who could press for reforms to 
expand labor rights. Given the officials’ reaction to these labor NGOs and their limited support 
for collective bargaining, the state also appeared to recognize the potential of organizations and 
collective bargaining to galvanize workers toward taking contentious collective action.  
 The labor disputes discussed in this chapter show how the representational fix is able to 
effectively neutralize workers’ collective mobilization and block the development of sustained 
and organized movement activity. The CompuTech case highlights how the ACFTU used its 
representational monopoly to steer workers away from collective bargaining and the labor NGOs 
that promoted it. The ShoePro case highlighted how the state used the outright repression of 
labor activists and NGOs to prevent workers from connecting with these more “subversive” 
actors. But even prior to activists’ arrest, the majority of workers did not appear particularly 
willing to follow activists’ advice, and those open to collective bargaining were few.  
   
 This chapter details how the state deployed the representational fix to prevent the use of 
collective bargaining as a tool to expand labor rights. It shows how the repression of activists is 
but one aspect of this representational fix and is not, in fact, doled out in an arbitrary or ad hoc 
manner. Rather, repression of labor NGOs conforms with the structuring of organizations in 
China that grants institutional legitimacy to a limited few while situating the rest as legally 
ambiguous or plainly unauthorized in their activities. Harassment and detainment of labor 
activists is not simply the heavy hand of authoritarianism against which these weak actors of 
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have little recourse; it is legitimized enforcement of the organizational structure by state 
authorities.  
The findings here extend movement literature by specifying how the structuring of 
organizational entities within an authoritarian regime is able to choke rights-expanding 
repertoires of contention. In addition to the use of repressive measures, a contradictory 
organizational infrastructure built by the state led workers away from NGOs and contentious 
collective bargaining. As these cases show, it was not for lack of opportunities or resources, nor 
is it simply fragmentation by economic conditions (Lee, 2007) or capital fixes (Ngai & Chan, 
2012) or even a lack of consciousness alone that bars worker from organizing and claiming 
collective rights. Rather, the representational fix prevented workers from benefiting from the 
support of labor-advocacy groups and kept them from using collective bargaining. Even though 
resources and effective repertoires of contention were extant, because of the representational fix 
that incapacitated them, these were not practically viable for workers.  
This chapter also shows that while in many cases the state does directly intervene in labor 
conflict, the installation of procedural and organizational mechanisms fragmenting workers 
occasionally allows the state to take more indirect measures to suppress the potential for 
workers’ movements. In the CompuTech case, rather than directly confronting workers or 
refusing to respond to their claims, the feedback mechanism redirected workers back into the 
legal system, largely by their own choosing.  
I would be remiss in not addressing a looming limitation in this study: the unsubstantiated 
counterfactual to my argument. I am unable to verify that if prevailing conditions were 
different—if the ACFTU represented workers’ interests alone and civil-society organizations 
could operate more freely— contentious collective bargaining would have become a central 
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tactic for workers in China. Studies of countries that share China’s authoritarian legacy but have 
undergone transitions to democracy show that even with increased political access and 
organizational freedom, labor has not always found increased power (Caraway, Cook, & 
Crowley, 2015). On the whole, across many historically authoritarian, democratically 
transitioned countries, no single system has been able to consistently usher in the necessary 
constellation of political and economic features to override the historically trenchant institutions 
influencing labor outcomes (Caraway, Cook, & Crowley, 2015). In China, because the 
representational fix interacts with the atomizing legal structure and single-party system of 
governance, the counterfactual conditions must come in tandem with each other—a tall order for 
labor rights’ struggles.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter departs from optimistic conclusions by other studies on China’s labor 
relations that are hopeful for an expansion of labor rights in the future (Bradsher, 2010; Pringle 
2013). Such prognostications are not totally unfounded, as there is a robust body of scholarship 
that evidences multiple avenues to movement success. Some studies recognize that indigenous 
leadership and membership rooted in community networks have engineered movement success 
in the past (Jenkins, 1983). According to this logic, the main issue preventing the use of 
contentious collective bargaining articulated here—the representational fix that incapacitates the 
potential for labor NGOs to galvanize and support workers in collective bargaining—does not 
necessarily extinguish the possibility of workers deciding to use collective bargaining on their 
own accord, and perhaps construct their own uses for it. 
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However, since the state is able to combine the representational fix with placating 
measures to subdue workers’ insurgencies, as was seen in the ShoePro labor dispute, it is able to 
maintain the veneer of control even as strikes and protests continue (Lee and Zhang 2013). 
Furthermore, more recently, the ACFTU has sought to make collective bargaining its own. The 
state’s reach to take up the mantle of collective bargaining is seen clearly on its official website, 
which on its front page declares collective bargaining to be a “Paramount Priority,” details the 
“2014–2015 ACFTU Plan on Further Promoting Collective Bargaining,” and celebrates the 
establishment of the union’s first collective-bargaining office in Shanghai in early 2015. 
Collective bargaining is now within the purview of the union—and, by extension, no longer 
under the domain of labor NGOs. The ACFTU’s appropriation of collective bargaining indicates 
a concerted effort by the state to diminish labor NGOs’ stake in the practice, take control of its 
use, and neuter bargaining’s potential as means to expand workers rights.  
Meanwhile, the Chinese state has intensified its repressive measures against labor NGOs 
and activists. In December 2015, in one of its more intensive crackdowns on civil society in 
recent times (Libcom.org, 2015), the state moved to shut down labor NGOs in Guangzhou that 
were involved in collective bargaining. Authorities also arrested a prominent activist heading one 
of these organizations, detaining him for over eight months and launching a media campaign 
against the leader to vilify him as being morally and legally suspect. When I returned to the field 
in the summer of 2016, only two NGOs that had been part of the network of those promoting 
collective bargaining were still operating. Many of the activists who I had met and interviewed 
were no longer involved in promoting labor rights. L, who had met with the ShoePro workers, 
had already left Guangdong.  
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Shenzhen Law, which had been involved in CompuTech and ShoePro cases, had its own 
share of troubles. While the firm was still in operation, and though the lawyer continued to be 
involved in labor advocacy, much of his funding sources had been cut off, and he had been 
compelled to move to an office space half the size of his original quarters and to release his core 
staff so they could seek less politically risky means of employment.  
As one of his former staff members said to me over lunch, “NGOs are really only able to 
influence workers at 100 or so companies,” a drop in the bucket relative to the tens of thousands 
of companies and millions of workers in the region (Interview 20160614). But in as much as 
these organizations and their work plant the seeds for a labor movement, the maneuvering of the 
state to block and constrain them has made the expansion of labor rights through collective 
























The Story of Collective Bargaining’s Rise and Fall in Southern China 
In tracing the rise and fall of collective bargaining in China, this dissertation shows how spaces 
for contention open and close in a highly constrained political setting. The government’s 
endorsement of collective negotiations in 2009 and 2010 signaled a willingness to consider the 
collective interests of workers, at least for wage-setting. In tandem with the state’s promotion of 
collective negotiations, a network of labor NGOs began promoting collective bargaining to 
expand workers rights. Chinese labor NGOs promotion of collective bargaining was not simply 
another instance of civil society organizations aligning themselves with state policies and goals. 
Unlike other labor NGOs in China, these NGOs tended to take a more critical stance toward the 
state and sought to use collective bargaining to affect substantive labor reforms. Furthermore, the 
impetus for their promotion of collective bargaining came not from the Chinese state, but from 
an international labor organization. Nevertheless, the state’s signaling in support of collective 
negotiations permitted lower-level officials to give labor NGOs the space to promote a 
contentious collective bargaining. City and county officials did not move to immediately shut 
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down labor NGOs activities, and would eventually even offer to facilitate bargaining sessions 
between workers and management.  
 Thus, labor NGOs promoting contentious collective bargaining enjoyed a brief period in 
which they were able to advocate the practice with minimal interference from the state. But even 
with local state officials willing to tolerate NGOs, and NGOs actively seeking to spread 
collective bargaining in China, it remained to be seen whether workers themselves would be 
willing to organize and use collective bargaining during their labor disputes and whether 
companies would be willing participate.  
 Workers’ willingness to use collective bargaining was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. Given the state’s concerted push for legal avenues, using arbitration or litigation was 
certainly one of the more familiar means for seeking recourse. Strike action is also an available 
option to workers and carries its own risks and rewards. In contrast to either of these forms for 
redress, collective bargaining required much more collective organization; it also required a 
logistical know-how that workers, by their own account, were not familiar with.  
 In the end, workers willingness to take up collective bargaining was not a result of labor 
NGOs persuasive powers alone—although, this did play a role. When asked why they decided to 
engage in collective bargaining, some responded that there was nothing else they could do. 
However, this sentiment belies the political and economic environment that led to workers’ 
decision’s to try collective bargaining. By 2010, the Chinese economy was experiencing a 
painful fall; manufacturing companies across southern China were down-scaling their production 
to accommodate the economic realities of a slowing business environment. The measures that 
companies took in the face of their own failing profit margins— be it cuts to the labor force, 
restructuring of the wage system, or merger and acquisition— left workers in deeply precarious 
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situation. In all the cases discussed in this dissertation, the attempt to strengthen their financial 
security in a highly-insecure economic setting motivated workers to action. They sought to claim 
unpaid social insurance arrears, demand more overtime, or to resist uncertain futures as their 
companies underwent merger and acquisition. In almost all cases, either because they lacked 
evidentiary documents, faced bureaucratic blockading, or were terminated for taking strike 
action, workers found themselves facing a dead-end due to political arrangements that left them 
vulnerable and without good options.  
 In the cases discussed here, these were the circumstances that turned workers toward 
NGOs promoting collective bargaining for assistance. Initially, when they did so, they were not 
necessarily particularly interested in collective bargaining. Some that I spoke to told me that they 
were in fact hoping to receive legal aid. Labor NGOs were able to point to the legal weakness of 
workers claims, as well as the costs and inefficiencies associated with legal action, and present 
collective bargaining as an alternative means for action. As labor activists explained it, collective 
bargaining would draw on workers’ collective power to bring the results that litigation and 
corrupt local officials could not.  
 However, even while activists eschewed legal channels and state actors, and couched 
collective bargaining as worker-led, non-institutional action, workers were not able to 
independently engage in collective bargaining without the assistance of the state. Workers’ 
demands to meet with company management were simply refused. Because collective bargaining 
existed outside institutionalized spaces for dispute resolution, there was nothing compelling 
managers to participate. Even if workers deployed wildcat strikes, they could be easily fired and 
the prospect of collective bargaining rendered moot. It would take the intervention of local state 
actors to compel companies to participate in negotiations with workers.  
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 Local officials and state agents, be they officials of the labor bureau or the union, were 
themselves were not immediately inclined to offer workers their support. Among the first set of 
workers who attempted to use collective bargaining, local state actors were quite resistant to 
intervening and forcing companies to participate in negotiation sessions. While workers were 
eventually able to secure the assistance of a provincial union official, such assistance only came 
after many months of appeals. Once workers were able to garner the support of local officials 
and engage in bargaining sessions, they were able to win their demands. But it was only when 
state agents such as union or labor bureau officials stepped in to force companies to engage in 
bargaining that workers were able to undergo some semblance of the bargaining process with 
management.  
 When workers were able to use collective bargaining to find redress for their grievances, 
local labor NGOs were able to claim collective bargaining’s efficacy for meeting demands, and 
the state was able to avoid socially destabilizing disruption. Not long after the first attempt of 
workers to use collective bargaining, another dispute in the same county with workers making 
the same demands unfolded soon after. In this case, local union officials readily stepped in to 
assist workers upon request. Collective bargaining appeared to be gaining real traction, at least 
among the low-wage manufacturing workers in Guangzhou. When yet another labor dispute 
broke out, with workers striking over minimum wage payments, local officials (who were called 
to the scene by management) actively encouraged workers to use collective bargaining.  
 But local officials were not offering carte-blanch support for workers in collective 
bargaining. Indeed, state agents’ decision to intervene on workers’ behalf tended to hinge on 
both the legality of workers’ claims and the extent to which the use of collective bargaining 
could placate workers who might otherwise be inclined to use more disruptive methods to find 
	 156 
recourse. After the same set of workers successfully used collective bargaining to address 
minimum wage issues, they then turned to long-simmering grievances around overtime— or lack 
thereof— at the company. Local officials quickly rebuffed expectations that they would continue 
to facilitate collective bargaining. Since workers did not have a legal basis for their demands, 
local officials were much less inclined to support them. In response, workers made appeals up 
the regional chain of command. Eventually, the state grudgingly offered its support for workers, 
and only in order to avoid further escalation of workers’ appeals.  
 In contrast to earlier disputes, the benefits of collective bargaining in this case were much 
more clearly in favor of workers—and at the expense of the state. Workers were able to win 
demands that went beyond current legal standards. Labor NGOs could tout the case as another 
instance in which collective bargaining could be used to expand workers’ rights. But from the 
perspective of the state, their own advocacy of collective bargaining had the unintended 
consequence of encouraging workers to move outside legal parameters, continue factory strikes, 
and escalate their appeals upward along regional state hierarchy. Especially when under the 
influence of labor NGOs, collective bargaining did little to contain workers’ agitations or limit 
the escalation of their petitions. Instead, workers’ successful use of collective bargaining created 
more problems for the state. Subsequent labor disputes indicate a retrenchment of the state’s 
support and facilitation of collective bargaining. And without the support of local officials in 
facilitating bargaining for workers, the practice could not be implemented at all, let alone spread.  
 The state also moved to reign in local labor NGOs who promoted contentious collective 
bargaining. Where the state had initially tolerated labor activists in their efforts to promote 
collective bargaining, by 2014, their tolerance appeared to wane. Local law enforcement 
detained activists who sought to connect with workers in high-profile labor disputes, preventing 
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them from making inroads with these workers. In another case, when workers asked union 
officials for assistance with their labor dispute, union officials promised help on the condition 
that workers cut ties with a labor NGO the had encouraged them to use collective bargaining.  
 By barring labor NGOs’ access to workers, the state sought to reassert itself as the sole 
vanguard of workers’ interests— despite the fact that government officials openly admit equal (if 
not greater) dedication to capital’s interests. The installment of the official Chinese labor union 
as the only institutionally-legitimized representative for workers has long been recognized as a 
problematic, not least because the union officials are commonly known to side with companies 
during labor disputes, but also because the union as a whole has failed to adequately represent 
workers’ collective interests and advocate for substantive political reforms on workers’ behalf. 
Where the ACFTU failed, however, labor NGOs succeeded. They stepped in to represent 
workers’ interests and provide dedicated support to labor. The success of local labor NGOs in 
providing worker-centered support made these organizations a threat to the ACFTU and to the 
state’s own primacy in structuring industrial relations. Labor NGOs’ openly critical stance of the 
union, their eschewing of legal channels in favor of contentious collective action, and their 
encouraging of workers to go beyond legal minimums in their claims further undermined the 
structures of power that these institutions support.  
 In December 2015, state officials moved to dismantle the network of labor NGOs 
advocating collective bargaining, arresting a number of prominent activists and shuttering 
several organizations. During my fieldwork in 2014, as I sat in on various conferences, dinners, 
gatherings among NGOs, and collective bargaining training sessions, activists were exuberant in 
their assurance that collective bargaining would pave the way to labor reforms. But by the time I 
returned in the summer of 2016, the atmosphere had changed completely. Many activists had 
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already left the province. The labor law firm where I had interned had now moved into a much 
smaller space and had released core staff who had been involved in managing and promoting 
collective bargaining. While he was still able to keep his firm running, the cause lawyer heading 
the organization confided to me that he had been cut off from many of the revenue streams that 
allowed him engage in pro bono services for workers and promote collective bargaining. At the 
same time, he is now required to charge workers for his services, like any other law firm. This 
limits the cause lawyer’s reach among workers as some may be unable to make payments. And it 
also effectively shuts down the NGO-like operations of the firm. Whereas in previous years the 
office was often alive with lawyers, activists, students, and scholars, during my own two-month 
visit in 2016, it was often empty. The few paid lawyers who occasionally floated in did not stay 
long. The cause lawyer himself came in perhaps twice during my stay. Desks and the 
photocopier gathered dust, and boxes from the move remained unopened. Overall, the 
despondency was palpable.  
 While the cause worker is still active, the prospect of contentious collective bargaining 
continuing to spread throughout the province appears dim. So, too, does the potential for workers 
to use bargaining as a means to deploy organized collective action to demand substantive labor 
reforms. Even at the height of their activities, labor NGOs who promoted collective bargaining 
were only able to connect with workers on a case-by-case basis. Their reach among the millions 
of workers is quite limited. One activist told me that although his NGO occasionally provided 
public teaching sessions to introduce collective bargaining to larger numbers of workers, no 
workers who attended these sessions ended up using collective bargaining of their own volition. 
Rather, it was only when workers were involved in a labor dispute and if they were able to 
connect with a labor NGO that they might be persuaded to use collective bargaining. With so 
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few organizations and activists left to make inroads with workers, it is difficult to see how 
collective bargaining as a contentious, rights-expanding action will be able to diffuse across the 
industrial landscape as activists had originally hoped.  
 Even more, as the state cleared away labor NGOs and activists, the official union has 
moved in to make collective bargaining it’s own, claiming it “a new priority” for unions across 
the nation. By 2015, a special office dedicated to training negotiators to help company-level 
unions conduct collective bargaining was established in Shanghai. The Ningbo Municipal 
Federation of Trade Unions also published an article on its own steps to “refine the management 
of collective wage bargaining” (ACFTU 2015). And a municipal trade union in Sichuan has also 
proclaimed the efficacy of collective bargaining and its implementation of a fledgling collective 
bargaining system. All this indicates a national movement to appropriate collective bargaining 
and neuter its more contentious aspects. Once appropriated by the ACFTU, it is unlikely that the 




 In highlighting ambiguous political opportunities, this study shows how the presence of 
contravening factors in the political environment are an integral part of social movement 
processes. Contradictions in the political structure can influence the adoption of unfamiliar 
tactics, opening new possibilities for contention and rights expansions. At the same time, state-
driven contradictions in society’s organizational infrastructure can close these spaces for 
contention, keeping challengers in check and maintaining structures of power.  
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 Tracing the life course of collective bargaining in China also contributes to social-
movement theories by allowing this literature to better understand movement failure, detailing 
how legal and organizational institutions ensure regime resilience. The emergence of contentious 
collective bargaining was simply an interlude within a larger story of authoritarian reproduction. 
That contentious activities aiming to expand workers rights unfolded in an authoritarian regime 
is not, in the grand scheme of social movement studies, entirely significant or new. What is 
significant is that this contentious practice and its demise were brought on through contradictions 
in the political and organizational structures purposively engineered by the state — rather than 
repressive forces alone, as much of social movements literature has implied.  
 By harnessing social-movement frameworks, this dissertation brings studies on regime 
resilience into a broader conversation of social change and reproduction, revealing connections 
among phenomena across widely different contexts. The ambiguous political opportunities that 
Chinese workers faced are not unlike the ones that their counterparts in the US are subject to. 
Here in the US, despite having the legal right to unionize, many low-wage workers are reluctant 
to do so, in part because they fear retaliation from their companies. Worker organizations, like 
labor NGOs in China, operate in place of unions to help workers organize and demand better 
working conditions. Given the overwhelmingly pro-business political environment and the 
inability to take their case to court, workers have reported feeling— like those in China— that 
there is little else to do but to try new tactics when organizing amongst themselves. In the face of 
insurgency, elites in western, democratic countries are just as interested in maintaining the status 
quo as those in China. How elites in different political environments make their decisions and 
how this decision-making relates to the structure of power may change from context to context. 
But ultimately, the underlying dynamic of preserving elite interests and the institutions that serve 
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them remains consistent across time and place. Finally, the contradictory organizational 
infrastructure that marginalizes NGOs and makes the official union an agent of the state 
ultimately results in weak political power for Chinese workers. But workers in the US and UK 
do not enjoy particularly strong unions or labor parties, themselves. While there are important 
differences in the organizational arrangements and historical legacies of unions in the US and 
UK, their critics contend that early compromises left these organizations without teeth and 
complicit in the construction of profit-centered labor relations that continue to undermine 
workers today. Like Chinese workers, many of the most vulnerable workers in the US are, at 
turns, either unable or unwilling to unionize for their collective interests. And it is all too easy for 
capital in both China and the US to continue to leverage its own advantages against these 




 The limitations of this study primarily concern the data. This includes the heavy use of 
retrospective interviews and third-party media reports for cases that unfolded prior to my arrival 
to the field, and the lack of direct interviews with workers for cases that unfolded while there. 
Furthermore, while my interview with the retired union official and analysis of state-published 
documents allowed me to get a handle on the perspective of the state, the study would have 
benefited greatly from additional interviews with other state officials, such as bureaucrats in the 
labor bureau or union officials that were directly involved in each of the cases. Currently, my 
analysis on why state officials may have withheld support, or why they decided to intervene and 
provide legal aid, is based primarily on the publicly available and most obvious facts of a case—
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rather than on first-hand explanations from officials themselves. Finally, the perspective and 
voice of capital is missing from this account, and would have surely provided a richer and more 
complete picture of key actors who moved the course of events throughout each case.  
 Relatedly, some of the connections drawn between different elements of collective 
bargaining’s story are thin. I cannot show if union officials and labor bureau officials at the city 
or county level were even aware of the collective negotiation guides published by the Central 
and provincial governments, and cannot tell what their perspectives were on them. As well, this 
study implicitly links the success of the Golden Case— and the ability of workers in this case to 
use collective bargaining to achieve demands beyond legal standards— to later instances of state 
actors’ refusal to support workers’ attempts to use collective bargaining and its move to further 
marginalize associated labor NGOs. But there is now way of knowing the extent to which local 
officials in different cities were aware of this case or how much of an influence it had on the 
general retrenchment of the state’s tolerance for labor NGOs and collective bargaining.  
 Finally, this study’s claims could be stronger if all cases took place in the same city and 
county, and within companies that matched more closely in terms of sector, ownership, and 
grievances. It is possible that the granular details of these descriptive dimensions were influential 
to case outcomes. While it is true that all cases take place in the same province, and all firms 
were similar in terms of ownership and industry, controlling for the city, company headquarter 
locations, and sector would have allowed me to claim without a doubt that these were negligible 





Future Research Directions 
 Despite hopes for a transnational network of organized workers championing global labor 
rights to counter the increase in global corporate power, actual instances of workers forging links 
across national boundaries to claim their rights remain few. The scholarship on internationally-
oriented labor movements is fond of highlighting attention grabbing coalitions, such as WTO 
protests in Seattle in 1999, and tout the rise of transnational civil society. However, these 
accounts tend to feature activist organizations rather than workers. Tamara Kay’s 2005 piece in 
the American Journal of Sociology on the cross-national efforts between union workers in 
Mexico and the US to ameliorate the effects of the NAFTA agreements is a notable exception. 
However, beyond these more dramatic events, most labor contention actually involves highly 
localized efforts to confront labor exploitation through nationally-bound tactics. Indeed, labor 
rights advocacy has more recently taken a “local turn” as activists and scholars are now 
cognizant of the need to garner cooperation from local workers and strategically consider the 
constraints and opportunities of local institutions.   
 However, there are a limited number of cases where workers in China have reached out 
to foreign counterparts— other workers employed by the same transnational company but living 
in different countries— during a labor dispute. In these cases, workers in China aimed to forge 
an alliance with their international counterparts in the hopes they could pressure foreign 
headquarters who might then pressure local Chinese factories to acquiesce to their demands.  
One such case occurred in 2008 when a group of workers at an electronics company in northern 
China reached out to their Danish counterparts for support in a protracted labor dispute. Another 
2014 took place at a shoe manufacturing company (Gēshìbǐ 哥士比	Company)	 in southern 
China; in this case, workers sought out their English counterparts for support in the face of their 
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factory’s pending merger and acquisition. While rare, it is possible that additional cases of 
workers forging transnational linkage during labor disputes have occurred.  
 A future research agenda might ask when and why workers do workers decide to reach 
out to international counterparts? In what ways, if any, does doing so influence dispute 
outcomes? And to what extent might such action serve as a model for leveraging the global 
production processes that connect workers across different countries? Research in this direction 
would help us to understand how globalized supply chains contribute not only to the suppression 
of workers but can also spur collaboration and possibly enhance workers’ strength as they draw 
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